Vicki M. Smith v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2011-119 , Code
Sec(s) 6015.
VICKI M. SMITH, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent .
Case Information:
Code Sec(s):
6015
Docket: Docket
No. 25054-08.
Date Issued:
06/2/2011
Judge: Opinion by
CHIECHI
HEADNOTE
XX.
Reference(s): Code Sec. 6015
Syllabus
Official Tax Court Syllabus
Counsel
John W. Nelson, for petitioner.
Timothy S. Sinnott, for respondent.
Opinion by CHIECHI
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
Petitioner filed the petition in this case in response to a
so-called final appeals determination (notice of determination) concerning
petitioner's request for relief from joint and several liability under section 6015 1 for each of her taxable years
2003 and 2004. We must decide whether petitioner is entitled to relief under
that section for each of those years. We hold that she is to the extent stated
herein.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated and are
so found.
At the time she filed the petition in this case, petitioner
resided in Indiana.
Petitioner, who was born in 1961, received a bachelor of
science degree in business administration in 1983 from the University of
Evansville in Evansville, Indiana. During college, petitioner took courses in
accounting, marketing, statistics, finance, business administration, and
quantitative business analysis.
On May 26, 1984, petitioner married Michael Smith (Mr.
Smith). (We shall sometimes refer to petitioner and Mr. Smith as the Smiths.)
Mr. Smith, who was 49 years old at the time of the trial in this case, had
taken some college courses but had not received a college degree.
During their marriage, the Smiths maintained separate bank
accounts and deposited their respective earnings into their respective bank
accounts. From the time they married until around March 2007, Mr. Smith handled
the family's financial affairs, including signing any checks and paying
household bills.
As of the time of the trial in this case, neither petitioner
nor Mr. Smith had filed for divorce, and petitioner did not intend to file for
divorce. At no time during their marriage did Mr. Smith abuse petitioner.
The Smiths have a daughter and a son. At the time of the
trial in this case, the Smiths' daughter, who was 21 years old, was a full-time
student at a private university in Illinois, which was her primary residence.
The Smiths' daughter stayed with petitioner only during summers and other
school recesses. During college, the Smiths' daughter received certain
financial aid for her college education. In addition, at the time of the trial
in this case petitioner and her family were providing an unidentified amount of
support to the Smiths' daughter.
As of the time of the trial in this case, the Smiths' son,
who was 18 years old and residing with petitioner, was a senior at a private
high school in Indiana and intended to attend a private university in Ohio. At
that time, the Smiths' son was receiving certain financial aid for his high
school tuition, and petitioner was paying approximately $4,000 each school year
towards that tuition.
From around December 1986 until January or February 2005,
Mr. Smith worked as a patrol officer for the Indianapolis Police Department
(police department). During 2003 and 2004, Mr. Smith worked as a police officer
at least 40 hours each week and often worked significant amounts of overtime.
From around 1992 until at least the time of the trial in
this case, petitioner worked for Dow Agro Sciences, L.L.C. (Dow). As of the
time of that trial, petitioner was a customer service representative for Dow.
During 2003 and 2004, Dow paid peti- tioner salaries of $35,237.38 and
$37,774.05, respectively. During 2008, Dow paid her a salary of $48,012.
During 2003 and 2004, petitioner sold certain Mary Kay
products (Mary Kay activity). During those years, petitioner had net income
from the Mary Kay activity of $3,185 and $650, respec- tively.
At all relevant times, petitioner maintained through Dow a
retirement account under section 401(k)
(retirement account). From 1998 through late 2009 or early 2010, petitioner at
times borrowed money from her retirement account in order to pay certain
expenses, including basic living expenses.
At a time not disclosed by the record during the 1990s, Mr.
Smith began operating an unincorporated business (real estate business) in
which he (1) acquired and operated certain rental real estate properties in
Indianapolis and (2) engaged in so- called flipping, which involved his
purchasing certain proper- ties, renovating them, and selling them. Although
Mr. Smith's real estate business was initially successful, it became unprof-
itable at an undisclosed time before 2000, which caused the Smiths to incur
certain obligations and debts. Because of the unprofitability of Mr. Smith's
real estate business, around 2000 the Smiths commenced a bankruptcy proceeding.
In late 2001, Mr. Smith established First Choice Appraisal,
Inc. (First Choice), of which he owned at all relevant times all of the
outstanding stock. At no time did petitioner have an ownership interest in
First Choice. At all relevant times, First Choice was treated for Federal
income tax (tax) purposes as an S corporation. During 2003 and 2004, Mr. Smith,
in addition to working full time as a patrol officer for the police department,
appraised certain residential real estate in Indiana on behalf of First Choice.
At all relevant times, First Choice maintained an unidenti-
fied number of bank accounts (First Choice accounts) into which Mr. Smith
deposited all of the money that First Choice received. Petitioner did not have
access to the First Choice accounts.
During 2003 and 2004, First Choice maintained an office in
Indianapolis at which Mr. Smith conducted most of its business. At certain
times during those years, Mr. Smith also worked for First Choice at the Smiths'
residence where he conducted his work for First Choice primarily on the
family's computer. A password was necessary in order to access the First Choice
files that Mr. Smith created and maintained on that computer. Petitioner did
not know that password and did not at any time view those files.
During 2003 and 2004, petitioner did not have access to the
books and records or the financial statements of First Choice that would have
made her aware of the respective amounts of net income that that company was
generating during those years. Petitioner was not involved in the preparation
of any tax return that First Choice filed and was not shown any such return
before or after its filing.
On a date early in 2003 before April 15, the Smiths filed
jointly Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040), for 2002
(2002 joint return). In that return, they reported taxable income of $103,191,
showed tax of $21,658, claimed a withholding tax credit of $6,293, and showed
tax due of $15,365. The Smiths did not pay on or before April 15, 2003, the tax
shown due of $15,365.
Around August 2003, the Smiths entered into an installment
agreement (2003 installment agreement) with the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) with respect to their unpaid tax for 2002. Around November 17, 2003,
respondent applied a $601.49 overpay- ment for the Smiths' taxable year 2000
against their remaining unpaid tax for 2002. Pursuant to the 2003 installment
agreement, the Smiths made monthly payments to the Service of at least $1,000
from December 2003 through October 2004. 2
Because of certain activities (discussed below) in which Mr.
Smith engaged on behalf of First Choice while appraising certain residential
real estate, around late 2003 or early 2004 the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) began investigating him and that company. In February 2004, the FBI
executed a search warrant on Mr. Smith at the Smiths' residence and searched it
for about four hours. During that search, Mr. Smith and the Smiths' son were
present but not petitioner.
Around July 7, 2004, the Smiths filed Form 1040 for 2003
(2003 joint return). 3 In that return, the Smiths reported, inter alia, (1)
wages of $78,057, 4 (2) net income of $3,185 from the Mary Kay activity, (3)
net income of $131,718 from First Choice, (4) adjusted gross income of
$213,048, and (5) taxable income of $167,235. In the 2003 joint return, the
Smiths (1) showed tax of $37,006 and self-employment tax of $450, (2) claimed a
withhold- ing tax credit of $6,219, 5 and (3) showed tax due of $31,680.
Around July 7, 2004, Mr. Smith gave the 2003 joint return to
petitioner and asked her to sign it. Although petitioner did not review that
entire return before signing it, she was aware (1) that First Choice, an S
corporation, generated certain income that was reported in that return and (2)
that that return showed a significant amount of tax due. Petitioner asked Mr.
Smith how he intended to pay the tax shown due in the 2003 joint return. Mr.
Smith responded that he would pay it from the profits that First Choice would
generate in the following year.
Petitioner and Mr. Smith signed the 2003 joint return but
did not pay the tax shown due in that return when they filed it around July 7,
2004. At the time the Smiths filed the 2003 joint return, petitioner did not
suffer from any physical or mental illness.
At a time not disclosed by the record after the Smiths filed
the 2003 joint return, petitioner recommended to Mr. Smith that he establish a
quarterly payment plan with the Service with respect to any tax estimated to be
due on income generated by First Choice in order to reduce the amount that the
Smiths would owe when they filed a tax return in which they reported such
income. Mr. Smith did not do so.
From November 2004 to January 2005, the Smiths did not make
the payments required under the 2003 installment agreement. As a result, on
January 14, 2005, respondent issued a separate Letter LT11, Final
Notice--Notice of Intent to Levy and Your Notice of a Right to a Hearing
(notice of levy), to petitioner and Mr. Smith with respect to 2002 and 2003. Respondent
included with the notice of levy that respondent issued to petitioner, inter
alia, Publication 594, What You Should Know About The IRS Collection Process.
That publication indicated that so-called innocent spouse relief might be
available to certain taxpayers and di- rected taxpayers to another publication
of the Service discussing such relief.
On January 25, 2005, a grand jury for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana (District Court) indicted Mr. Smith
and nine other individuals on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United
States, wire fraud, and money laundering. 6 That indictment alleged that one or
more cocon- spirators of Mr. Smith purchased certain property for low prices
and then sold that property to another coconspirator who pur- chased it for an
inflated price (second purchase) and thereafter failed to make the required
mortgage loan payments to the lending institution that financed the second
purchase. The second purchase by another coconspirator caused a significant
loss to the lending institution because the property purchased was worth
considerably less than the outstanding mortgage loan. The indictment alleged
that Mr. Smith provided an inaccurate and inflated appraisal in order to (1)
aid certain of his cocon- spirators in obtaining financing for the second
purchase of the subject property at an inflated price and (2) appropriate to
himself and his coconspirators the gain realized by the seller in the second
purchase.
After Mr. Smith was indicted, he was arrested, released on
his own recognizance pending his trial in the District Court, and suspended in
January or February 2005 from the police department.
Around April 3, 2005, pursuant to the respective notices of
levy issued to petitioner and Mr. Smith, respondent levied against certain
unidentified assets of one or both of them and credited $2,412.58 against their
tax liability for 2002.
Around April 13, 2005, the Smiths filed Form 1040 for 2004
(2004 joint return). 7 In that return, the Smiths reported, inter alia, (1)
wages of $83,941, 8 (2) net income of $650 from the Mary Kay activity, (3) net
income of $133,000 from First Choice, (4) adjusted gross income of $219,210,
and (5) taxable income of $183,188. In the 2004 joint return, the Smiths (1)
showed tax of $41,477 and self-employment tax of $91, (2) claimed a withholding
tax credit of $6,740, 9 and (3) showed tax due of $35,805. 10
Around April 13, 2005, Mr. Smith gave the 2004 joint return
to petitioner and asked her to sign it. Although petitioner did not review that
entire return before signing it, she was aware (1) that First Choice, an S
corporation, generated certain income that was reported in that return and (2)
that that return showed a significant amount of tax due. Petitioner asked Mr.
Smith how he intended to pay the tax shown due in the 2004 joint return. Mr.
Smith responded that he would pay it from the profits that First Choice would
generate in the following year.
Petitioner and Mr. Smith signed the 2004 joint return but
did not pay the tax shown due in that return when they filed it around April
13, 2005. At the time the Smiths filed the 2004 joint return, petitioner did
not suffer from any physical or mental illness.
Around May 16, 2005, pursuant to the respective notices of
levy issued to petitioner and Mr. Smith, respondent levied against certain
unidentified assets of one or both of them and credited $803.31 against their
tax liability for 2002. Around March 27, 2006, respondent applied an
overpayment of $5,581 for the Smiths' taxable year 2005 as credits of $1,388.10
and $4,192.90 against the amounts that they owed for 2002 and 2003,
respectively. Around April 15, 2006, respondent applied an overpayment of $439
for the Smiths' taxable year 2005 as a credit against the amount that they owed
for 2003.
On September 11, 2006, the District Court commenced the
trial of Mr. Smith and certain of his coconspirators on the charges in the
indictment. On September 22, 2006, the jury unanimously found Mr. Smith guilty
of each of the counts against him. On January 26, 2007, the District Court
sentenced Mr. Smith to 57 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised
release. The District Court also ordered Mr. Smith to pay restitution of
$1,086,292.80 to certain lending institutions. On March 1, 2007, Mr. Smith
reported to the Federal prison at Ashland, Kentucky, to begin serving his
prison sentence. As of the time of the trial in this case, Mr. Smith was to be
released from prison around October 25, 2010. As of that time, petitioner
expected that Mr. Smith would return to live with her after his release.
Around November 1, 2007, petitioner filed Form 8857, Request
for Innocent Spouse Relief (Form 8857), with respect to 2003 and 2004.
Petitioner attached to that form Form 12510, Questionnaire for Requesting
Spouse (Form 12510). (We shall sometimes refer collectively to Form 8857 and
Form 12510 that petitioner filed with respect to 2003 and 2004 as petitioner's
innocent spouse relief request.) In petitioner's innocent spouse relief
request, she claimed (1) that she had no reason to believe there was a problem
with the 2003 joint return or the 2004 joint return and (2) that Mr. Smith
handled all of the family finances. At the time she filed petitioner's innocent
spouse relief request, petitioner did not suffer from any physical or mental
illness.
In petitioner's Form 8857, petitioner claimed total monthly
income of $4,559 consisting of monthly wages of $3,559 and monthly gifts of
$1,000. In that form, petitioner also claimed total monthly expenses of $4,534
consisting of:
Claimed Monthly Expense
Amount
Federal,
State, and local taxes $326
Rent or
mortgage
1,735
Utilities
200
Telephone
60
Food 200
<1>
Car
(including car payments and insurance) 1,300
Medical
expenses
84
Life insurance 19
Clothing
10
<2>
Tuition
600
Total 4,534
<1>
In Form
12510 that petitioner attached to Form 8857 that
she submitted to the
Service, petitioner claimed total monthly
car expenses of
$1,500 consisting of $1,200 for automobile
payments, $100 for
automobile insurance, and $200 for automobile
gas and repairs. The
record does not establish why petitioner
claimed $1,300 in
Form 8857 and $1,500 in Form 12510.
<2>
The
tuition expense that petitioner claimed was for tuition
that she paid to the
university that the Smiths' daughter was
attending.
Around December 27, 2007, Mr. Smith submitted to respondent
Form 12508, Questionnaire for Non-Requesting Spouse. In that form, Mr. Smith
claimed that he and petitioner maintained sepa- rate bank accounts, that
petitioner did not have any access to the First Choice accounts, and that
petitioner was not involved in any of the business or the financial affairs of
First Choice.
On November 19, 2007, respondent issued to petitioner Letter
3661C, Preliminary Determination (preliminary determination), with respect to
petitioner's request for relief under
section 6015 for 2003. In that letter, respondent determined that
petitioner was not entitled to that relief because she did not file her request
for relief within two years of the first collec- tion activity with respect to
2003.
Around December 19, 2007, petitioner submitted to respondent
Form 12509, Statement of Disagreement (Form 12509), in response to respondent's
determination with respect to her request for relief under section 6015 for 2003 (2007 Form 12509). In
that form, petitioner stated:
I was unaware of the attempts from the IRS to collect the
debt. When I found out, my spouse (Michael) as- sured me that the matter was
being taken care of. Michael was the person who received the mail at our house.
For many years of our marriage he was responsi- ble for all the household
expenses. He had a full-time job and owned a small business whose tax
consequences were attached to our personal income tax returns. The tax returns
were completed by a third party tax profes- sional. I had no reason to question
or review the returns each year, so I signed them in reliance on their
accuracy. My inability to pay this debt only became a matter of heightened
concern this year after Michael was incar- cerated. *** Michael believed he
would be able to pay all expenses including any taxes when the investi- gation
(which turned into a case) was settled. He believed [he] would be vindicated, return
to work, get the money back that was taken from him and be able [to] make
arrangements to settle any outstanding debt. That did not happen. *** His
incarceration has created a financial hardship for me, my son and my daughter.
I have been forced to give up our four bedroom house and move to a two bedroom
apartment. I cannot make the mortgage payment so the house will be foreclosed
on soon. I am now attempting to work to resolve this situation. I ask that the
IRS grant me Equitable Relief from this debt as it was my reasonable belief
that my husband was taking care of any expenses due from his business including
the taxes. This debt places an extreme financial hardship on me and my and
[sic] children who have already lost our home. This debt places a finan- cial
strain on the daily care of my children. Please also consider the fact that
prior to my husband's problems I was fully compliant with the tax laws in every
year prior and since. As you can see by the data provided on Form 12510, this
tax debt is more than my annual salary. This tax debt was not a result of my
doings or knowl- edge. I relied on my husband and a professional tax preparer.
I have now been faced with financial ruin because of it. I respectfully request
that the IRS grant me Equitable Relief from this debt.
An examiner working for the Service (respondent's examiner)
prepared an examination workpaper dated January 9, 2008 (examina- tion
workpaper) with respect to petitioner's request for relief under section 6015 for 2004. In that workpaper,
respondent's examiner concluded that petitioner is not entitled to relief under
that section for any portion of the underpayment for that year. The examination
workpaper stated, inter alia: GENERAL INFORMATION Denied - She is liable for
part of the UP [underpay- ment]. Per tax ran & attribution worksheet they
both did not have enough taxes withheld from their income to pay the bal due.
She is liable for $1180 & he is liable for $33648. She has no reason to
believe he was going to pay. She knew there was a bal due & she knew they
had financial problems because he lost his job & his business closed. She
also knew there was a bal due from the previous yr not paid. It would not cause
an economic hardship to hold her liable. Her income exceeds her expenses by
$625 a month. They have not been apart 12 months. SPOUSE'S RESPONSE He just
talks about she was not involved in his busi- ness. He does not talk about the
balance due. EVALUATION PROCESS
Year 2004
IRC 6015(f)
Liability arose on or after July 22, 1998
Joint return is valid There is enough information to
determine the claim No OIC accepted Eligibility factors: Underpayment of tax -
relief is not available under IRC
6015(b) & 6015(c) Filed a joint return Claim filed timely Liability unpaid,
or RS [requesting spouse] may have refundable payments Not a fraudulent return
No fraudulent transfer of assets No disqualified assets transferred The
underpaid tax is not solely attributable to the NRS [nonrequesting spouse]
Attribution: Per the attribution worksheet they both did not have enough taxes
withheld from their income to pay the balance due. Partial attribution to the
NRS. Continue evaluating for the portion attributable to the NRS. Deny relief
for the portion attributable to the RS. Tier I factors (limited scope):
Taxpayers are currently not divorced, widowed or le- gally separated, and did
not live apart prior to the claim for at least 12 consecutive months Tier I
factors (limited scope) not met Tier II factors: Taxpayers are currently not
divorced, widowed Against or legally separated, and did not live apart prior to
the claim for at least 12 consecutive months No economic hardship Against
Explanation: The info she provided shows her income exceeds her expenses by $25
a month but she added her daughters college tuition of $600 a month as an
expenses & after a call to her to verify this that [sic] is not a basic
living expenses so her in- come exceeds by $625 a month. No marital abuse No
poor mental or physical health No legal obligation established Knowledge:
Background:
RS - Bachelor of Science in NRS - Some college Business
Administration Business Admin, Finance, Intro Acctg, Marketing, Stastics [sic]
Involvement:
RS - She had her own account NRS - He had his that her
income was own account. deposited into. They had no joint account. Lifestyle
changes: No NRS's elusiveness: No Duty to inquire: She did not review the
return before signing it. Living arrangements: Lived together all year. RS had
knowledge or reason to know Against Explanation: She knew there was a balance
due. She did not have reason to believe he was going to pay it. She knew they
had financial problems when he lost his job & his business was shut down.
They also owed the year before & have not paid it. No significant benefit
gained. For Explanation: She did not receive any benefit. Made a good faith
effort to comply with the tax For laws Explanation: She has been compliant
Unique circumstances: No Not meeting Tier II factors - deny claim Tier II
consideration: Based on the above facts it is equitable to hold the RS lia- ble
for the balance. She did not have reason to believe he was going to pay. It
would not cause an economic hardship. They are still married/living together.
Tier II factors not met - deny Claim denied under IRC 6015(f) - full scope CONCLUSION 2004 -
Denied under 6015(f) She is liable for part bal due. She did not have reason to
believe he was going to pay. It would not cause an economic hardship. They are
still married/ living together. She states they have been apart since March
2007 but he is just incarcerated which does not constitute a separation. On
January 18, 2008, respondent issued to petitioner a preliminary determination
with respect to her request for relief under
section 6015 for 2004. In that letter, respondent deter- mined that
petitioner is not entitled to that relief because “you [petitioner] did not
show it would be unfair to hold you respon- sible. You did not prove, that at
the time you signed the return, you had reason to believe the tax would be
paid. Also, the documentation you provided does not prove economic hardship.”
Around February 8, 2008, petitioner submitted to respondent
Form 12509 in response to respondent's determination with respect to her
request for relief under section 6015
for 2004 (2008 Form 12509). That form contained a statement materially
identical to the one that petitioner had included in her 2007 Form 12509.
Petitioner's 2008 Form 12509 also included the following addi- tional
information with respect to her then current expenses:
Since initially
filing for Equitable Relief, it has
become more
clear the magnitude of my monthly expenses.
They include:
Rent $940; Gas & Electricity $150; Food
$280; Tithes
$360; Auto payment $414; Auto Ins. $120;
Auto License
Plates $31; Life Ins. $85; Auto Gas &
Repairs $200;
Medical/Dental Ins. $88; Sears Card $100;
Loan $452;
Clothing $50; Taxes $534; plus co-pays for
any
medical/dental appointments, prescriptions, vision
exams, glasses
and contact lenses, etc.
While I understand the family contribution of my daugh-
ter's college expenses is not considered part of my financial hardship, my son
is in high school and I have varying expenses that relate to that as well (i.e.
his tuition ~$2,000/yr., books $500/yr., etc.) Respondent assigned petitioner's
appeal to an officer (respondent's Appeals officer) in respondent's Appeals
Office (Appeals Office). While that appeal was pending, petitioner submitted to
the Appeals Office (1) a pay statement dated April 25, 2008, reflecting
petitioner's gross salary (petitioner's salary) from Dow and certain amounts
that Dow had deducted from petitioner's salary for the biweekly pay period
April 7 to 20, 2008 (April 2008 pay statement) and (2) a spreadsheet showing
certain of petitioner's monthly expenses (expenses spreadsheet). The April 2008
pay statement indicated that petitioner's monthly salary was $4,001. That pay
statement showed the following biweekly amounts that Dow had deducted from
petitioner's salary:
Actual Prorated
Biweekly Monthly
Deduction 1
Amount Deduction
Federal, State,
and local taxes $284.57 $616.57
Medical, dental,
vision, and
disability
insurance and health
care
reimbursement account
137.86 298.70
Life
insurance
18.18 39.39
<2>
ESP loan
226.09 489.86
Contribution to
petitioner's
retirement
account
110.80 240.07
<3>
34.99
Miscellaneous 16.15
Total
793.65 1,719.58
<1>
For
convenience, we have prorated the amount that Dow
deducted from
petitioner's salary in order to determine the
amount that Dow would
have deducted each month from petitioner's
monthly salary.
<2>
The
ESP loan represented payments that petitioner made to
her retirement
account in order to repay certain loans that she
had made from that
account.
<3>
The
category "Miscellaneous" included two items identified
on the April 2008 pay
statement as "RHCAP" and "HP MBRSHP/SINGL".
The record does not establish what those two items
represented or
why petitioner paid
certain amounts with respect to those items.
In the expenses spreadsheet, petitioner claimed the follow-
ing monthly expenses:
Claimed Expense Amount
Rent $940.00
Gas
100.00
Electric
50.00
Car payment
414.06
Cable
65.45
Home telephone 32.00
Cellular telephone
130.00
Automobile--gas
200.00
Food
230.00
<1>
Sears card
75.00
Tithes
400.00
Total 2,636.51
<1>
As of the
time of the trial in this case, petitioner had
paid the balance on
her Sears credit card.
After considering petitioner's appeal, respondent's Appeals
officer prepared an appeals case memorandum dated June 27, 2008 (appeals
memorandum). In that memorandum, respondent's Appeals officer concluded that
petitioner is not entitled to relief under
section 6015 for 2003 or 2004. The appeals memorandum stated in
pertinent part: 11 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS ***
§6015(f) Relief is provided for under
§6015(f) if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency
(or any portion of either); and relief is not available under subsection §6015(b) or (c). Threshold Factors
under IRC §6015(f) A joint return was
filed. IRC Sections 6015(b) and (c) are
not avail- able.
There was a timely application for relief.
There was no underpayment as of July 22, 1998. There is no
evidence of fraudulent transfers of assets. There is no evidence of disqualified
assets transferred. There was no evidence of a fraudulent joint return
presented.
The EO [examining officer] determined that the threshold
factors of §6015(f) WERE NOT met
because the taxpayer did not request relief within 2 years of the first
collection activity for the 2003 account. She filed for relief November 2007.
The notice of intent to levy was mailed to each indi- vidual January 2005. The
taxpayer meets the threshold factors for the 2004 tax year because collection
activities had not yet begun. I agree with the examining officer's
determinations. Only the 2004 tax year will be considered further. TIER I &
TIER II factors of §6015(f) The
taxpayer DOES/DOES NOT qualify under the TIER I/TIER II factors of §6015(f) Following are the circumstances
under which equitable relief under
§6015(f) will ordi- narily be granted. Tier I (1) In cases where a
liability reported on a joint return is unpaid, equitable relief under §6015(f) will ordinarily be granted in cases
where uALLu of the following elements are satisfied: (a) At the time relief is
requested, the requesting spouse is no longer married to, or is legally
separated from, the nonrequesting spouse, or has not been a member of the same
household as the nonrequesting spouse at any time during the 12-month period
ending on the date relief was requested; Relevant facts from taxpayer &
Govern- ment... the taxpayer is still married and did not mention any plans to
file for divorce. Her spouse is incarcerated for the next few years in federal
prison. This element IS NOT satisfied because... the taxpayers are married and
separate living arrangements due to imprisonment does not qualify as sepa- rate
households.
(b) At the time the return was signed, the requesting spouse
had no knowledge or reason to know that the tax would not be paid. The
requesting spouse must establish that it was reasonable for the requesting
spouse to be- lieve that the nonrequesting spouse would pay the reported
liability. *** and Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern-
ment... The taxpayer believed that her
husband would be found innocent, rein- stated at his job,
and their lives would return to normal. She signed the 2004 tax return after he
was indicted and had been suspended from his job. This element IS NOT satisfied
because... the taxpayer knew that the tax liability would not be paid for some
time due to the criminal proceedings that were taking place during 2005. The
couple was using their savings to pay for their personal living expenses and
his attorney fees.
(c) The requesting spouse will suffer eco- nomic hardship if
relief is not granted. For purposes of this section, the determination of
whether a requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship will be made by the
Commis- sioner or the Commissioner's delegate, and will be based on rules
similar to those pro- vided in
§301.6343-1(b)(4) of the Regulations on Procedure and Administration ***
Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer is trying to change
the family's standard of living so that her income is enough to pay their basic
living expenses. She has moved from the family home to an apartment because she
could not afford the mortgage payment. The taxpayer is experiencing economic
hardship with or without this tax lia- bility. This element IS satisfied
because... the taxpayer is suffering an economic hard- ship and is unable to
pay her basic living expenses at the present time. Tier II The Secretary may
grant equitable relief under §6015(f)
if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequita- ble to
hold the requesting spouse liable for all or part of the unpaid liability or
defi- ciency. The following is a partial list of the positive and negative
factors that will be taken into account in determining whether to grant full or
partial equitable relief under
§6015(f). No single factor will be determinative of whether equitable
relief will or will not be granted in any particular case. Rather, all factors
will be considered and weighed appropriately. The list is not intended to be
exhaustive.
(1) Factors that favor relief. The factors weighing in favor
of relief in- clude, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Marital status.
The requesting spouse is separated (whether legally separated or liv- ing
apart) or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse. Relevant facts from taxpayer
& Govern- ment... The taxpayer is still married and did not mention any
plans to file for divorce. Her spouse is incarcerated for the next few years in
federal prison. This element IS NOT satisfied because... the taxpayers are
married and separate living arrangements due to imprisonment does not qualify
as sepa- rate households.
(b) Economic hardship. The requesting spouse would suffer
economic hardship (within the meaning of section 4.02(1)(c) of this revenue
procedure) if relief from the liability is not granted. Relevant facts from
taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer is trying to change the family's
standard of living so that her income is enough to pay their basic living
expenses. She has moved from the family home to an apartment because she could
not afford the mortgage payment. The taxpayer is experiencing economic hardship
with or without this tax lia- bility. This element IS satisfied because... the
taxpayer is suffering an economic hard- ship and is unable to pay her basic
living expenses at the present time.
(c) Abuse. The requesting spouse was abused by the
nonrequesting spouse, but such abuse did not amount to duress. Relevant facts
from taxpayer & Govern- ment... the taxpayer was not abused by her spouse.
This factor does not favor relief be- cause... there is no evidence or allega-
tion of abuse.
(d) No knowledge or reason to know. In the case of a
liability that was properly re- ported but not paid, the requesting spouse did
not know and had no reason to know that the liability would not be paid. ***
Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer believed that
her husband would be found innocent, rein- stated at his job, and their lives
would return to normal. She signed the 2004 tax return after he was indicted
and had been suspended from his job. This element IS NOT satisfied because...
the taxpayer knew that the tax liability would not be paid for some time due to
the criminal proceedings that were taking place during 2005. The couple was
using their savings to pay for their personal living expenses and his attorney
fees.
(e) Nonrequesting spouse's legal obligation. The
nonrequesting spouse has a legal obliga- tion pursuant to a divorce decree or
arrange- ment to pay the outstanding liability. This will not be a factor
weighing in favor of relief if the requesting spouse knew or had reason to
know, at the time the divorce de- cree or agreement was entered into, that the
nonrequesting spouse would not pay the lia- bility. Relevant facts from
taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer is still legally married to her
spouse and does not plan to divorce him at this time. The factor does not favor
relief because... there is no legal obligation from a divorce decree that the
spouse is to pay the liability. (f) Attributable to nonrequesting spouse. The
liability for which relief is sought is solely attributable to the
nonrequesting spouse. Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment... The
taxpayer is liable for a small portion of the liability since her withholding
credits were not enough to cover her share of the tax liability. The majority
of the tax due is credited to the taxpayer's spouse. This factor favors relief
because... a substantial portion of the tax liability is her spouse's
responsibility. (2) Factors weighing against relief. The factors weighing
against relief include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Attributable
to the requesting spouse. The unpaid liability or item giving rise to the
deficiency is attributable to the re- questing spouse. Relevant facts from
taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer is liable for a small portion of
the liability since her withholding credits were not enough to cover her share
of the tax liability. The majority of the tax due is credited to the taxpayer's
spouse. This factor does not weigh against re- lief. (b) Knowledge, or reason
to know. A request- ing spouse knew or had reason to know of the item giving
rise to a deficiency or that the reported liability would be unpaid at the time
the return was signed. This is an ex- tremely strong factor weighing against
re- lief. Nonetheless, when the factors in favor of equitable relief are
unusually strong, it may be appropriate to grant relief under §6015(f) in limited situations where a re-
questing spouse knew or had reason to know that the liability would not be
paid, and in very limited situations where the requesting spouse knew or had
reason to know of an item giving rise to a deficiency. Relevant facts from
taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer believed that her husband would be
found innocent, rein- stated at his job, and their lives would return to
normal. She signed the 2004 tax return after he was indicted and had been
suspended from his job. This factor weighs against relief. (c) Significant
benefit. The requesting spouse has significantly benefited [sic] (beyond normal
support) from the unpaid lia- bility or items giving rise to the deficiency.
See § 1.6013-5(b). Relevant facts from
taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer and her family were paying normal
living expenses and the attorney fees with savings after her spouse was
suspended without pay from his job. This factor does not weigh against re-
lief. (d) Lack of economic hardship. The request- ing spouse will not
experience economic hard- ship (within the meaning of section 4.02(1)(c) of
this revenue procedure) if relief from the liability is not granted. Relevant
facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer is trying to change the
family's standard of living so that her income is enough to pay their basic
living expenses. She has moved from the family home to an apartment because she
could not afford the mortgage payment. The taxpayer is experiencing economic
hardship with or without this tax lia- bility. This factor does not weigh
against re- lief. (e) Noncompliance with federal income tax laws. The
requesting spouse has not made a good faith effort to comply with federal
income tax laws in the tax years following the tax year or years to which the
request for relief relates. Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment...
The taxpayer and her spouse have filed and paid their tax liabilities for the
2005 and 2006 tax years. This factor does not weigh against re- lief. (f)
Requesting spouse's legal obligation. The requesting spouse has a legal
obligation pursuant to a divorce decree or agreement to pay the liability.
Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment... the taxpayer is still
legally married to her spouse and does not plan to divorce him at this time.
This factor does weigh against relief.
No additional factors were presented by the tax- payer that
would favor relief.
Taking into account all the facts and circumstances in this
case, there are hazards that would be faced by both sides should the case be
heard at US Tax Court. In an effort to settle both tax years, I offered to
relieve her of his liability for the 2004 tax year. She has not accepted the
offer. Because the taxpayer did not establish that it would be inequitable to
hold her liable for the 2003 and 2004 tax years, I am recommending that the
examiner's posi- tion should be sustained. The taxpayer does not meet the
statutory requirements for the 2003 tax year and has not proven her case
regarding the 2004 tax year. On July 11, 2008, respondent issued to petitioner
the notice of determination. In that notice, respondent denied petitioner's
request for relief under section 6015
for each of 2003 and 2004. With respect to 2003, the notice of determination
stated in pertinent part:
You [petitioner] did not file your request timely. IRC section 6015 requires innocent spouse
claims to be filed no later than two years after we start collection activity
against you. Our records show the date that the IRS first initiated collection
activity against you by sending you a due process notice was 1/15/2005. With
respect to 2004, the notice of determination stated in per- tinent part: “The
information we have available does not show you meet the requirements for
relief.”
As of April 30, 2010, the Smiths owed a balance of
$50,051.55 with respect to 2003. As of that date, the Smiths owed a balance of
$59,545.28 with respect to 2004.
At the trial in this case, petitioner claimed that certain
of her monthly expenses had changed (revised monthly expenses) since she
submitted petitioner's innocent spouse relief request and the expenses
spreadsheet. The revised monthly expenses that petitioner claimed at trial
consisted of:
Amount
Claimed Monthly Expense Rent $1,080 Electric 90 Cable 120 1
Telephone 187 Automobile, life, and renter's insurance 127
As of the time of the trial in this case, petitioner had a
monthly salary of $4,001 and monthly expenses of $4,004 consist- ing of: 12
Monthly Expense Amount Federal, State, and local taxes $617
Rent 1,080 Electric 90 Gas 100 Telephone 187 Cable 120 Car (including car
payments and gasoline) 614 Automobile, life, and renter's insurance 127 Food
230 Medical expenses (including insurance, dental, vision, and disability) 299
Retirement account loan payment 490 Clothing 50 Total 4,004
As of the time of the trial in this case, petitioner had
complied with the tax laws for each taxable year after 2003 and 2004.
OPINION
The parties' only dispute is whether petitioner is entitled
to relief under section 6015(f) for her
taxable year 2004. 13 ___ (2011); Hall v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 374 (2010). In Lantz, the Court of
Appeals upheld the validity of sec.
1.6015-5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., which requires that a requesting spouse file
a request for relief no more than two years after the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (Commissioner) first begins collection activity with respect to the
year for which relief is requested.
(continued...)Petitioner bears the burden of proving that she is
entitled to relief under that section. See Rule 142(a); Jonson v. Commis-
sioner, 118 T.C. 106, 113 (2002),
affd. 353 F.3d 1181 [93 AFTR 2d
2004-323] (10th Cir. 2003).
Section 6015(f)
provides:
SEC. 6015. RELIEF
FROM JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY ON JOINT RETURN.
(f) Equitable Relief.--Under procedures pre- scribed by the
Secretary, if—
(1) taking into
account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the indi-
vidual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either);
and
(2) relief is not available to such individ- ual under
subsection (b) or (c), the Secretary may relieve such individual of such
liability.
As directed by
section 6015(f), the Commissioner has pre- scribed procedures in Revenue Procedure 2003-61 that are to be
used in determining whether it would be inequitable to find the requesting
spouse liable for part or all of the underpayment of tax. That revenue
procedure lists seven threshold conditions (threshold conditions) which must be
satisfied before the Commis- 13 (...continued) Lantz v. Commissioner, supra at
486. Petitioner filed Form 8857 more than two years after respondent first
began collection activity with respect to 2003. sioner will consider a request
for relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B.
at 297.
Petitioner concedes that she does not satisfy all of the
threshold conditions with respect to the portion of the underpay- ment for 2004
that is attributable to herself. See
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(7). On the record before us, we find that
petitioner is not entitled to relief under
section 6015(f) for that portion.
The parties agree that petitioner satisfies all of the
threshold conditions with respect to the portion of the underpay- ment for 2004
that is attributable to Mr. Smith. Where the requesting spouse satisfies the
threshold conditions, section 4.02(1) of
Revenue Procedure 2003-61 sets forth the circumstances under which the
Commissioner ordinarily will grant relief to that spouse under section 6015(f) in a case, like the instant
case, where a liability is reported in a joint return but not paid. Petitioner
concedes that she does not qualify for relief under section 4.02(1) of Revenue Procedure 2003-61. Instead, she
relies on section 4.03 of that revenue procedure in support of her claim for
relief under section 6015(f).
Section 4.03 of
Revenue Procedure 2003-61 sets forth the following factors that are to
be considered in determining whether a requesting spouse is entitled to relief
under section 6015(f): (1) Whether the
requesting spouse is separated or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse
(marital status factor);
(2) whether the requesting spouse would suffer economic
hardship if not granted relief (economic hardship factor); (3) whether the
requesting spouse knew or had reason to know that the nonre- questing spouse
would not pay the tax liability (knowledge factor); (4) whether the
nonrequesting spouse has a legal obliga- tion to pay the outstanding tax
liability pursuant to a divorce decree or agreement (legal obligation factor);
(5) whether the requesting spouse received a significant benefit from the item
giving rise to the deficiency (significant benefit factor); and (6) whether the
requesting spouse has made a good faith effort to comply with the tax laws for
the taxable years following the taxable year to which the request for such
relief relates (com- pliance factor). 14
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a), 2003-2 C.B. at 298-299. In making
our determination under section 14
Other factors that may be considered under Revenue Proce-
dure 2003-61 are (1) whether the nonrequesting spouse abused the requesting
spouse (abuse factor) and (2) whether the requesting spouse was in poor mental
or physical health (mental or physical health factor) when he or she signed the
tax return (return) or when he or she requested relief. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(b), 2003-2
C.B. at 298. In the event (1) the nonrequest- ing spouse abused the requesting
spouse or (2) the requesting spouse was in poor mental or physical health when
he or she signed the return or when he or she requested relief, the abuse
factor or the mental or physical health factor, as the case may be, will be
taken into account. Id. However, where, as here, (1) the nonrequesting spouse
did not abuse the requesting spouse and (2) the requesting spouse was not in
poor mental or physical health when she signed the return or when she requested
relief, those factors are not taken into account. Id. 6015(f), we shall
consider those factors and any other relevant factors. No single factor is to
be determinative in any particu- lar case, and all factors are to be considered
and weighed appropriately.
With respect to the marital status factor, the parties agree
that the Smiths remained married as of the time of the trial in this case.
With respect to the economic hardship factor, 15 respondent
(ii) Information from taxpayer.—In determining a reasonable
amount for basic living expenses the direc- tor will consider any information
provided by the taxpayer including—
(A) The taxpayer's age, employment status and history,
ability to earn, number of dependents, and status as a dependent of someone
else;
(B) The amount reasonably necessary for food, clothing,
housing (including utilities, home-owner insurance, home-owner dues, and the
like), medical expenses (including health insurance), transportation, current
tax payments (including federal, state, and local), alimony, child support, or
other court-ordered payments, and expenses necessary to the taxpayer's
production of income (such as dues for a trade union or professional
organization, or child care payments which allow the taxpayer to be gainfully
employed); (continued...) argues that
petitioner “merely testified that she had the ex- penses listed in her brief,
but did not provide any substantia- tion of those expenses.” We reject
respondent's argument. In addition to her testimony, which we found to be
credible, peti- tioner submitted (1) Form 8857 in which she claimed certain
expenses, (2) the 2008 Form 12509 in which she provided addi- tional information
about her monthly expenses, (3) the April 2008 pay statement detailing certain
expenses that Dow deducted from her wages, and (4) the expenses spreadsheet in
which she detailed certain of her expenses. In evaluating petitioner's request
for relief, neither respondent's examiner nor respondent's Appeals officer
maintained that petitioner was not entitled to relief because she failed to
substantiate her claimed expenses. In fact, respondent's Appeals officer relied
on those claimed expenses in reaching the conclusion in the appeals memorandum
that petitioner was “experiencing economic hardship with or without this tax
liability.”
We have found that as of the time of the trial in this case
petitioner had (1) a monthly salary of $4,001 and (2) monthly expenses of
$4,004 exclusive of certain expenses that petitioner argues should be included
as part of her basic living expenses 16 and certain other expenses that
respondent argues should be excluded as part of her basic living expenses. 17
Thus, we have 16
Petitioner argues that her claimed monthly expense for food
(i.e., $230) is unreasonably low and significantly less than the monthly
expense for food (i.e., $537) set forth in the national standards (Service's
national standards) that the Service uses in determining whether a taxpayer is
suffering an economic hardship. Petitioner also asserts that she is entitled to
use the monthly expenses set forth in the Service's national standards for
“Food, Clothing and Other Items”. We need not and shall not address whether
petitioner is entitled to use those monthly expenses. That is because, without
including in peti- tioner's basic living expenses the monthly expenses set
forth in the Service's national standards for “Food, Clothing and Other Items”,
we have found that petitioner's monthly expenses exceed her monthly salary.
found that petitioner's monthly expenses exceeded her monthly salary.
Respondent argues that the balance in petitioner's retire-
ment account, which as of the time of the trial in this case was approximately
$75,000, “could be used to pay a significant portion of the liabilities.”
Respondent's argument ignores that petitioner concedes that she is liable for
the Smiths' tax liability for 2003, which as of April 30, 2010, was $50,051.55.
18 Respondent's argument also ignores that petitioner has at times borrowed
money from her retirement account in order to pay certain expenses, including
basic living expenses. We believe that she will be required to continue to
borrow from her retire- ment account in order to meet certain of those basic
living expenses.
On the record before us, we find that petitioner has carried
her burden of establishing that she would suffer economic hard- ship if relief
under section 6015(f) were not granted
with respect to the portion of the underpayment for 2004 that is attributable
to Mr. Smith.
With respect to the knowledge factor, petitioner must establish
that it was reasonable for her to believe that Mr. Smith would pay the tax
shown due in the 2004 joint return. See
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.02(1)(b), 4.03(2)(a)(iii), 2003-2 C.B. at
298.
Respondent argues that “Based on Mr. Smith's legal difficul-
ties and loss of employment *** petitioner knew or had reason to know that Mr.
Smith would not pay those [tax] liabilities with the return or in a reasonably
prompt time.” 19 Petitioner coun- ters that she had no reason to believe that
the tax shown due in the 2004 joint return would not be paid. That is because,
according to petitioner, it was reasonable for her to believe 19
Respondent's argument that petitioner must believe that the
tax would be paid in a reasonably prompt time is based on Banderas v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-129 [TC
Memo 2007-129]. In Banderas, we held that in order for a belief that a
liability would be paid to be reasonable the requesting spouse must believe
that the funds to pay the liability would be on hand within a reasonably prompt
time. Respondent contends that that holding in Banderas is wrong and that the
requesting spouse must believe that the tax would be paid by the later of the
date on which the return was filed or the date on which the tax is due to be
paid. We need not revisit our holding in Banderas as respondent invites us to
do because, as discussed below, even under that holding we sustain respon-
dent's argument with respect to the knowledge factor. Mr. Smith when he told
her that he would pay that amount out of the profits generated by First Choice
in the following year. Petitioner contends that at the time she signed the 2004
joint return her husband's business, 1st Choice Appraisal (”1st Choice”), was
coming off of an impressive year in 2003 where it had total income of $131,718.
Given that its total income in 2004 was $133,000, sufficient income was being
produced to pay the tax liability. Moreover, although the indictment against
Michael Smith had been filed on January 25, 2005, the trial against him did not
commence until September 11, 2006, over one year after petitioner signed the
2004 return. Moreover, the jury verdict against Mr. Smith was not returned
until January 17, 2007. Thus, although there was perhaps cause for concern at
the time the return was filed, the full extent of Mr. Smith's legal problems
was not yet apparent to petitioner when she signed the return. [Cross-refs.
omitted.]
On the record before us, we reject petitioner's argument. We
have found that around April 13, 2005, petitioner and Mr. Smith signed the 2004
joint return. We have also found that at that time petitioner was aware that
(1) around 2000 the Smiths commenced a bankruptcy proceeding; (2) early in 2003
before April 15, the Smiths filed the 2002 joint return in which they showed
tax of $21,658, claimed a withholding tax credit of $6,293, and showed tax due
of $15,365; (3) the Smiths did not pay on or before April 15, 2003, the tax
shown due in the 2002 joint return of $15,365; (4) around August 2003 the
Smiths entered into the 2003 installment agreement; (5) around July 7, 2004,
(a) the Smiths filed the 2003 joint return in which they showed tax due of
$31,680 and (b) petitioner was aware that that return showed a significant
amount of tax due; (6) the Smiths did not include any payment with the 2003
joint return when they filed it around July 7, 2004; (7) from November 2004 to
January 2005 the Smiths did not make the payments required under the 2003
installment agree- ment; (8) on January 25, 2005, a grand jury for the District
Court indicted Mr. Smith on 16 counts; and (9) in January or February 2005 Mr.
Smith was suspended from the police department.
On the record before us, we find that it was not reasonable
for petitioner to believe at the time she signed the 2004 joint return around
April 13, 2005, that First Choice would generate profits in the following year
sufficient to pay the tax shown due in that return. 20
On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed
to carry her burden of establishing that she reasonably believed that the tax
shown due in the 2004 joint return would be paid on or before the date on which
that tax was due. On that record, we further find that petitioner has failed to
carry her burden of establishing that she reasonably believed that the funds to
pay the tax shown due in the 2004 joint return would be available within a
reasonably prompt time. 21 On the record before us, we find that petitioner has
failed to carry her burden of establish- ing that she did not know and had no
reason to know that the tax shown due in the 2004 joint return would not be
paid.
With respect to the legal obligation factor, the parties
agree that there is no divorce decree or other agreement that obligates Mr.
Smith to pay the portion of the underpayment that is attributable to him.
With respect to the significant benefit factor, the parties
agree that petitioner did not receive a significant benefit beyond normal
support from the portion of the underpayment attributable to Mr. Smith.
With respect to the compliance factor, the parties agree
that petitioner has complied with the tax laws for all years after 2004.
Based upon our examination of the entire record before us,
we find that petitioner has carried her burden of establishing that it would be
inequitable to hold her liable for the portion of the underpayment for 2004
that is attributable to Mr. Smith. On that record, we further find that
petitioner has carried her burden of establishing that she is entitled to
relief under section 6015(f) for that
portion of that underpayment. 21
See supra note 19.
We have considered all of the contentions and arguments of
the parties that are not discussed herein, and we find them to be without
merit, irrelevant, and/or moot.
To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of petitioner,
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
1
All section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times.
All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
2
Pursuant to the 2003
installment agreement, in June and October 2004 the Smiths paid to the Service
$2,000 and $1,500, respectively.
3
Mr. Smith hired
Jimmie Johnson (Mr. Johnson), a self-em- ployed tax preparer, to prepare their
2003 joint return. The Smiths previously had used H&R Block to prepare
their tax re- turns.
4
The wages of $78,057
that the Smiths reported in the 2003 joint return consisted of $35,237.38 that
Dow paid to petitioner and $42,820.35 that the police department paid to Mr.
Smith during 2003. We note that the Smiths rounded to the nearest dollar all
amounts that they reported in the respective joint tax returns that they filed
for 2003 and 2004.
5
The $6,219
withholding tax credit that the Smiths claimed in the 2003 joint return
consisted of $3,121.66 that Dow withheld from petitioner's wages and $3,096.97
that the police department withheld from Mr. Smith's wages during 2003.
6
The indictment
against Mr. Smith and the nine other indi- viduals contained 101 counts. Mr.
Smith was indicted on only 2 counts of conspiracy to defraud the United States,
13 counts of wire fraud, and 1 count of money laundering.
7
Mr. Johnson, who
prepared the Smiths' 2003 joint return, also prepared their 2004 joint return.
8
The wages of $83,941
that the Smiths reported in the 2004 joint return consisted of $37,774.05 that
Dow paid to petitioner and $46,166.76 that the police department paid to Mr.
Smith during 2004.
9
The $6,740
withholding tax credit that the Smiths claimed in the 2004 joint return
consisted of $3,544.06 that Dow withheld from petitioner's wages and $3,195.74
that the police department withheld from Mr. Smith's wages during 2004.
10
The tax due shown in
the 2004 joint return included an estimated tax penalty of $977.
11
In the appeals
memorandum, respondent's Appeals officer analyzed petitioner's appeal under the
factors set forth in Rev. Proc.
2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447 ( Revenue
Procedure 2000-15). We note that Rev.
Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296 (
Revenue Procedure 2003-61), superseded
Revenue Procedure 2000-15. Revenue Proce- dure 2003-61 is effective for
requests for relief under sec. 6015(f)
that were filed on or after Nov. 1, 2003. Id.
sec. 7. Revenue Procedure
2003-61 is applicable in this case because petitioner filed petitioner's
innocent spouse relief request around Nov. 1, 2007.
90
1
At the time of the
trial in this case, petitioner had disconnected her landline home telephone
service. At that time, petitioner and her children had only cellular telephone
service.
12
For convenience, we
have rounded petitioner's monthly expenses to the nearest dollar.
90
50
13
13
14
15
In determining
whether a requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship, sec. 4.02(1)(c)
of Revenue Procedure 2003-61 requires
reliance on rules similar to those provided in
sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs. That regulation gener-
ally provides that an individual suffers an economic hardship if the individual
is unable to pay his or her reasonable basic living expenses. Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin.
Regs., provides in pertinent part:
16
17
Respondent argues
that cable television, tithes to peti- tioner's church, and certain
contributions to petitioner's retirement account do not constitute reasonable
basic living expenses. We need not and shall not address whether tithes to
petitioner's church and certain contributions to petitioner's retirement
account constitute reasonable basic living expenses. That is because, without
including in petitioner's reasonable basic living expenses those tithes and
those contributions, we have found that petitioner's monthly expenses exceed her
monthly salary. We have included $120 for cable television in peti- tioner's
reasonable basic living expenses. In doing so, we have rejected respondent's
argument that “petitioner's cable expense of $120.00 is not a reasonable basic
living expense”. Even if we were to exclude cable television from petitioner's
reasonable basic living expenses, petitioner's monthly salary would exceed her
monthly expenses by only $117 and would not change our finding below with
respect to the economic hardship factor.
In the alternative, respondent argues that “at best, [peti-
tioner's cable expense] would fall under `other' or `miscella- neous' items of
the National Standards petitioner relies upon and would not be a separate
allowable expense.” Respondent's argu- ment is not clear. In any event, we have
not included in deter- mining petitioner's reasonable basic living expenses any
of the monthly expenses set forth in the Service's national standards for
“Food, Clothing and Other Items”, see supra note 16, and we need not and shall
not address respondent's alternative argument.
18
The tax liability
for 2003 continues to accrue interest until paid. See sec. 6601.
19
20
We thus reject
petitioner's contention that the instant case is materially similar to Downs v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-165 [TC
Memo 2010-165]. We find Downs to be materially distinguishable from the instant
case and petitioner's reliance on that case to be misplaced.
21
21
ev. Proc. 2003-61,
2003-2 CB 296, 07/25/2003, IRC Sec(s). 66
Relief from joint and several liability on joint return.
Headnote:
For requests filed on or after 11/1/2003, IRS has revised
procedure for spouses who wish to request equitable relief from tax liability
under Code Sec. 66(c); or Code Sec. 6015(f); . To be considered for relief,
requesting spouse must have filed return for year in which relief is sought,
relief isn't available under either Code Sec. 6015(b); or Code Sec. 6015(c); ,
application is filed not later than two years after IRS's first collection activity
after 6/22/1998, liability remains unpaid, assets weren't transferred between
spouses as part of a fraudulent scheme, no Code Sec. 6015(c)(4)(B);
disqualified assets were transferred, and spouse seeking relief didn't file
return with intent to defraud. Generally, relief will be granted if requesting
spouse is no longer married or hasn't been member of same household at any time
during 12-month period ending date relief was requested, at time return was
filed, requesting spouse didn't have reason to believe that tax wouldn't be
paid by other spouse, and would suffer economic hardship if relief wasn't
granted. Rev Proc 2000-15, 2000-1 CB 447, is superseded.
Reference(s): ¶ 60,155.01(5); ¶ 665.01(3); Code Sec. 66;
Code Sec. 6015;
Full Text:
1. Purpose And Scope
.01. Purpose.
.01. This revenue procedure provides guidance for a taxpayer
seeking equitable relief from income tax liability under section 66(c) or section 6015(f) of the Internal Revenue Code
(a “requesting spouse”). Section 4.01
of this revenue procedure provides the threshold requirements for any request
for equitable relief. Section 4.02 of
this revenue procedure sets forth the conditions under which the Internal
Revenue Service ordinarily will grant equitable relief under section 6015(f) from an underpayment of
income tax reported on a joint return.
Section 4.03 of this revenue procedure provides a nonexclusive list of
factors for consideration in determining whether relief should be granted
under section 6015(f) because it would
be inequitable to hold a requesting spouse jointly and severally liable for an
underpayment of income tax on a joint return where the conditions of section
4.02 are not met, or for a deficiency. The factors in section 4.03 also will
apply in determining whether to relieve a spouse from income tax liability
resulting from the operation of community property law under the equitable
relief provision of section 66(c).
.02. Scope.
.02. This revenue procedure applies to spouses who request
either equitable relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(f), or equitable relief
under section 66(c) from income tax
liability resulting from the operation of community property law.
2. Background
.01. Section
6013(d)(3) provides that married taxpayers who file a joint return under section 6013 will be jointly and severally
liable for the income tax arising from that joint return. For purposes of section 6013(d)(3) and this revenue
procedure, the term “tax” includes penalties, additions to tax, and interest.
See sections 6601(e)(1) and 6665(a)(2).
.02. Section 3201(a)
of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (RRA), enacted
section 6015, which provides relief in certain circumstances from the
joint and several liability imposed by
section 6013(d)(3). Section
6015(b) and (c) specifies two sets of circumstances
under which relief from joint and several liability is available. If relief is
not available under section 6015(b) or
(c), section 6015(f) authorizes the
Secretary to grant equitable relief if, taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, the Secretary determines that it is inequitable to hold a
requesting spouse liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion
of either). Section 66(c) provides
relief from income tax liability resulting from the operation of community
property law to taxpayers domiciled in a community property state who do not
file a joint return. Section 3201(b) of RRA amended section 66(c) to add an equitable relief
provision similar to section 6015(f).
.03. Section 6015
provides relief only from joint and several liability arising from a joint
return. If an individual signs a joint return under duress, the election to
file jointly is not valid and there is no valid joint return. The individual is
not jointly and severally liable for any income tax liabilities arising from
that return. Therefore, section 6015
does not apply.
.04. Under section
6015(b) and (c), relief is available
only from a proposed or assessed deficiency.
Section 6015(b) and (c) does not
authorize relief from an underpayment of income tax reported on a joint
return. Section 66(c) and section 6015(f) permit equitable relief for
an underpayment of income tax. The legislative history of section 6015 provides that Congress intended
for the Secretary to exercise discretion in granting equitable relief if a requesting
spouse “does not know, and had no reason to know, that funds intended for the
payment of tax were instead taken by the other spouse for such other spouse's
benefit.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998). Congress also intended
for the Secretary to exercise the equitable relief authority under section 6015(f) in other situations if,
“taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold
an individual liable for all or part of any unpaid tax or deficiency arising
from a joint return.” Id.
3. Changes
This revenue procedure supersedes Revenue Procedure 2000-15, changing the
following:
.01. Section 4.01 of
this revenue procedure adds a new threshold requirement under section 4.01(7).
.02. Section
4.03(2)(a)(iii) of this revenue procedure revises the weight given to the
knowledge or reason to know factor.
.03. Section 4.04 of
this revenue procedure broadens the availability of refunds if equitable relief
is granted under section 66(c) or section 6015(f).
4. General Conditions For Relief
.01. Eligibility for equitable relief.
.01. A requesting spouse must satisfy all of the following
threshold conditions to be eligible to submit a request for equitable relief
under section 6015(f). With the
exception of conditions (1) and (2), a requesting spouse must satisfy all of
the following threshold conditions to be eligible to submit a request for
equitable relief under section 66(c).
The Service may relieve a requesting spouse who satisfies all the applicable
threshold conditions set forth below of all or part of the income tax liability
under section 66(c) or section 6015(f), if, taking into account all
the facts and circumstances, the Service determines that it would be inequitable
to hold the requesting spouse liable for the income tax liability. The
threshold conditions are as follows:
(1) The requesting spouse filed a joint return for the
taxable year for which he or she seeks relief.
(2) Relief is not available to the requesting spouse
under section 6015(b) or (c).
(3) The requesting spouse applies for relief no later than
two years after the date of the Service's first collection activity after July
22, 1998, with respect to the requesting spouse. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(2)(i) for the
definition of collection activity.
(4) No assets were transferred between the spouses as part
of a fraudulent scheme by the spouses.
(5) The nonrequesting spouse did not transfer disqualified
assets to the requesting spouse. If the nonrequesting spouse transferred
disqualified assets to the requesting spouse, relief will be available only to
the extent that the income tax liability exceeds the value of the disqualified
assets. For this purpose, the term “disqualified asset” has the meaning given
the term by section 6015(c)(4)(B).
(6) The requesting spouse did not file or fail to file the
return with fraudulent intent.
(7) The income tax liability from which the requesting
spouse seeks relief is attributable to an item of the individual with whom the
requesting spouse filed the joint return (the “nonrequesting spouse”), unless
one of the following exceptions applies:
(a) Attribution solely due to the operation of community
property law. If an item is attributable or partially attributable to the
requesting spouse solely due to the operation of community property law, then
for purposes of this revenue procedure, that item (or portion thereof) will be
considered to be attributable to the nonrequesting spouse.
(b) Nominal ownership. If the item is titled in the name of
the requesting spouse, the item is presumptively attributable to the requesting
spouse. This presumption is rebuttable. For example, H opens an individual
retirement account (IRA) in W's name and forges W's signature on the IRA in
1998. Thereafter, H makes contributions to the IRA and in 2002 takes a taxable
distribution from the IRA. H and W file a joint return for the 2002 taxable
year, but do not report the taxable distribution on their joint return. The
Service later proposes a deficiency relating to the taxable IRA distribution
and assesses the deficiency against H and W. W requests relief from joint and
several liability under section 6015. W
establishes that W did not contribute to the IRA, sign paperwork relating to
the IRA, or otherwise act as if W were the owner of the IRA. W thereby rebutted
the presumption that the IRA is attributable to W.
(c) Misappropriation of funds. If the requesting spouse did
not know, and had no reason to know, that funds intended for the payment of tax
were misappropriated by the nonrequesting spouse for the nonrequesting spouse's
benefit, the Service will consider granting equitable relief although the
underpayment may be attributable in part or in full to an item of the
requesting spouse. The Service will consider relief in this case only to the
extent that the funds intended for the payment of tax were taken by the
nonrequesting spouse.
(d) Abuse not amounting to duress. If the requesting spouse
establishes that he or she was the victim of abuse prior to the time the return
was signed, and that, as a result of the prior abuse, the requesting spouse did
not challenge the treatment of any items on the return for fear of the
nonrequesting spouse's retaliation, the Service will consider granting
equitable relief although the deficiency or underpayment may be attributable in
part or in full to an item of the requesting spouse.
.02. Circumstances under which the Service ordinarily will
grant equitable relief under section
6015(f) with respect to underpayments on joint returns.
.02. (1) If an income tax liability reported on a joint
return is unpaid, the Service ordinarily will grant equitable relief under section 6015(f) (subject to the limitations
of paragraph (2) below) in cases in which all of the following elements are
satisfied:
(a) On the date of the request for relief, the requesting
spouse is no longer married to, or is legally separated from, the nonrequesting
spouse, or has not been a member of the same household as the nonrequesting
spouse at any time during the 12-month period ending on the date of the request
for relief.
(b) On the date the requesting spouse signed the joint return,
the requesting spouse had no knowledge or reason to know that the nonrequesting
spouse would not pay the income tax liability. The requesting spouse must
establish that it was reasonable for the requesting spouse to believe that the
nonrequesting spouse would pay the reported income tax liability. If a
requesting spouse would otherwise qualify for relief under this section, except
for the fact that the requesting spouse's lack of knowledge or reason to know
relates only to a portion of the unpaid income tax liability, then the
requesting spouse may receive relief to the extent that the income tax
liability is attributable to that portion.
(c) The requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship if
the Service does not grant relief. For purposes of this revenue procedure, the
Service will base its determination of whether the requesting spouse will
suffer economic hardship on rules similar to those provided in Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4). After the
requesting spouse is deceased, there can be no economic hardship. See Jonson v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 126 (2002),
appeal docketed, No. 02-9009 (10 Cir. May 24, 2002) (taxpayer appeal filed on
other grounds).
(2) Relief under this section 4.02 is subject to the
following limitation: If the Service adjusts the joint return to reflect an
understatement of income tax, relief will be available only to the extent of
the income tax liability shown on the joint return prior to the Service's
adjustment.
.03. Factors for determining whether to grant equitable relief.
.03. (1) Applicability. This section 4.03 applies to
requesting spouses who did not file a joint return in a community property stVicki
M. Smith v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2011-119 , Code Sec(s) 6015.
VICKI M. SMITH, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent .
Case Information:
Code Sec(s):
6015
Docket: Docket
No. 25054-08.
Date Issued:
06/2/2011
Judge: Opinion by
CHIECHI
HEADNOTE
XX.
Reference(s): Code Sec. 6015
Syllabus
Official Tax Court Syllabus
Counsel
John W. Nelson, for petitioner.
Timothy S. Sinnott, for respondent.
Opinion by CHIECHI
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
Petitioner filed the petition in this case in response to a
so-called final appeals determination (notice of determination) concerning
petitioner's request for relief from joint and several liability under section 6015 1 for each of her taxable years
2003 and 2004. We must decide whether petitioner is entitled to relief under
that section for each of those years. We hold that she is to the extent stated
herein.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated and are
so found.
At the time she filed the petition in this case, petitioner
resided in Indiana.
Petitioner, who was born in 1961, received a bachelor of
science degree in business administration in 1983 from the University of
Evansville in Evansville, Indiana. During college, petitioner took courses in
accounting, marketing, statistics, finance, business administration, and
quantitative business analysis.
On May 26, 1984, petitioner married Michael Smith (Mr.
Smith). (We shall sometimes refer to petitioner and Mr. Smith as the Smiths.)
Mr. Smith, who was 49 years old at the time of the trial in this case, had
taken some college courses but had not received a college degree.
During their marriage, the Smiths maintained separate bank
accounts and deposited their respective earnings into their respective bank
accounts. From the time they married until around March 2007, Mr. Smith handled
the family's financial affairs, including signing any checks and paying
household bills.
As of the time of the trial in this case, neither petitioner
nor Mr. Smith had filed for divorce, and petitioner did not intend to file for
divorce. At no time during their marriage did Mr. Smith abuse petitioner.
The Smiths have a daughter and a son. At the time of the
trial in this case, the Smiths' daughter, who was 21 years old, was a full-time
student at a private university in Illinois, which was her primary residence.
The Smiths' daughter stayed with petitioner only during summers and other
school recesses. During college, the Smiths' daughter received certain
financial aid for her college education. In addition, at the time of the trial
in this case petitioner and her family were providing an unidentified amount of
support to the Smiths' daughter.
As of the time of the trial in this case, the Smiths' son,
who was 18 years old and residing with petitioner, was a senior at a private
high school in Indiana and intended to attend a private university in Ohio. At
that time, the Smiths' son was receiving certain financial aid for his high
school tuition, and petitioner was paying approximately $4,000 each school year
towards that tuition.
From around December 1986 until January or February 2005,
Mr. Smith worked as a patrol officer for the Indianapolis Police Department
(police department). During 2003 and 2004, Mr. Smith worked as a police officer
at least 40 hours each week and often worked significant amounts of overtime.
From around 1992 until at least the time of the trial in
this case, petitioner worked for Dow Agro Sciences, L.L.C. (Dow). As of the
time of that trial, petitioner was a customer service representative for Dow.
During 2003 and 2004, Dow paid peti- tioner salaries of $35,237.38 and $37,774.05,
respectively. During 2008, Dow paid her a salary of $48,012.
During 2003 and 2004, petitioner sold certain Mary Kay
products (Mary Kay activity). During those years, petitioner had net income
from the Mary Kay activity of $3,185 and $650, respec- tively.
At all relevant times, petitioner maintained through Dow a
retirement account under section 401(k)
(retirement account). From 1998 through late 2009 or early 2010, petitioner at
times borrowed money from her retirement account in order to pay certain
expenses, including basic living expenses.
At a time not disclosed by the record during the 1990s, Mr.
Smith began operating an unincorporated business (real estate business) in
which he (1) acquired and operated certain rental real estate properties in
Indianapolis and (2) engaged in so- called flipping, which involved his
purchasing certain proper- ties, renovating them, and selling them. Although
Mr. Smith's real estate business was initially successful, it became unprof-
itable at an undisclosed time before 2000, which caused the Smiths to incur
certain obligations and debts. Because of the unprofitability of Mr. Smith's
real estate business, around 2000 the Smiths commenced a bankruptcy proceeding.
In late 2001, Mr. Smith established First Choice Appraisal,
Inc. (First Choice), of which he owned at all relevant times all of the
outstanding stock. At no time did petitioner have an ownership interest in
First Choice. At all relevant times, First Choice was treated for Federal
income tax (tax) purposes as an S corporation. During 2003 and 2004, Mr. Smith,
in addition to working full time as a patrol officer for the police department,
appraised certain residential real estate in Indiana on behalf of First Choice.
At all relevant times, First Choice maintained an unidenti-
fied number of bank accounts (First Choice accounts) into which Mr. Smith
deposited all of the money that First Choice received. Petitioner did not have
access to the First Choice accounts.
During 2003 and 2004, First Choice maintained an office in
Indianapolis at which Mr. Smith conducted most of its business. At certain
times during those years, Mr. Smith also worked for First Choice at the Smiths'
residence where he conducted his work for First Choice primarily on the
family's computer. A password was necessary in order to access the First Choice
files that Mr. Smith created and maintained on that computer. Petitioner did
not know that password and did not at any time view those files.
During 2003 and 2004, petitioner did not have access to the
books and records or the financial statements of First Choice that would have
made her aware of the respective amounts of net income that that company was
generating during those years. Petitioner was not involved in the preparation
of any tax return that First Choice filed and was not shown any such return
before or after its filing.
On a date early in 2003 before April 15, the Smiths filed
jointly Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040), for 2002
(2002 joint return). In that return, they reported taxable income of $103,191,
showed tax of $21,658, claimed a withholding tax credit of $6,293, and showed
tax due of $15,365. The Smiths did not pay on or before April 15, 2003, the tax
shown due of $15,365.
Around August 2003, the Smiths entered into an installment
agreement (2003 installment agreement) with the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) with respect to their unpaid tax for 2002. Around November 17, 2003,
respondent applied a $601.49 overpay- ment for the Smiths' taxable year 2000
against their remaining unpaid tax for 2002. Pursuant to the 2003 installment
agreement, the Smiths made monthly payments to the Service of at least $1,000
from December 2003 through October 2004. 2
Because of certain activities (discussed below) in which Mr.
Smith engaged on behalf of First Choice while appraising certain residential
real estate, around late 2003 or early 2004 the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) began investigating him and that company. In February 2004, the FBI
executed a search warrant on Mr. Smith at the Smiths' residence and searched it
for about four hours. During that search, Mr. Smith and the Smiths' son were
present but not petitioner.
Around July 7, 2004, the Smiths filed Form 1040 for 2003
(2003 joint return). 3 In that return, the Smiths reported, inter alia, (1)
wages of $78,057, 4 (2) net income of $3,185 from the Mary Kay activity, (3)
net income of $131,718 from First Choice, (4) adjusted gross income of $213,048,
and (5) taxable income of $167,235. In the 2003 joint return, the Smiths (1)
showed tax of $37,006 and self-employment tax of $450, (2) claimed a withhold-
ing tax credit of $6,219, 5 and (3) showed tax due of $31,680.
Around July 7, 2004, Mr. Smith gave the 2003 joint return to
petitioner and asked her to sign it. Although petitioner did not review that
entire return before signing it, she was aware (1) that First Choice, an S
corporation, generated certain income that was reported in that return and (2)
that that return showed a significant amount of tax due. Petitioner asked Mr.
Smith how he intended to pay the tax shown due in the 2003 joint return. Mr.
Smith responded that he would pay it from the profits that First Choice would
generate in the following year.
Petitioner and Mr. Smith signed the 2003 joint return but
did not pay the tax shown due in that return when they filed it around July 7,
2004. At the time the Smiths filed the 2003 joint return, petitioner did not
suffer from any physical or mental illness.
At a time not disclosed by the record after the Smiths filed
the 2003 joint return, petitioner recommended to Mr. Smith that he establish a
quarterly payment plan with the Service with respect to any tax estimated to be
due on income generated by First Choice in order to reduce the amount that the
Smiths would owe when they filed a tax return in which they reported such
income. Mr. Smith did not do so.
From November 2004 to January 2005, the Smiths did not make
the payments required under the 2003 installment agreement. As a result, on
January 14, 2005, respondent issued a separate Letter LT11, Final
Notice--Notice of Intent to Levy and Your Notice of a Right to a Hearing
(notice of levy), to petitioner and Mr. Smith with respect to 2002 and 2003.
Respondent included with the notice of levy that respondent issued to
petitioner, inter alia, Publication 594, What You Should Know About The IRS
Collection Process. That publication indicated that so-called innocent spouse
relief might be available to certain taxpayers and di- rected taxpayers to
another publication of the Service discussing such relief.
On January 25, 2005, a grand jury for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana (District Court) indicted Mr. Smith
and nine other individuals on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United
States, wire fraud, and money laundering. 6 That indictment alleged that one or
more cocon- spirators of Mr. Smith purchased certain property for low prices
and then sold that property to another coconspirator who pur- chased it for an
inflated price (second purchase) and thereafter failed to make the required
mortgage loan payments to the lending institution that financed the second
purchase. The second purchase by another coconspirator caused a significant
loss to the lending institution because the property purchased was worth
considerably less than the outstanding mortgage loan. The indictment alleged
that Mr. Smith provided an inaccurate and inflated appraisal in order to (1)
aid certain of his cocon- spirators in obtaining financing for the second
purchase of the subject property at an inflated price and (2) appropriate to
himself and his coconspirators the gain realized by the seller in the second
purchase.
After Mr. Smith was indicted, he was arrested, released on
his own recognizance pending his trial in the District Court, and suspended in
January or February 2005 from the police department.
Around April 3, 2005, pursuant to the respective notices of
levy issued to petitioner and Mr. Smith, respondent levied against certain
unidentified assets of one or both of them and credited $2,412.58 against their
tax liability for 2002.
Around April 13, 2005, the Smiths filed Form 1040 for 2004
(2004 joint return). 7 In that return, the Smiths reported, inter alia, (1)
wages of $83,941, 8 (2) net income of $650 from the Mary Kay activity, (3) net
income of $133,000 from First Choice, (4) adjusted gross income of $219,210,
and (5) taxable income of $183,188. In the 2004 joint return, the Smiths (1) showed
tax of $41,477 and self-employment tax of $91, (2) claimed a withholding tax
credit of $6,740, 9 and (3) showed tax due of $35,805. 10
Around April 13, 2005, Mr. Smith gave the 2004 joint return
to petitioner and asked her to sign it. Although petitioner did not review that
entire return before signing it, she was aware (1) that First Choice, an S
corporation, generated certain income that was reported in that return and (2)
that that return showed a significant amount of tax due. Petitioner asked Mr.
Smith how he intended to pay the tax shown due in the 2004 joint return. Mr.
Smith responded that he would pay it from the profits that First Choice would
generate in the following year.
Petitioner and Mr. Smith signed the 2004 joint return but
did not pay the tax shown due in that return when they filed it around April
13, 2005. At the time the Smiths filed the 2004 joint return, petitioner did
not suffer from any physical or mental illness.
Around May 16, 2005, pursuant to the respective notices of
levy issued to petitioner and Mr. Smith, respondent levied against certain
unidentified assets of one or both of them and credited $803.31 against their
tax liability for 2002. Around March 27, 2006, respondent applied an
overpayment of $5,581 for the Smiths' taxable year 2005 as credits of $1,388.10
and $4,192.90 against the amounts that they owed for 2002 and 2003,
respectively. Around April 15, 2006, respondent applied an overpayment of $439
for the Smiths' taxable year 2005 as a credit against the amount that they owed
for 2003.
On September 11, 2006, the District Court commenced the
trial of Mr. Smith and certain of his coconspirators on the charges in the
indictment. On September 22, 2006, the jury unanimously found Mr. Smith guilty
of each of the counts against him. On January 26, 2007, the District Court
sentenced Mr. Smith to 57 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised
release. The District Court also ordered Mr. Smith to pay restitution of
$1,086,292.80 to certain lending institutions. On March 1, 2007, Mr. Smith
reported to the Federal prison at Ashland, Kentucky, to begin serving his
prison sentence. As of the time of the trial in this case, Mr. Smith was to be
released from prison around October 25, 2010. As of that time, petitioner
expected that Mr. Smith would return to live with her after his release.
Around November 1, 2007, petitioner filed Form 8857, Request
for Innocent Spouse Relief (Form 8857), with respect to 2003 and 2004.
Petitioner attached to that form Form 12510, Questionnaire for Requesting
Spouse (Form 12510). (We shall sometimes refer collectively to Form 8857 and
Form 12510 that petitioner filed with respect to 2003 and 2004 as petitioner's
innocent spouse relief request.) In petitioner's innocent spouse relief
request, she claimed (1) that she had no reason to believe there was a problem
with the 2003 joint return or the 2004 joint return and (2) that Mr. Smith
handled all of the family finances. At the time she filed petitioner's innocent
spouse relief request, petitioner did not suffer from any physical or mental
illness.
In petitioner's Form 8857, petitioner claimed total monthly
income of $4,559 consisting of monthly wages of $3,559 and monthly gifts of
$1,000. In that form, petitioner also claimed total monthly expenses of $4,534
consisting of:
Claimed Monthly Expense
Amount
Federal,
State, and local taxes
$326
Rent or
mortgage
1,735
Utilities
200
Telephone 60
Food
200
<1>
Car
(including car payments and insurance) 1,300
Medical expenses 84
Life
insurance 19
Clothing
10
<2>
Tuition 600
Total
4,534
<1>
In Form
12510 that petitioner attached to Form 8857 that
she submitted to the
Service, petitioner claimed total monthly
car expenses of
$1,500 consisting of $1,200 for automobile
payments, $100 for
automobile insurance, and $200 for automobile
gas and repairs. The
record does not establish why petitioner
claimed $1,300 in
Form 8857 and $1,500 in Form 12510.
<2>
The tuition expense that petitioner
claimed was for tuition
that she paid to the
university that the Smiths' daughter was
attending.
Around December 27, 2007, Mr. Smith submitted to respondent
Form 12508, Questionnaire for Non-Requesting Spouse. In that form, Mr. Smith
claimed that he and petitioner maintained sepa- rate bank accounts, that
petitioner did not have any access to the First Choice accounts, and that
petitioner was not involved in any of the business or the financial affairs of
First Choice.
On November 19, 2007, respondent issued to petitioner Letter
3661C, Preliminary Determination (preliminary determination), with respect to
petitioner's request for relief under
section 6015 for 2003. In that letter, respondent determined that
petitioner was not entitled to that relief because she did not file her request
for relief within two years of the first collec- tion activity with respect to
2003.
Around December 19, 2007, petitioner submitted to respondent
Form 12509, Statement of Disagreement (Form 12509), in response to respondent's
determination with respect to her request for relief under section 6015 for 2003 (2007 Form 12509). In
that form, petitioner stated:
I was unaware of the attempts from the IRS to collect the
debt. When I found out, my spouse (Michael) as- sured me that the matter was
being taken care of. Michael was the person who received the mail at our house.
For many years of our marriage he was responsi- ble for all the household
expenses. He had a full-time job and owned a small business whose tax
consequences were attached to our personal income tax returns. The tax returns
were completed by a third party tax profes- sional. I had no reason to question
or review the returns each year, so I signed them in reliance on their
accuracy. My inability to pay this debt only became a matter of heightened
concern this year after Michael was incar- cerated. *** Michael believed he
would be able to pay all expenses including any taxes when the investi- gation
(which turned into a case) was settled. He believed [he] would be vindicated,
return to work, get the money back that was taken from him and be able [to]
make arrangements to settle any outstanding debt. That did not happen. *** His
incarceration has created a financial hardship for me, my son and my daughter.
I have been forced to give up our four bedroom house and move to a two bedroom
apartment. I cannot make the mortgage payment so the house will be foreclosed
on soon. I am now attempting to work to resolve this situation. I ask that the
IRS grant me Equitable Relief from this debt as it was my reasonable belief
that my husband was taking care of any expenses due from his business including
the taxes. This debt places an extreme financial hardship on me and my and
[sic] children who have already lost our home. This debt places a finan- cial
strain on the daily care of my children. Please also consider the fact that
prior to my husband's problems I was fully compliant with the tax laws in every
year prior and since. As you can see by the data provided on Form 12510, this
tax debt is more than my annual salary. This tax debt was not a result of my
doings or knowl- edge. I relied on my husband and a professional tax preparer.
I have now been faced with financial ruin because of it. I respectfully request
that the IRS grant me Equitable Relief from this debt.
An examiner working for the Service (respondent's examiner) prepared
an examination workpaper dated January 9, 2008 (examina- tion workpaper) with
respect to petitioner's request for relief under section 6015 for 2004. In that workpaper,
respondent's examiner concluded that petitioner is not entitled to relief under
that section for any portion of the underpayment for that year. The examination
workpaper stated, inter alia: GENERAL INFORMATION Denied - She is liable for
part of the UP [underpay- ment]. Per tax ran & attribution worksheet they
both did not have enough taxes withheld from their income to pay the bal due.
She is liable for $1180 & he is liable for $33648. She has no reason to
believe he was going to pay. She knew there was a bal due & she knew they
had financial problems because he lost his job & his business closed. She
also knew there was a bal due from the previous yr not paid. It would not cause
an economic hardship to hold her liable. Her income exceeds her expenses by
$625 a month. They have not been apart 12 months. SPOUSE'S RESPONSE He just talks
about she was not involved in his busi- ness. He does not talk about the
balance due. EVALUATION PROCESS
Year 2004
IRC 6015(f)
Liability arose on or after July 22, 1998
Joint return is valid There is enough information to
determine the claim No OIC accepted Eligibility factors: Underpayment of tax -
relief is not available under IRC
6015(b) & 6015(c) Filed a joint return Claim filed timely Liability unpaid,
or RS [requesting spouse] may have refundable payments Not a fraudulent return
No fraudulent transfer of assets No disqualified assets transferred The
underpaid tax is not solely attributable to the NRS [nonrequesting spouse]
Attribution: Per the attribution worksheet they both did not have enough taxes
withheld from their income to pay the balance due. Partial attribution to the
NRS. Continue evaluating for the portion attributable to the NRS. Deny relief
for the portion attributable to the RS. Tier I factors (limited scope):
Taxpayers are currently not divorced, widowed or le- gally separated, and did
not live apart prior to the claim for at least 12 consecutive months Tier I
factors (limited scope) not met Tier II factors: Taxpayers are currently not
divorced, widowed Against or legally separated, and did not live apart prior to
the claim for at least 12 consecutive months No economic hardship Against
Explanation: The info she provided shows her income exceeds her expenses by $25
a month but she added her daughters college tuition of $600 a month as an
expenses & after a call to her to verify this that [sic] is not a basic
living expenses so her in- come exceeds by $625 a month. No marital abuse No
poor mental or physical health No legal obligation established Knowledge:
Background:
RS - Bachelor of Science in NRS - Some college Business
Administration Business Admin, Finance, Intro Acctg, Marketing, Stastics [sic]
Involvement:
RS - She had her own account NRS - He had his that her
income was own account. deposited into. They had no joint account. Lifestyle
changes: No NRS's elusiveness: No Duty to inquire: She did not review the
return before signing it. Living arrangements: Lived together all year. RS had
knowledge or reason to know Against Explanation: She knew there was a balance
due. She did not have reason to believe he was going to pay it. She knew they
had financial problems when he lost his job & his business was shut down.
They also owed the year before & have not paid it. No significant benefit
gained. For Explanation: She did not receive any benefit. Made a good faith
effort to comply with the tax For laws Explanation: She has been compliant
Unique circumstances: No Not meeting Tier II factors - deny claim Tier II
consideration: Based on the above facts it is equitable to hold the RS lia- ble
for the balance. She did not have reason to believe he was going to pay. It
would not cause an economic hardship. They are still married/living together.
Tier II factors not met - deny Claim denied under IRC 6015(f) - full scope CONCLUSION 2004 -
Denied under 6015(f) She is liable for part bal due. She did not have reason to
believe he was going to pay. It would not cause an economic hardship. They are
still married/ living together. She states they have been apart since March
2007 but he is just incarcerated which does not constitute a separation. On
January 18, 2008, respondent issued to petitioner a preliminary determination
with respect to her request for relief under
section 6015 for 2004. In that letter, respondent deter- mined that
petitioner is not entitled to that relief because “you [petitioner] did not
show it would be unfair to hold you respon- sible. You did not prove, that at
the time you signed the return, you had reason to believe the tax would be
paid. Also, the documentation you provided does not prove economic hardship.”
Around February 8, 2008, petitioner submitted to respondent
Form 12509 in response to respondent's determination with respect to her
request for relief under section 6015
for 2004 (2008 Form 12509). That form contained a statement materially
identical to the one that petitioner had included in her 2007 Form 12509.
Petitioner's 2008 Form 12509 also included the following addi- tional
information with respect to her then current expenses:
Since initially
filing for Equitable Relief, it has
become more
clear the magnitude of my monthly expenses.
They include:
Rent $940; Gas & Electricity $150; Food
$280; Tithes
$360; Auto payment $414; Auto Ins. $120;
Auto License
Plates $31; Life Ins. $85; Auto Gas &
Repairs $200;
Medical/Dental Ins. $88; Sears Card $100;
Loan $452;
Clothing $50; Taxes $534; plus co-pays for
any
medical/dental appointments, prescriptions, vision
exams, glasses
and contact lenses, etc.
While I understand the family contribution of my daugh-
ter's college expenses is not considered part of my financial hardship, my son
is in high school and I have varying expenses that relate to that as well (i.e.
his tuition ~$2,000/yr., books $500/yr., etc.) Respondent assigned petitioner's
appeal to an officer (respondent's Appeals officer) in respondent's Appeals
Office (Appeals Office). While that appeal was pending, petitioner submitted to
the Appeals Office (1) a pay statement dated April 25, 2008, reflecting
petitioner's gross salary (petitioner's salary) from Dow and certain amounts
that Dow had deducted from petitioner's salary for the biweekly pay period
April 7 to 20, 2008 (April 2008 pay statement) and (2) a spreadsheet showing
certain of petitioner's monthly expenses (expenses spreadsheet). The April 2008
pay statement indicated that petitioner's monthly salary was $4,001. That pay
statement showed the following biweekly amounts that Dow had deducted from
petitioner's salary:
Actual Prorated
Biweekly Monthly
Deduction 1
Amount Deduction
Federal, State,
and local taxes $284.57 $616.57
Medical, dental,
vision, and
disability
insurance and health
care
reimbursement account
137.86 298.70
Life
insurance 18.18 39.39
<2>
ESP loan
226.09 489.86
Contribution to
petitioner's
retirement
account
110.80 240.07
<3>
34.99
Miscellaneous 16.15
Total
793.65 1,719.58
<1>
For
convenience, we have prorated the amount that Dow
deducted from
petitioner's salary in order to determine the
amount that Dow would
have deducted each month from petitioner's
monthly salary.
<2>
The
ESP loan represented payments that petitioner made to
her retirement
account in order to repay certain loans that she
had made from that
account.
<3>
The
category "Miscellaneous" included two items identified
on the April 2008 pay
statement as "RHCAP" and "HP MBRSHP/SINGL".
The record does not establish what those two items
represented or
why petitioner paid
certain amounts with respect to those items.
In the expenses spreadsheet, petitioner claimed the follow-
ing monthly expenses:
Claimed Expense Amount
Rent
$940.00
Gas
100.00
Electric 50.00
Car payment
414.06
Cable
65.45
Home telephone
32.00
Cellular telephone
130.00
Automobile--gas 200.00
Food
230.00
<1>
Sears card
75.00
Tithes 400.00
Total 2,636.51
<1>
As of the
time of the trial in this case, petitioner had
paid the balance on
her Sears credit card.
After considering petitioner's appeal, respondent's Appeals
officer prepared an appeals case memorandum dated June 27, 2008 (appeals
memorandum). In that memorandum, respondent's Appeals officer concluded that
petitioner is not entitled to relief under
section 6015 for 2003 or 2004. The appeals memorandum stated in pertinent
part: 11 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS ***
§6015(f) Relief is provided for under
§6015(f) if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency
(or any portion of either); and relief is not available under subsection §6015(b) or (c). Threshold Factors
under IRC §6015(f) A joint return was
filed. IRC Sections 6015(b) and (c) are
not avail- able.
There was a timely application for relief.
There was no underpayment as of July 22, 1998. There is no
evidence of fraudulent transfers of assets. There is no evidence of
disqualified assets transferred. There was no evidence of a fraudulent joint
return presented.
The EO [examining officer] determined that the threshold
factors of §6015(f) WERE NOT met
because the taxpayer did not request relief within 2 years of the first
collection activity for the 2003 account. She filed for relief November 2007.
The notice of intent to levy was mailed to each indi- vidual January 2005. The
taxpayer meets the threshold factors for the 2004 tax year because collection
activities had not yet begun. I agree with the examining officer's
determinations. Only the 2004 tax year will be considered further. TIER I &
TIER II factors of §6015(f) The
taxpayer DOES/DOES NOT qualify under the TIER I/TIER II factors of §6015(f) Following are the circumstances
under which equitable relief under
§6015(f) will ordi- narily be granted. Tier I (1) In cases where a
liability reported on a joint return is unpaid, equitable relief under §6015(f) will ordinarily be granted in cases
where uALLu of the following elements are satisfied: (a) At the time relief is
requested, the requesting spouse is no longer married to, or is legally
separated from, the nonrequesting spouse, or has not been a member of the same
household as the nonrequesting spouse at any time during the 12-month period
ending on the date relief was requested; Relevant facts from taxpayer &
Govern- ment... the taxpayer is still married and did not mention any plans to
file for divorce. Her spouse is incarcerated for the next few years in federal
prison. This element IS NOT satisfied because... the taxpayers are married and
separate living arrangements due to imprisonment does not qualify as sepa- rate
households.
(b) At the time the return was signed, the requesting spouse
had no knowledge or reason to know that the tax would not be paid. The
requesting spouse must establish that it was reasonable for the requesting spouse
to be- lieve that the nonrequesting spouse would pay the reported liability.
*** and Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern-
ment... The taxpayer believed that her
husband would be found innocent, rein- stated at his job,
and their lives would return to normal. She signed the 2004 tax return after he
was indicted and had been suspended from his job. This element IS NOT satisfied
because... the taxpayer knew that the tax liability would not be paid for some
time due to the criminal proceedings that were taking place during 2005. The
couple was using their savings to pay for their personal living expenses and
his attorney fees.
(c) The requesting spouse will suffer eco- nomic hardship if
relief is not granted. For purposes of this section, the determination of
whether a requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship will be made by the
Commis- sioner or the Commissioner's delegate, and will be based on rules
similar to those pro- vided in
§301.6343-1(b)(4) of the Regulations on Procedure and Administration ***
Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer is trying to
change the family's standard of living so that her income is enough to pay
their basic living expenses. She has moved from the family home to an apartment
because she could not afford the mortgage payment. The taxpayer is experiencing
economic hardship with or without this tax lia- bility. This element IS
satisfied because... the taxpayer is suffering an economic hard- ship and is
unable to pay her basic living expenses at the present time. Tier II The
Secretary may grant equitable relief under
§6015(f) if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is
inequita- ble to hold the requesting spouse liable for all or part of the
unpaid liability or defi- ciency. The following is a partial list of the
positive and negative factors that will be taken into account in determining
whether to grant full or partial equitable relief under §6015(f). No single factor will be
determinative of whether equitable relief will or will not be granted in any
particular case. Rather, all factors will be considered and weighed
appropriately. The list is not intended to be exhaustive.
(1) Factors that favor relief. The factors weighing in favor
of relief in- clude, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Marital status.
The requesting spouse is separated (whether legally separated or liv- ing
apart) or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse. Relevant facts from taxpayer
& Govern- ment... The taxpayer is still married and did not mention any
plans to file for divorce. Her spouse is incarcerated for the next few years in
federal prison. This element IS NOT satisfied because... the taxpayers are
married and separate living arrangements due to imprisonment does not qualify
as sepa- rate households.
(b) Economic hardship. The requesting spouse would suffer
economic hardship (within the meaning of section 4.02(1)(c) of this revenue
procedure) if relief from the liability is not granted. Relevant facts from
taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer is trying to change the family's
standard of living so that her income is enough to pay their basic living
expenses. She has moved from the family home to an apartment because she could
not afford the mortgage payment. The taxpayer is experiencing economic hardship
with or without this tax lia- bility. This element IS satisfied because... the
taxpayer is suffering an economic hard- ship and is unable to pay her basic
living expenses at the present time.
(c) Abuse. The requesting spouse was abused by the
nonrequesting spouse, but such abuse did not amount to duress. Relevant facts
from taxpayer & Govern- ment... the taxpayer was not abused by her spouse.
This factor does not favor relief be- cause... there is no evidence or allega-
tion of abuse.
(d) No knowledge or reason to know. In the case of a
liability that was properly re- ported but not paid, the requesting spouse did
not know and had no reason to know that the liability would not be paid. ***
Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer believed that
her husband would be found innocent, rein- stated at his job, and their lives
would return to normal. She signed the 2004 tax return after he was indicted
and had been suspended from his job. This element IS NOT satisfied because... the
taxpayer knew that the tax liability would not be paid for some time due to the
criminal proceedings that were taking place during 2005. The couple was using
their savings to pay for their personal living expenses and his attorney fees.
(e) Nonrequesting spouse's legal obligation. The
nonrequesting spouse has a legal obliga- tion pursuant to a divorce decree or
arrange- ment to pay the outstanding liability. This will not be a factor
weighing in favor of relief if the requesting spouse knew or had reason to
know, at the time the divorce de- cree or agreement was entered into, that the
nonrequesting spouse would not pay the lia- bility. Relevant facts from
taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer is still legally married to her
spouse and does not plan to divorce him at this time. The factor does not favor
relief because... there is no legal obligation from a divorce decree that the
spouse is to pay the liability. (f) Attributable to nonrequesting spouse. The
liability for which relief is sought is solely attributable to the
nonrequesting spouse. Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment... The
taxpayer is liable for a small portion of the liability since her withholding
credits were not enough to cover her share of the tax liability. The majority
of the tax due is credited to the taxpayer's spouse. This factor favors relief
because... a substantial portion of the tax liability is her spouse's
responsibility. (2) Factors weighing against relief. The factors weighing
against relief include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Attributable
to the requesting spouse. The unpaid liability or item giving rise to the
deficiency is attributable to the re- questing spouse. Relevant facts from
taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer is liable for a small portion of
the liability since her withholding credits were not enough to cover her share
of the tax liability. The majority of the tax due is credited to the taxpayer's
spouse. This factor does not weigh against re- lief. (b) Knowledge, or reason
to know. A request- ing spouse knew or had reason to know of the item giving
rise to a deficiency or that the reported liability would be unpaid at the time
the return was signed. This is an ex- tremely strong factor weighing against
re- lief. Nonetheless, when the factors in favor of equitable relief are
unusually strong, it may be appropriate to grant relief under §6015(f) in limited situations where a re-
questing spouse knew or had reason to know that the liability would not be
paid, and in very limited situations where the requesting spouse knew or had
reason to know of an item giving rise to a deficiency. Relevant facts from
taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer believed that her husband would be
found innocent, rein- stated at his job, and their lives would return to
normal. She signed the 2004 tax return after he was indicted and had been
suspended from his job. This factor weighs against relief. (c) Significant
benefit. The requesting spouse has significantly benefited [sic] (beyond normal
support) from the unpaid lia- bility or items giving rise to the deficiency.
See § 1.6013-5(b). Relevant facts from
taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer and her family were paying normal
living expenses and the attorney fees with savings after her spouse was
suspended without pay from his job. This factor does not weigh against re-
lief. (d) Lack of economic hardship. The request- ing spouse will not
experience economic hard- ship (within the meaning of section 4.02(1)(c) of
this revenue procedure) if relief from the liability is not granted. Relevant
facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment... The taxpayer is trying to change the
family's standard of living so that her income is enough to pay their basic
living expenses. She has moved from the family home to an apartment because she
could not afford the mortgage payment. The taxpayer is experiencing economic
hardship with or without this tax lia- bility. This factor does not weigh
against re- lief. (e) Noncompliance with federal income tax laws. The
requesting spouse has not made a good faith effort to comply with federal
income tax laws in the tax years following the tax year or years to which the
request for relief relates. Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment...
The taxpayer and her spouse have filed and paid their tax liabilities for the
2005 and 2006 tax years. This factor does not weigh against re- lief. (f)
Requesting spouse's legal obligation. The requesting spouse has a legal
obligation pursuant to a divorce decree or agreement to pay the liability.
Relevant facts from taxpayer & Govern- ment... the taxpayer is still
legally married to her spouse and does not plan to divorce him at this time.
This factor does weigh against relief.
No additional factors were presented by the tax- payer that
would favor relief.
Taking into account all the facts and circumstances in this
case, there are hazards that would be faced by both sides should the case be
heard at US Tax Court. In an effort to settle both tax years, I offered to
relieve her of his liability for the 2004 tax year. She has not accepted the
offer. Because the taxpayer did not establish that it would be inequitable to
hold her liable for the 2003 and 2004 tax years, I am recommending that the
examiner's posi- tion should be sustained. The taxpayer does not meet the
statutory requirements for the 2003 tax year and has not proven her case
regarding the 2004 tax year. On July 11, 2008, respondent issued to petitioner
the notice of determination. In that notice, respondent denied petitioner's
request for relief under section 6015
for each of 2003 and 2004. With respect to 2003, the notice of determination
stated in pertinent part:
You [petitioner] did not file your request timely. IRC section 6015 requires innocent spouse
claims to be filed no later than two years after we start collection activity
against you. Our records show the date that the IRS first initiated collection
activity against you by sending you a due process notice was 1/15/2005. With
respect to 2004, the notice of determination stated in per- tinent part: “The
information we have available does not show you meet the requirements for
relief.”
As of April 30, 2010, the Smiths owed a balance of
$50,051.55 with respect to 2003. As of that date, the Smiths owed a balance of
$59,545.28 with respect to 2004.
At the trial in this case, petitioner claimed that certain
of her monthly expenses had changed (revised monthly expenses) since she
submitted petitioner's innocent spouse relief request and the expenses
spreadsheet. The revised monthly expenses that petitioner claimed at trial
consisted of:
Amount
Claimed Monthly Expense Rent $1,080 Electric 90 Cable 120 1
Telephone 187 Automobile, life, and renter's insurance 127
As of the time of the trial in this case, petitioner had a
monthly salary of $4,001 and monthly expenses of $4,004 consist- ing of: 12
Monthly Expense Amount Federal, State, and local taxes $617
Rent 1,080 Electric 90 Gas 100 Telephone 187 Cable 120 Car (including car
payments and gasoline) 614 Automobile, life, and renter's insurance 127 Food 230
Medical expenses (including insurance, dental, vision, and disability) 299
Retirement account loan payment 490 Clothing 50 Total 4,004
As of the time of the trial in this case, petitioner had
complied with the tax laws for each taxable year after 2003 and 2004.
OPINION
The parties' only dispute is whether petitioner is entitled
to relief under section 6015(f) for her
taxable year 2004. 13 ___ (2011); Hall v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 374 (2010). In Lantz, the Court of
Appeals upheld the validity of sec. 1.6015-5(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., which
requires that a requesting spouse file a request for relief no more than two
years after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) first begins
collection activity with respect to the year for which relief is
requested. (continued...)Petitioner
bears the burden of proving that she is entitled to relief under that section.
See Rule 142(a); Jonson v. Commis- sioner,
118 T.C. 106, 113 (2002), affd.
353 F.3d 1181 [93 AFTR 2d 2004-323] (10th Cir. 2003).
Section 6015(f)
provides:
SEC. 6015. RELIEF
FROM JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY ON JOINT RETURN.
(f) Equitable Relief.--Under procedures pre- scribed by the
Secretary, if—
(1) taking into
account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the indi-
vidual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either);
and
(2) relief is not available to such individ- ual under
subsection (b) or (c), the Secretary may relieve such individual of such
liability.
As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has pre-
scribed procedures in Revenue Procedure
2003-61 that are to be used in determining whether it would be inequitable to
find the requesting spouse liable for part or all of the underpayment of tax.
That revenue procedure lists seven threshold conditions (threshold conditions)
which must be satisfied before the Commis- 13 (...continued) Lantz v.
Commissioner, supra at 486. Petitioner filed Form 8857 more than two years
after respondent first began collection activity with respect to 2003. sioner
will consider a request for relief under
section 6015(f). Rev. Proc.
2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297.
Petitioner concedes that she does not satisfy all of the
threshold conditions with respect to the portion of the underpay- ment for 2004
that is attributable to herself. See
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(7). On the record before us, we find that
petitioner is not entitled to relief under
section 6015(f) for that portion.
The parties agree that petitioner satisfies all of the
threshold conditions with respect to the portion of the underpay- ment for 2004
that is attributable to Mr. Smith. Where the requesting spouse satisfies the
threshold conditions, section 4.02(1) of
Revenue Procedure 2003-61 sets forth the circumstances under which the
Commissioner ordinarily will grant relief to that spouse under section 6015(f) in a case, like the instant
case, where a liability is reported in a joint return but not paid. Petitioner
concedes that she does not qualify for relief under section 4.02(1) of Revenue Procedure 2003-61. Instead, she
relies on section 4.03 of that revenue procedure in support of her claim for
relief under section 6015(f).
Section 4.03 of
Revenue Procedure 2003-61 sets forth the following factors that are to
be considered in determining whether a requesting spouse is entitled to relief
under section 6015(f): (1) Whether the
requesting spouse is separated or divorced from the nonrequesting spouse
(marital status factor);
(2) whether the requesting spouse would suffer economic
hardship if not granted relief (economic hardship factor); (3) whether the
requesting spouse knew or had reason to know that the nonre- questing spouse
would not pay the tax liability (knowledge factor); (4) whether the
nonrequesting spouse has a legal obliga- tion to pay the outstanding tax
liability pursuant to a divorce decree or agreement (legal obligation factor);
(5) whether the requesting spouse received a significant benefit from the item
giving rise to the deficiency (significant benefit factor); and (6) whether the
requesting spouse has made a good faith effort to comply with the tax laws for
the taxable years following the taxable year to which the request for such
relief relates (com- pliance factor). 14
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a), 2003-2 C.B. at 298-299. In making
our determination under section 14
Other factors that may be considered under Revenue Proce-
dure 2003-61 are (1) whether the nonrequesting spouse abused the requesting
spouse (abuse factor) and (2) whether the requesting spouse was in poor mental
or physical health (mental or physical health factor) when he or she signed the
tax return (return) or when he or she requested relief. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(b), 2003-2
C.B. at 298. In the event (1) the nonrequest- ing spouse abused the requesting
spouse or (2) the requesting spouse was in poor mental or physical health when
he or she signed the return or when he or she requested relief, the abuse
factor or the mental or physical health factor, as the case may be, will be
taken into account. Id. However, where, as here, (1) the nonrequesting spouse
did not abuse the requesting spouse and (2) the requesting spouse was not in
poor mental or physical health when she signed the return or when she requested
relief, those factors are not taken into account. Id. 6015(f), we shall
consider those factors and any other relevant factors. No single factor is to
be determinative in any particu- lar case, and all factors are to be considered
and weighed appropriately.
With respect to the marital status factor, the parties agree
that the Smiths remained married as of the time of the trial in this case.
With respect to the economic hardship factor, 15 respondent
(ii) Information from taxpayer.—In determining a reasonable
amount for basic living expenses the direc- tor will consider any information
provided by the taxpayer including—
(A) The taxpayer's age, employment status and history,
ability to earn, number of dependents, and status as a dependent of someone
else;
(B) The amount reasonably necessary for food, clothing,
housing (including utilities, home-owner insurance, home-owner dues, and the
like), medical expenses (including health insurance), transportation, current
tax payments (including federal, state, and local), alimony, child support, or
other court-ordered payments, and expenses necessary to the taxpayer's
production of income (such as dues for a trade union or professional
organization, or child care payments which allow the taxpayer to be gainfully
employed); (continued...) argues that
petitioner “merely testified that she had the ex- penses listed in her brief,
but did not provide any substantia- tion of those expenses.” We reject
respondent's argument. In addition to her testimony, which we found to be
credible, peti- tioner submitted (1) Form 8857 in which she claimed certain
expenses, (2) the 2008 Form 12509 in which she provided addi- tional
information about her monthly expenses, (3) the April 2008 pay statement
detailing certain expenses that Dow deducted from her wages, and (4) the
expenses spreadsheet in which she detailed certain of her expenses. In
evaluating petitioner's request for relief, neither respondent's examiner nor
respondent's Appeals officer maintained that petitioner was not entitled to
relief because she failed to substantiate her claimed expenses. In fact,
respondent's Appeals officer relied on those claimed expenses in reaching the
conclusion in the appeals memorandum that petitioner was “experiencing economic
hardship with or without this tax liability.”
We have found that as of the time of the trial in this case
petitioner had (1) a monthly salary of $4,001 and (2) monthly expenses of $4,004
exclusive of certain expenses that petitioner argues should be included as part
of her basic living expenses 16 and certain other expenses that respondent
argues should be excluded as part of her basic living expenses. 17 Thus, we
have 16
Petitioner argues that her claimed monthly expense for food
(i.e., $230) is unreasonably low and significantly less than the monthly
expense for food (i.e., $537) set forth in the national standards (Service's
national standards) that the Service uses in determining whether a taxpayer is
suffering an economic hardship. Petitioner also asserts that she is entitled to
use the monthly expenses set forth in the Service's national standards for
“Food, Clothing and Other Items”. We need not and shall not address whether petitioner
is entitled to use those monthly expenses. That is because, without including
in peti- tioner's basic living expenses the monthly expenses set forth in the
Service's national standards for “Food, Clothing and Other Items”, we have
found that petitioner's monthly expenses exceed her monthly salary. found that
petitioner's monthly expenses exceeded her monthly salary.
Respondent argues that the balance in petitioner's retire-
ment account, which as of the time of the trial in this case was approximately
$75,000, “could be used to pay a significant portion of the liabilities.”
Respondent's argument ignores that petitioner concedes that she is liable for
the Smiths' tax liability for 2003, which as of April 30, 2010, was $50,051.55.
18 Respondent's argument also ignores that petitioner has at times borrowed
money from her retirement account in order to pay certain expenses, including
basic living expenses. We believe that she will be required to continue to
borrow from her retire- ment account in order to meet certain of those basic
living expenses.
On the record before us, we find that petitioner has carried
her burden of establishing that she would suffer economic hard- ship if relief
under section 6015(f) were not granted
with respect to the portion of the underpayment for 2004 that is attributable
to Mr. Smith.
With respect to the knowledge factor, petitioner must
establish that it was reasonable for her to believe that Mr. Smith would pay
the tax shown due in the 2004 joint return. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.02(1)(b),
4.03(2)(a)(iii), 2003-2 C.B. at 298.
Respondent argues that “Based on Mr. Smith's legal difficul-
ties and loss of employment *** petitioner knew or had reason to know that Mr.
Smith would not pay those [tax] liabilities with the return or in a reasonably
prompt time.” 19 Petitioner coun- ters that she had no reason to believe that
the tax shown due in the 2004 joint return would not be paid. That is because,
according to petitioner, it was reasonable for her to believe 19
Respondent's argument that petitioner must believe that the
tax would be paid in a reasonably prompt time is based on Banderas v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-129 [TC
Memo 2007-129]. In Banderas, we held that in order for a belief that a
liability would be paid to be reasonable the requesting spouse must believe
that the funds to pay the liability would be on hand within a reasonably prompt
time. Respondent contends that that holding in Banderas is wrong and that the
requesting spouse must believe that the tax would be paid by the later of the
date on which the return was filed or the date on which the tax is due to be
paid. We need not revisit our holding in Banderas as respondent invites us to
do because, as discussed below, even under that holding we sustain respon-
dent's argument with respect to the knowledge factor. Mr. Smith when he told
her that he would pay that amount out of the profits generated by First Choice
in the following year. Petitioner contends that at the time she signed the 2004
joint return her husband's business, 1st Choice Appraisal (”1st Choice”), was
coming off of an impressive year in 2003 where it had total income of $131,718.
Given that its total income in 2004 was $133,000, sufficient income was being
produced to pay the tax liability. Moreover, although the indictment against
Michael Smith had been filed on January 25, 2005, the trial against him did not
commence until September 11, 2006, over one year after petitioner signed the
2004 return. Moreover, the jury verdict against Mr. Smith was not returned
until January 17, 2007. Thus, although there was perhaps cause for concern at
the time the return was filed, the full extent of Mr. Smith's legal problems
was not yet apparent to petitioner when she signed the return. [Cross-refs. omitted.]
On the record before us, we reject petitioner's argument. We
have found that around April 13, 2005, petitioner and Mr. Smith signed the 2004
joint return. We have also found that at that time petitioner was aware that
(1) around 2000 the Smiths commenced a bankruptcy proceeding; (2) early in 2003
before April 15, the Smiths filed the 2002 joint return in which they showed
tax of $21,658, claimed a withholding tax credit of $6,293, and showed tax due
of $15,365; (3) the Smiths did not pay on or before April 15, 2003, the tax
shown due in the 2002 joint return of $15,365; (4) around August 2003 the
Smiths entered into the 2003 installment agreement; (5) around July 7, 2004,
(a) the Smiths filed the 2003 joint return in which they showed tax due of
$31,680 and (b) petitioner was aware that that return showed a significant
amount of tax due; (6) the Smiths did not include any payment with the 2003
joint return when they filed it around July 7, 2004; (7) from November 2004 to
January 2005 the Smiths did not make the payments required under the 2003
installment agree- ment; (8) on January 25, 2005, a grand jury for the District
Court indicted Mr. Smith on 16 counts; and (9) in January or February 2005 Mr.
Smith was suspended from the police department.
On the record before us, we find that it was not reasonable
for petitioner to believe at the time she signed the 2004 joint return around
April 13, 2005, that First Choice would generate profits in the following year
sufficient to pay the tax shown due in that return. 20
On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed
to carry her burden of establishing that she reasonably believed that the tax
shown due in the 2004 joint return would be paid on or before the date on which
that tax was due. On that record, we further find that petitioner has failed to
carry her burden of establishing that she reasonably believed that the funds to
pay the tax shown due in the 2004 joint return would be available within a
reasonably prompt time. 21 On the record before us, we find that petitioner has
failed to carry her burden of establish- ing that she did not know and had no
reason to know that the tax shown due in the 2004 joint return would not be
paid.
With respect to the legal obligation factor, the parties
agree that there is no divorce decree or other agreement that obligates Mr.
Smith to pay the portion of the underpayment that is attributable to him.
With respect to the significant benefit factor, the parties
agree that petitioner did not receive a significant benefit beyond normal
support from the portion of the underpayment attributable to Mr. Smith.
With respect to the compliance factor, the parties agree
that petitioner has complied with the tax laws for all years after 2004.
Based upon our examination of the entire record before us,
we find that petitioner has carried her burden of establishing that it would be
inequitable to hold her liable for the portion of the underpayment for 2004
that is attributable to Mr. Smith. On that record, we further find that petitioner
has carried her burden of establishing that she is entitled to relief
under section 6015(f) for that portion
of that underpayment. 21
See supra note 19.
We have considered all of the contentions and arguments of
the parties that are not discussed herein, and we find them to be without
merit, irrelevant, and/or moot.
To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of petitioner,
Decision will be entered under Rule 155.
1
All section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times.
All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
2
Pursuant to the 2003
installment agreement, in June and October 2004 the Smiths paid to the Service
$2,000 and $1,500, respectively.
3
Mr. Smith hired
Jimmie Johnson (Mr. Johnson), a self-em- ployed tax preparer, to prepare their
2003 joint return. The Smiths previously had used H&R Block to prepare
their tax re- turns.
4
The wages of $78,057
that the Smiths reported in the 2003 joint return consisted of $35,237.38 that
Dow paid to petitioner and $42,820.35 that the police department paid to Mr.
Smith during 2003. We note that the Smiths rounded to the nearest dollar all amounts
that they reported in the respective joint tax returns that they filed for 2003
and 2004.
5
The $6,219
withholding tax credit that the Smiths claimed in the 2003 joint return
consisted of $3,121.66 that Dow withheld from petitioner's wages and $3,096.97
that the police department withheld from Mr. Smith's wages during 2003.
6
The indictment
against Mr. Smith and the nine other indi- viduals contained 101 counts. Mr.
Smith was indicted on only 2 counts of conspiracy to defraud the United States,
13 counts of wire fraud, and 1 count of money laundering.
7
Mr. Johnson, who
prepared the Smiths' 2003 joint return, also prepared their 2004 joint return.
8
The wages of $83,941
that the Smiths reported in the 2004 joint return consisted of $37,774.05 that
Dow paid to petitioner and $46,166.76 that the police department paid to Mr.
Smith during 2004.
9
The $6,740
withholding tax credit that the Smiths claimed in the 2004 joint return
consisted of $3,544.06 that Dow withheld from petitioner's wages and $3,195.74
that the police department withheld from Mr. Smith's wages during 2004.
10
The tax due shown in
the 2004 joint return included an estimated tax penalty of $977.
11
In the appeals
memorandum, respondent's Appeals officer analyzed petitioner's appeal under the
factors set forth in Rev. Proc.
2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447 ( Revenue
Procedure 2000-15). We note that Rev.
Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296 (
Revenue Procedure 2003-61), superseded
Revenue Procedure 2000-15. Revenue Proce- dure 2003-61 is effective for
requests for relief under sec. 6015(f)
that were filed on or after Nov. 1, 2003. Id.
sec. 7. Revenue Procedure 2003-61
is applicable in this case because petitioner filed petitioner's innocent
spouse relief request around Nov. 1, 2007.
90
1
At the time of the
trial in this case, petitioner had disconnected her landline home telephone
service. At that time, petitioner and her children had only cellular telephone
service.
12
For convenience, we
have rounded petitioner's monthly expenses to the nearest dollar.
90
50
13
13
14
15
In determining
whether a requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship, sec. 4.02(1)(c)
of Revenue Procedure 2003-61 requires
reliance on rules similar to those provided in
sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs. That regulation gener-
ally provides that an individual suffers an economic hardship if the individual
is unable to pay his or her reasonable basic living expenses. Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin.
Regs., provides in pertinent part:
16
17
Respondent argues
that cable television, tithes to peti- tioner's church, and certain
contributions to petitioner's retirement account do not constitute reasonable
basic living expenses. We need not and shall not address whether tithes to
petitioner's church and certain contributions to petitioner's retirement
account constitute reasonable basic living expenses. That is because, without
including in petitioner's reasonable basic living expenses those tithes and
those contributions, we have found that petitioner's monthly expenses exceed her
monthly salary. We have included $120 for cable television in peti- tioner's
reasonable basic living expenses. In doing so, we have rejected respondent's
argument that “petitioner's cable expense of $120.00 is not a reasonable basic
living expense”. Even if we were to exclude cable television from petitioner's
reasonable basic living expenses, petitioner's monthly salary would exceed her
monthly expenses by only $117 and would not change our finding below with
respect to the economic hardship factor.
In the alternative, respondent argues that “at best, [peti-
tioner's cable expense] would fall under `other' or `miscella- neous' items of
the National Standards petitioner relies upon and would not be a separate
allowable expense.” Respondent's argu- ment is not clear. In any event, we have
not included in deter- mining petitioner's reasonable basic living expenses any
of the monthly expenses set forth in the Service's national standards for
“Food, Clothing and Other Items”, see supra note 16, and we need not and shall
not address respondent's alternative argument.
18
The tax liability
for 2003 continues to accrue interest until paid. See sec. 6601.
19
20
We thus reject
petitioner's contention that the instant case is materially similar to Downs v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-165 [TC
Memo 2010-165]. We find Downs to be materially distinguishable from the instant
case and petitioner's reliance on that case to be misplaced.
21
21
ev. Proc. 2003-61,
2003-2 CB 296, 07/25/2003, IRC Sec(s). 66
Relief from joint and several liability on joint return.
Headnote:
For requests filed on or after 11/1/2003, IRS has revised
procedure for spouses who wish to request equitable relief from tax liability
under Code Sec. 66(c); or Code Sec. 6015(f); . To be considered for relief,
requesting spouse must have filed return for year in which relief is sought,
relief isn't available under either Code Sec. 6015(b); or Code Sec. 6015(c); ,
application is filed not later than two years after IRS's first collection activity
after 6/22/1998, liability remains unpaid, assets weren't transferred between
spouses as part of a fraudulent scheme, no Code Sec. 6015(c)(4)(B);
disqualified assets were transferred, and spouse seeking relief didn't file
return with intent to defraud. Generally, relief will be granted if requesting
spouse is no longer married or hasn't been member of same household at any time
during 12-month period ending date relief was requested, at time return was
filed, requesting spouse didn't have reason to believe that tax wouldn't be
paid by other spouse, and would suffer economic hardship if relief wasn't
granted. Rev Proc 2000-15, 2000-1 CB 447, is superseded.
Reference(s): ¶ 60,155.01(5); ¶ 665.01(3); Code Sec. 66;
Code Sec. 6015;
Full Text:
1. Purpose And Scope
.01. Purpose.
.01. This revenue procedure provides guidance for a taxpayer
seeking equitable relief from income tax liability under section 66(c) or section 6015(f) of the Internal Revenue Code
(a “requesting spouse”). Section 4.01
of this revenue procedure provides the threshold requirements for any request
for equitable relief. Section 4.02 of
this revenue procedure sets forth the conditions under which the Internal
Revenue Service ordinarily will grant equitable relief under section 6015(f) from an underpayment of
income tax reported on a joint return.
Section 4.03 of this revenue procedure provides a nonexclusive list of
factors for consideration in determining whether relief should be granted
under section 6015(f) because it would
be inequitable to hold a requesting spouse jointly and severally liable for an
underpayment of income tax on a joint return where the conditions of section
4.02 are not met, or for a deficiency. The factors in section 4.03 also will
apply in determining whether to relieve a spouse from income tax liability
resulting from the operation of community property law under the equitable
relief provision of section 66(c).
.02. Scope.
.02. This revenue procedure applies to spouses who request
either equitable relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(f), or equitable relief
under section 66(c) from income tax
liability resulting from the operation of community property law.
2. Background
.01. Section
6013(d)(3) provides that married taxpayers who file a joint return under section 6013 will be jointly and severally
liable for the income tax arising from that joint return. For purposes of section 6013(d)(3) and this revenue
procedure, the term “tax” includes penalties, additions to tax, and interest.
See sections 6601(e)(1) and 6665(a)(2).
.02. Section 3201(a)
of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (RRA), enacted
section 6015, which provides relief in certain circumstances from the
joint and several liability imposed by
section 6013(d)(3). Section
6015(b) and (c) specifies two sets of
circumstances under which relief from joint and several liability is available.
If relief is not available under
section 6015(b) or (c), section
6015(f) authorizes the Secretary to grant equitable relief if, taking into
account all the facts and circumstances, the Secretary determines that it is
inequitable to hold a requesting spouse liable for any unpaid tax or any
deficiency (or any portion of either).
Section 66(c) provides relief from income tax liability resulting from
the operation of community property law to taxpayers domiciled in a community
property state who do not file a joint return. Section 3201(b) of RRA
amended section 66(c) to add an
equitable relief provision similar to
section 6015(f).
.03. Section 6015
provides relief only from joint and several liability arising from a joint
return. If an individual signs a joint return under duress, the election to
file jointly is not valid and there is no valid joint return. The individual is
not jointly and severally liable for any income tax liabilities arising from
that return. Therefore, section 6015
does not apply.
.04. Under section 6015(b)
and (c), relief is available only from
a proposed or assessed deficiency.
Section 6015(b) and (c) does not
authorize relief from an underpayment of income tax reported on a joint
return. Section 66(c) and section 6015(f) permit equitable relief for
an underpayment of income tax. The legislative history of section 6015 provides that Congress intended
for the Secretary to exercise discretion in granting equitable relief if a
requesting spouse “does not know, and had no reason to know, that funds
intended for the payment of tax were instead taken by the other spouse for such
other spouse's benefit.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998). Congress
also intended for the Secretary to exercise the equitable relief authority
under section 6015(f) in other
situations if, “taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to hold an individual liable for all or part of any unpaid tax or
deficiency arising from a joint return.” Id.
3. Changes
This revenue procedure supersedes Revenue Procedure 2000-15, changing the
following:
.01. Section 4.01 of
this revenue procedure adds a new threshold requirement under section 4.01(7).
.02. Section
4.03(2)(a)(iii) of this revenue procedure revises the weight given to the
knowledge or reason to know factor.
.03. Section 4.04 of
this revenue procedure broadens the availability of refunds if equitable relief
is granted under section 66(c) or section 6015(f).
4. General Conditions For Relief
.01. Eligibility for equitable relief.
.01. A requesting spouse must satisfy all of the following
threshold conditions to be eligible to submit a request for equitable relief
under section 6015(f). With the
exception of conditions (1) and (2), a requesting spouse must satisfy all of
the following threshold conditions to be eligible to submit a request for
equitable relief under section 66(c).
The Service may relieve a requesting spouse who satisfies all the applicable
threshold conditions set forth below of all or part of the income tax liability
under section 66(c) or section 6015(f), if, taking into account all
the facts and circumstances, the Service determines that it would be inequitable
to hold the requesting spouse liable for the income tax liability. The
threshold conditions are as follows:
(1) The requesting spouse filed a joint return for the
taxable year for which he or she seeks relief.
(2) Relief is not available to the requesting spouse
under section 6015(b) or (c).
(3) The requesting spouse applies for relief no later than
two years after the date of the Service's first collection activity after July
22, 1998, with respect to the requesting spouse. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(2)(i) for the
definition of collection activity.
(4) No assets were transferred between the spouses as part
of a fraudulent scheme by the spouses.
(5) The nonrequesting spouse did not transfer disqualified
assets to the requesting spouse. If the nonrequesting spouse transferred
disqualified assets to the requesting spouse, relief will be available only to
the extent that the income tax liability exceeds the value of the disqualified
assets. For this purpose, the term “disqualified asset” has the meaning given
the term by section 6015(c)(4)(B).
(6) The requesting spouse did not file or fail to file the
return with fraudulent intent.
(7) The income tax liability from which the requesting
spouse seeks relief is attributable to an item of the individual with whom the
requesting spouse filed the joint return (the “nonrequesting spouse”), unless
one of the following exceptions applies:
(a) Attribution solely due to the operation of community
property law. If an item is attributable or partially attributable to the
requesting spouse solely due to the operation of community property law, then
for purposes of this revenue procedure, that item (or portion thereof) will be
considered to be attributable to the nonrequesting spouse.
(b) Nominal ownership. If the item is titled in the name of
the requesting spouse, the item is presumptively attributable to the requesting
spouse. This presumption is rebuttable. For example, H opens an individual
retirement account (IRA) in W's name and forges W's signature on the IRA in
1998. Thereafter, H makes contributions to the IRA and in 2002 takes a taxable
distribution from the IRA. H and W file a joint return for the 2002 taxable
year, but do not report the taxable distribution on their joint return. The
Service later proposes a deficiency relating to the taxable IRA distribution
and assesses the deficiency against H and W. W requests relief from joint and
several liability under section 6015. W
establishes that W did not contribute to the IRA, sign paperwork relating to the
IRA, or otherwise act as if W were the owner of the IRA. W thereby rebutted the
presumption that the IRA is attributable to W.
(c) Misappropriation of funds. If the requesting spouse did
not know, and had no reason to know, that funds intended for the payment of tax
were misappropriated by the nonrequesting spouse for the nonrequesting spouse's
benefit, the Service will consider granting equitable relief although the
underpayment may be attributable in part or in full to an item of the
requesting spouse. The Service will consider relief in this case only to the
extent that the funds intended for the payment of tax were taken by the
nonrequesting spouse.
(d) Abuse not amounting to duress. If the requesting spouse
establishes that he or she was the victim of abuse prior to the time the return
was signed, and that, as a result of the prior abuse, the requesting spouse did
not challenge the treatment of any items on the return for fear of the
nonrequesting spouse's retaliation, the Service will consider granting
equitable relief although the deficiency or underpayment may be attributable in
part or in full to an item of the requesting spouse.
.02. Circumstances under which the Service ordinarily will
grant equitable relief under section
6015(f) with respect to underpayments on joint returns.
.02. (1) If an income tax liability reported on a joint
return is unpaid, the Service ordinarily will grant equitable relief under section 6015(f) (subject to the limitations
of paragraph (2) below) in cases in which all of the following elements are
satisfied:
(a) On the date of the request for relief, the requesting
spouse is no longer married to, or is legally separated from, the nonrequesting
spouse, or has not been a member of the same household as the nonrequesting
spouse at any time during the 12-month period ending on the date of the request
for relief.
(b) On the date the requesting spouse signed the joint
return, the requesting spouse had no knowledge or reason to know that the
nonrequesting spouse would not pay the income tax liability. The requesting
spouse must establish that it was reasonable for the requesting spouse to
believe that the nonrequesting spouse would pay the reported income tax
liability. If a requesting spouse would otherwise qualify for relief under this
section, except for the fact that the requesting spouse's lack of knowledge or
reason to know relates only to a portion of the unpaid income tax liability,
then the requesting spouse may receive relief to the extent that the income tax
liability is attributable to that portion.
(c) The requesting spouse will suffer economic hardship if
the Service does not grant relief. For purposes of this revenue procedure, the
Service will base its determination of whether the requesting spouse will
suffer economic hardship on rules similar to those provided in Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4). After the
requesting spouse is deceased, there can be no economic hardship. See Jonson v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 126 (2002),
appeal docketed, No. 02-9009 (10 Cir. May 24, 2002) (taxpayer appeal filed on
other grounds).
(2) Relief under this section 4.02 is subject to the
following limitation: If the Service adjusts the joint return to reflect an
understatement of income tax, relief will be available only to the extent of
the income tax liability shown on the joint return prior to the Service's
adjustment.
.03. Factors for determining whether to grant equitable
relief.
.03. (1) Applicability. This section 4.03 applies to
requesting spouses who did not file a joint return in a community property
state, who request relief under section
66(c), and satisfy the applicable threshold conditions of section 4.01. This
section 4.03 also applies to requesting spouses who filed a joint return,
request relief under section 6015, and
satisfy the threshold conditions of section 4.01, but do not qualify for relief
under section 4.02.
(2) Factors. The following is a nonexclusive list of factors
that the Service will consider in determining whether, taking into account all
the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse
liable for all or part of the unpaid income tax liability or deficiency, and
full or partial equitable relief under
section 66(c) or section 6015(f)
should be granted. No single factor will be determinative of whether to grant
equitable relief in any particular case. Rather, the Service will consider and
weigh all relevant factors, regardless of whether the factor is listed in this
section 4.03.
(a) Factors that may be relevant to whether the Service will
grant equitable relief include, but are not limited to, the following:
(i) Marital status. Whether the requesting spouse is
separated (whether legally separated or living apart) or divorced from the
nonrequesting spouse. A temporary absence, such as an absence due to
incarceration, illness, business, vacation, military service, or education,
shall not be considered separation for purposes of this revenue procedure if it
can be reasonably expected that the absent spouse will return to a household
maintained in anticipation of his or her return. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(b)(3)(i) for the
definition of a temporary absence.ate, who request relief under section 66(c), and satisfy the applicable
threshold conditions of section 4.01. This section 4.03 also applies to
requesting spouses who filed a joint return, request relief under section 6015, and satisfy the threshold
conditions of section 4.01, but do not qualify for relief under section 4.02.
(2) Factors. The following is a nonexclusive list of factors
that the Service will consider in determining whether, taking into account all
the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse
liable for all or part of the unpaid income tax liability or deficiency, and full
or partial equitable relief under
section 66(c) or section 6015(f)
should be granted. No single factor will be determinative of whether to grant
equitable relief in any particular case. Rather, the Service will consider and
weigh all relevant factors, regardless of whether the factor is listed in this
section 4.03.
(a) Factors that may be relevant to whether the Service will
grant equitable relief include, but are not limited to, the following:
(i) Marital status. Whether the requesting spouse is separated
(whether legally separated or living apart) or divorced from the nonrequesting
spouse. A temporary absence, such as an absence due to incarceration, illness,
business, vacation, military service, or education, shall not be considered
separation for purposes of this revenue procedure if it can be reasonably
expected that the absent spouse will return to a household maintained in
anticipation of his or her return. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(b)(3)(i) for the definition of a temporary
absence.
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