Thursday, April 29, 2010

-2010-53, April 27, 2010

WASHINGTON — As a result of changes made by the recently enacted Affordable Care Act, health coverage provided for an employee's children under 27 years of age is now generally tax-free to the employee, effective March 30, 2010.

The Internal Revenue Service announced today that these changes immediately allow employers with cafeteria plans –– plans that allow employees to choose from a menu of tax-free benefit options and cash or taxable benefits –– to permit employees to begin making pre-tax contributions to pay for this expanded benefit.

IRS Notice 2010-38 explains these changes and provides further guidance to employers, employees, health insurers and other interested taxpayers.

“These changes give employers a unique opportunity to offer a worthwhile benefit to their employees,” IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman said. “We want to make it as easy as possible for employers to quickly implement this change and extend health coverage on a tax-favored basis to older children of their employees.”

This expanded health care tax benefit applies to various workplace and retiree health plans. It also applies to self-employed individuals who qualify for the self-employed health insurance deduction on their federal income tax return.

Employees who have children who will not have reached age 27 by the end of the year are eligible for the new tax benefit from March 30, 2010, forward, if the children are already covered under the employer’s plan or are added to the employer’s plan at any time. For this purpose, a child includes a son, daughter, stepchild, adopted child or eligible foster child. This new age 27 standard replaces the lower age limits that applied under prior tax law, as well as the requirement that a child generally qualify as a dependent for tax purposes.

The notice says that employers with cafeteria plans may permit employees to immediately make pre-tax salary reduction contributions to provide coverage for children under age 27, even if the cafeteria plan has not yet been amended to cover these individuals. Plan sponsors then have until the end of 2010 to amend their cafeteria plan language to incorporate this change.

In addition to changing the tax rules as described above, the Affordable Care Act also requires plans that provide dependent coverage of children to continue to make the coverage available for an adult child until the child turns age 26. The extended coverage must be provided not later than plan years beginning on or after Sept. 23, 2010. The favorable tax treatment described in the notice applies to that extended

Thursday, April 15, 2010

U.S. v. ROZIN, Cite as 105 AFTR 2d 2010-XXXX, 03/23/2010
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UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff, v. Leif D. ROZIN, et al., Defendants.
Case Information:
Code Sec(s):
Court Name: United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division,
Docket No.: No. 1:05-cr-139,
Date Decided: 03/23/2010.
Disposition:
III. ANALYSIS
A. Evidence of Willfulness
Rozin was charged and convicted under Count Two of the Indictment with willful subscription of a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) and under Count Six with attempting to evade taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. To prove Rozin guilty under Count Two, the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Rozin willfully made and subscribed a tax return; (2) the return was subscribed “under penalties of perjury”; and (3) Rozin did not believe the return to be true and correct as to every material matter. See United States v. Kemp, 156 F.3d 1233, 1998 [82 AFTR 2d 98-5162] WL 415990, at 4 (6th Cir. July 6, 1998) (citingUnited States v. Bishop , 412 U.S. 346, 350 [32 AFTR 2d 73-5018], 93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973)). To prove Rozin guilty under Count Six, the Government was required to prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) willfulness; (2) the existence of a tax deficiency; and (3) an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax.See United States v. Curtis , 782 F.2d 593, 595 [57 AFTR 2d 86-753] (6th Cir.1986).
Rozin argues that he is entitled to acquittal as to both counts because the Government failed to present sufficient evidence of willfulness. Specifically, Rozin argues that the Government failed to prove that at the time Rozin signed and filed the 1998 corporate and personal tax returns he knew that the documents were false and fraudulent and that additional taxes were owing. Rozin also maintains that he reasonably relied on the advice of others, particularly Cohen, Liss, Koehler and Keehn, and that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence to negate his good faith belief that the tax returns were accurate.
The Government, in response, alleges that Rozin highlights particular pieces of evidence and views that evidence in a light most favorable to him. The Government argues that, among other things, evidence demonstrating the fraudulent nature of the LOI policy purchases, the backdating of several of the LOI policies, Rozin's use of grantor trusts to protect his money from Caduceus, Rozin's decision to participate in the reinsurance scheme, and Rozin's filing of a false claim under the LOI policies is more than sufficient to prove willfulness.
Willfulness in the context of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 to 7207 means “a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.” Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 [32 AFTR 2d 73-5018], 93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973).
The showing of willfulness can be negated by “a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax laws.” The defendant's belief or misunderstanding need not be objectively reasonable, and whether it was held in good faith should be determined by the fact-finder.
United States v. Aaron, 590 F.3d 405 [104 AFTR 2d 2009-7832] (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202–03 [67 AFTR 2d 91-344], 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991)) (internal citations omitted). However, jurors may consider the reasonableness of a belief in determining whether the defendant held that belief in good faith. United States v. Benson, 67 F.3d 641, 649 [76 AFTR 2d 95-6791] (7th Cir.1995).
Examining the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government, the Court concludes that a rational trier of fact could have found the element of willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt. Multiple pieces of evidence prove that there was no true business purpose for purchasing the various LOI policies beyond reducing the taxable income of the company. The policies did not cover loss of income resulting from a number of specified causes, including death; disability due to accident or sickness; employee voluntary termination; self-inflicted injuries; proven criminal acts; negligent or willful misconduct; substance abuse; dishonesty or fraud; insubordination, incompetence, or inefficiency; conflict of interest; or breach of employment contract. The testimony at trial revealed that there was no real risk that Rozin would lose his income from Rozin, Inc. under any circumstances, aside from bankruptcy, that would actually be covered by the policies. Several witnesses also testified that Rozin, Inc. was not under any imminent threat of bankruptcy.
The dubious nature of any insurance purpose for purchasing the LOI policies was also demonstrated through evidence of the extremely high premium to coverage ratio and the backdating of six of the policies. Specifically, the evidence indicated that the maximum potential coverage under the policies was only approximately 1.2 times greater than the premium payments. Considering all eight LOI policies together, Rozin, Inc. spent approximately $3,460,000 for only $4,190,000 in maximum coverage. Moreover, that maximum coverage amount would only be available in the event that the insured met the many contingencies discussed above upon losing employment. Whatever insurance benefit may have existed was further eroded by the backdating of the policies purchased in August and December of 1999. The backdating resulted in the issuance of half-expired policies, covering periods of time that had already lapsed without the occurrence of any event that would trigger a claim. Rozin disputes the Government's claim that those policies were backdated and that Rozin knew of the backdating. However, the Court finds ample evidence, as described in the statement of facts above, that the policies were backdated and sufficient evidence that Rozin knew of and participated in the decision to backdate the policies.
As indicated above, willfulness can be negated through evidence that Rozin had a good faith belief that he was not violating any tax law. Rozin argues that he reasonably relied on the advice of others and that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence to negate his good faith reliance. A defendant may raise the defense of good faith after having acted in reliance on the advice of an attorney or accountant.See United States v. Claiborne , 765 F.2d 784, 798 [56 AFTR 2d 85-6264] (9th Cir.1985). However, in cases where the defendant has relied on the advice of an attorney or accountant, the defense of good faith is not available if the defendant withheld tax information or took steps to mislead the attorney or accountant. See e.g., id. at 798. Instead, the defendant must have handed over all relevant information. See United States v. Masat, 948 F.2d 923, 930 [69 AFTR 2d 92-361] (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Becker, 965 F.2d 383, 387 [70 AFTR 2d 92-5014] (7th Cir.1992);United States v. Bishop , 291 F.3d 1100, 1107 [89 AFTR 2d 2002-2745] (9th Cir.2002).
Viewing all of this evidence in a light most favorable to the Government, the Court finds sufficient evidence of willfulness. Defendant Rozin fails to demonstrate that no rational trier of fact could find the element of willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt. At most, Rozin has shown that there are different ways of interpreting the evidence. However, the fact that a jurorcould have interpreted the evidence differently does not warrant acquittal.
B. Evidence of an Agreement to Participate in a Conspiracy to Defraud the United States
Rozin was charged and convicted under Count One of the Indictment with knowingly conspiring with the four other named Defendants to defraud the United States for the purpose of impeding, impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of the IRS in the ascertainment, computation, assessment, and collection of federal income taxes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Under 18 U.S.C. § 371, it is illegal for “two or more persons [to] conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose.” To prove a conspiracy, the government must establish: (1) the existence of an agreement to violate the law; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) an overt act constituting actual participation in the conspiracy.See United States v. Hughes , 505 F.3d 578, 593 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1368 (6th Cir.1994). “No formal or express agreement is required.” United States v. Hitow, 889 F.2d 1573, 1577 (6th Cir.1989). Rather, ““a tacit or mutual understanding among the parties will suffice.””United States v. Ables , 167 F.3d 1021, 1031 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Ellzey, 874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir.1989)). The agreement, whether formal or informal, may be proven through circumstantial evidence.See United States v. Crossley , 224 F.3d 847, 856 (6th Cir.2000).
Once the government proves the existence of a conspiracy, the defendant's “connection to the conspiracy must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, but the importance of the connection need not be great.” United States v. Betancourt, 838 F.2d 168, 174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1013 (1988). The government is not required to prove that the defendant “knew every detail [of the conspiracy] or the identity of all the other members involved in the conspiracy.”Crossley , 224 F.3d at 856. It is only necessary for the government to “show that a particular defendant knew the object of the conspiracy and voluntarily associated himself with it to further its objectives.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hitow, 889 F.2d at 1577.
In the instant case, Rozin does not dispute the existence of a conspiracy but claims that he never willfully joined the conspiracy. Instead, Rozin argues that “[t]he evidence taken as a whole clearly indicates that [he] was the object of a conspiracy that may have already been established.... He was, in fact, a buyer of a product that was presented to him as a legal way to invest his money.” (Doc. 278 at 16.) To the contrary, the Court finds for the same reasons as stated above in discussing the evidence of willfulness that there is sufficient evidence that Rozin knew of and intended to join in a conspiracy to defraud the IRS.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant Rozin's motion for judgment of acquittal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Wednesday, April 14, 2010

Committee Report for JCX-30-09, HR3200
DESCRIPTION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 3200, THE "AMERICA'S AFFORDABLE HEALTH CHOICES ACT OF 2009" [JCX-30-09 7/14/2009]

II Other Revenue Provisions

D.. Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine Present Law
In general

The Code provides detailed rules specifying the computation of taxable income, including the amount, timing, source, and character of items of income, gain, loss, and deduction. These rules permit both taxpayers and the government to compute taxable income with reasonable accuracy and predictability. Taxpayers generally may plan their transactions in reliance on these rules to determine the federal income tax consequences arising from the transactions.
In addition to the statutory provisions, courts have developed several doctrines that can be applied to deny the tax benefits of a tax-motivated transaction, notwithstanding that the transaction may satisfy the literal requirements of a specific tax provision. These common-law doctrines are not entirely distinguishable, and their application to a given set of facts is often blurred by the courts and the IRS. Although these doctrines serve an important role in the administration of the tax system, they can be seen as at odds with an objective, "rule-based" system of taxation.
One common-law doctrine applied over the years is the "economic substance" doctrine. In general, this doctrine denies tax benefits arising from transactions that do not result in a meaningful change to the taxpayer's economic position other than a purported reduction in federal income tax. 76
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76
See, e.g., ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), aff'g 73 T.C.M. CCH) 2189 (1997), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1017 (1999); Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Texas 2007), aff'd 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacating and remanding 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004) (slip opinion at 123-124, 128); cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (Mem.) (2007).
Closely related doctrines also applied by the courts (sometimes interchangeable with the economic substance doctrine) include the "sham transaction doctrine" and the "business purpose doctrine." See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (denying interest deductions on a "sham transaction" whose only purpose was to create the deductions). Certain "substance over form" cases involving tax-indifferent parties, in which courts have found that the substance of the transaction did not comport with the form asserted by the taxpayer, have also involved examination of whether the change in economic position that occurred, if any, was consistent with the form asserted, and whether the claimed business purpose supported the particular tax benefits that were claimed. See, e.g., TIFD- III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); BB&T Corporation v. United States, 2007-1 USTC P 50,130 (M.D.N.C. 2007), aff'd 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008).
Economic substance doctrine
Courts generally deny claimed tax benefits if the transaction that gives rise to those benefits lacks economic substance independent of U.S. federal income tax considerations — notwithstanding that the purported activity actually occurred. The Tax Court has described the doctrine as follows:
The tax law . . . requires that the intended transactions have economic substance separate and distinct from economic benefit achieved solely by tax reduction. The doctrine of economic substance becomes applicable, and a judicial remedy is warranted, where a taxpayer seeks to claim tax benefits, unintended by Congress, by means of transactions that serve no economic purpose other than tax savings. 77
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77
ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. at 2215.
Business purpose doctrine
A common law doctrine that often is considered together with the economic substance doctrine is the business purpose doctrine. The business purpose doctrine involves an inquiry into the subjective motives of the taxpayer — that is, whether the taxpayer intended the transaction to serve some useful non-tax purpose. In making this determination, some courts have bifurcated a transaction in which activities with non-tax objectives have been combined with unrelated activities having only tax-avoidance objectives, in order to disallow the tax benefits of the overall transaction. 78
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78
See, ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d at 256 n.48.
Application by the courts
Elements of the doctrine
There is a lack of uniformity regarding the proper application of the economic substance doctrine. 79 Some courts apply a conjunctive test that requires a taxpayer to establish the presence of both economic substance (i.e., the objective component) and business purpose (i.e., the subjective component) in order for the transaction to survive judicial scrutiny. 80 A narrower approach used by some courts is to conclude that either a business purpose or economic substance is sufficient to respect the transaction. 81 A third approach regards economic substance and business purpose as "simply more precise factors to consider" in determining whether a transaction has any practical economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits. 82
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79
"The casebooks are glutted with [economic substance] tests. Many such tests proliferate because they give the comforting illusion of consistency and precision. They often obscure rather than clarify." Collins v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988).
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80
See, e.g., Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The threshold question is whether the transaction has economic substance. If the answer is yes, the question becomes whether the taxpayer was motivated by profit to participate in the transaction."). See also, Klamath Strategic Investment Fund v. United States, 568 F. 3d 537, (5th Cir. 2009)(even if taxpayers may have had a profit motive, a transaction was disregarded where it did not in fact have any realistic possibility of profit and funding was never at risk).
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81
See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985) ("To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and, second, that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists."); IES Industries v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 358 (8th Cir. 2001) ("In determining whether a transaction is a sham for tax purposes [under the Eighth Circuit test], a transaction will be characterized as a sham if it is not motivated by any economic purpose out of tax considerations (the business purpose test), and if it is without economic substance because no real potential for profit exists (the economic substance test)."). As noted earlier, the economic substance doctrine and the sham transaction doctrine are similar and sometimes are applied interchangeably. For a more detailed discussion of the sham transaction doctrine, see, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, Study of Present-Law Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section 3801 of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (including Provisions Relating to Corporate Tax Shelters) (JCS-3-99) at 182.
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82
See, e.g., ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d at 247; James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905, 908 (10th Cir. 1995); Sacks v. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Instead, the consideration of business purpose and economic substance are simply more precise factors to consider . . . We have repeatedly and carefully noted that this formulation cannot be used as a 'rigid two-step analysis'.")
One decision by the Court of Federal Claims questioned the continuing viability of the doctrine. That court also stated that "the use of the 'economic substance' doctrine to trump 'mere compliance with the Code' would violate the separation of powers" though that court also found that the particular transaction at issue in the case did not lack economic substance. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit Court") overruled the Court of Federal Claims decision, reiterating the viability of the economic substance doctrine and concluding that the transaction in question violated that doctrine. 83 The Federal Circuit Court stated that "[w]hile the doctrine may well also apply if the taxpayer's sole subjective motivation is tax avoidance even if the transaction has economic substance, [footnote omitted], a lack of economic substance is sufficient to disqualify the transaction without proof that the taxpayer's sole motive is tax avoidance." 84
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83
Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004) (slip opinion at 123-124, 128); vacated and remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (Mem.) (2007).
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84
The Federal Circuit Court stated that "when the taxpayer claims a deduction, it is the taxpayer who bears the burden of proving that the transaction has economic substance." The Federal Circuit Court quoted a decision of its predecessor court, stating that "Gregory v. Helvering requires that a taxpayer carry an unusually heavy burden when he attempts to demonstrate that Congress intended to give favorable tax treatment to the kind of transaction that would never occur absent the motive of tax avoidance." The Court also stated that "while the taxpayer's subjective motivation may be pertinent to the existence of a tax avoidance purpose, all courts have looked to the objective reality of a transaction in assessing its economic substance." Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d at 1355, 1356.
Nontax economic benefits
There also is a lack of uniformity regarding the type of non-tax economic benefit a taxpayer must establish in order to demonstrate that a transaction has economic substance. Some courts have denied tax benefits on the grounds that a stated business benefit of a particular structure was not in fact obtained by that structure. 85 Several courts have denied tax benefits on doctrine, see, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, Study of Present-Law Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section 3801 of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (including Provisions Relating to Corporate Tax Shelters) (JCS-3-99) at 182. See, e.g., ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d at 247; James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905, 908 (10th Cir. 1995); Sacks v. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Instead, the consideration of business purpose and economic substance are simply more precise factors to consider . . . We have repeatedly and carefully noted that this formulation cannot be used as a 'rigid two-step analysis'.") the grounds that the subject transactions lacked profit potential. 86 In addition, some courts have applied the economic substance doctrine to disallow tax benefits in transactions in which a taxpayer was exposed to risk and the transaction had a profit potential, but the court concluded that the economic risks and profit potential were insignificant when compared to the tax benefits. 87 Under this analysis, the taxpayer's profit potential must be more than nominal. Conversely, other courts view the application of the economic substance doctrine as requiring an objective determination of whether a "reasonable possibility of profit" from the transaction existed apart from the tax benefits. 88 In these cases, in assessing whether a reasonable possibility of profit exists, it may be sufficient if there is a nominal amount of pre-tax profit as measured against expected tax benefits.
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85
See, e.g., Coltec Industries v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The court analyzed the transfer to a subsidiary of a note purporting to provide high stock basis in exchange for a purported assumption of liabilities, and held these transactions unnecessary to accomplish any business purpose of using a subsidiary to manage asbestos liabilities. The court also held that the purported business purpose of adding a barrier to veil-piercing claims by third parties was not accomplished by the transaction. 454 F.3d at 1358-1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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86
See, e.g., Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 361; Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that an unprofitable, leveraged acquisition of Treasury bills, and accompanying prepaid interest deduction, lacked economic substance).
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87
See, e.g., Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d at 739-40 (disallowing deduction even though taxpayer had a possibility of small gain or loss by owning Treasury bills); Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738, 768 (1990) (stating that "potential for gain . . . is infinitesimally nominal and vastly insignificant when considered in comparison with the claimed deductions").
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88
See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F. 2d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 1985) (the economic substance inquiry requires an objective determination of whether a reasonable possibility of profit from the transaction existed apart from tax benefits); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2001) (applied the same test, citing Rice's Toyota World); IES Industries v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001).
Financial accounting benefits
In determining whether a taxpayer had a valid business purpose for entering into a transaction, at least one court has concluded that financial accounting benefits arising from tax savings do not qualify as a non-tax business purpose. 89 However, based on court decisions that recognize the importance of financial accounting treatment, taxpayers have asserted that financial accounting benefits arising from tax savings can satisfy the business purpose test. 90
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89
See American Electric Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, 791-92 (S.D. Ohio 2001), aff'd, 326 F.3d.737 (6th Cir. 2003).
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90
See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, Report of Investigation of Enron Corporation and Related Entities Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy Recommendations (JSC-3-03) February, 2003 ("Enron Report"), Volume III at C-93, 289. Enron Corporation relied on Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 577-78 (1978), and Newman v. Commissioner, 902 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1990), to argue that financial accounting benefits arising from tax savings constitute a good business purpose.
Tax-indifferent parties
A number of cases have involved transactions structured to allocate income for Federal tax purposes to a tax-indifferent party, with a corresponding deduction, or favorable basis result, to a taxable person. The income allocated to the tax-indifferent party for tax purposes was structured to exceed any actual economic income to be received by the tax indifferent party from the transaction. Courts have sometimes concluded that a particular type of transaction did not satisfy the economic substance doctrine. 91 In other cases, courts have indicated that the substance of a transaction did not support the form of income allocations asserted by the taxpayer and have questioned whether asserted business purpose or other standards were met. 92
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91
See, e.g., ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), aff'g 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
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92
See, e.g., TIFD- III-E, Inc. v. United States,
Description of Proposal
The provision clarifies and enhances the application of the economic substance doctrine. Under the provision, in the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only if (1) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and (2) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction. 93 The provision provides a uniform definition of economic substance, but does not alter the flexibility of the courts in other respects.
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93
In applying these tests, any State or local income tax effect which is related to a Federal income tax effect shall be treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax effect.
The determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if the provision had never been enacted. Thus, the provision does not change current law standards in determining when to utilize an economic substance analysis. 94
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94
If the tax benefits are clearly consistent with all applicable provisions of the Code and the purposes of such provisions, it is not intended that such tax benefits be disallowed if the only reason for such disallowance is that the transaction fails the economic substance doctrine as defined in this provision. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. sec. 1.269-2, stating that characteristic of circumstances in which a deduction otherwise allowed will be disallowed are those in which the effect of the deduction, credit, or other allowance would be to distort the liability of the particular taxpayer when the essential nature of the transaction or situation is examined in the light of the basic purpose or plan which the deduction, credit, or other allowance was designed by the Congress to effectuate.
The provision is not intended to alter the tax treatment of certain basic business transactions that, under longstanding judicial and administrative practice are respected, merely because the choice between meaningful economic alternatives is largely or entirely based on comparative tax advantages. Among 95 these basic transactions are (1) the choice between capitalizing a business enterprise with debt or equity; 96 (2) a U.S. person's choice between utilizing a foreign corporation or a domestic corporation to make a foreign investment; 97 (3) the choice to enter a transaction or series of transactions that constitute a corporate organization or reorganization under subchapter C; 98 and (4) the choice to utilize a related-party entity in a transaction, provided that the arm's length standard of section 482 and other applicable concepts are satisfied. 99 Leasing transactions, like all other types of transactions, will continue to be analyzed in light of all the facts and circumstances. 100 As under present law, whether a particular transaction meets the requirements for specific treatment under any of these provisions can be a question of facts and circumstances. Also, the fact that a transaction does meet the requirements for specific treatment under any provision of the Code is not determinative of whether a transaction or series of transactions of which it is a part has economic substance. 101
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95
The examples are illustrative and not exclusive.
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96
See, e.g., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946) (respecting debt characterization in one case and not in the other, based on all the facts and circumstances).
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97
See, e.g., Sam Siegel v. Commissioner, 45. T.C. 566 (1966), acq. 1966-2 C.B. 3. But see Commissioner
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98
See, e.g. Rev. Proc. 2009-3 2009-1 I.R.B. 108, Secs. 3.01(38), (39), and (41) (IRS will not rule on certain matters relating to incorporations or reorganizations unless there is a "significant issue"); compare Gregory v. Helvering. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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99
See, e.g., National Carbide v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949), Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 435 (1943); compare, e.g. Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (1971), acq., 1972-2 C.B. 1; Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988); see also sec. 7701(l).
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100
See, e.g., Frank Lyon v. Commissioner, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305, aff'd, 671 F. 2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Coltec Industries v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (Mem) (2007); BB&T Corporation v. United States, 2007-1 USTC P 50,130 (M.D.N.C. 2007), aff'd, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008).
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101
As examples of cases in which courts have found that a transaction does not meet the requirements for the treatment claimed by the taxpayer under the Code, or does not have economic substance, see e.g., TIFD- III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); BB&T Corporation v. United States, 2007-1 USTC P 50,130 (M.D.N,C, 2007) aff'd, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008); Tribune Company and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 110 (2005); H.J. Heinz Company and Subsidiaries v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570 (2007); Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 1261 (Mem.) (2007); Long Term Capital Holdings LP v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff'd, 150 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2005); Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Texas 2007); aff'd, 568 F. 3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Santa Monica Pictures LLC v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.M. 1157 (2005).
The provision does not alter the court's ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise recharacterize a transaction when applying the doctrine. For example, the provision reiterates the present-law ability of the courts to bifurcate a transaction in which independent activities with non-tax objectives are combined with an unrelated item having only tax-avoidance objectives in order to disallow those tax-motivated benefits. 102
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102 See, e.g., Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 1261 (Mem.) (2007) ("the first asserted business purpose focuses on the wrong transaction--the creation of Garrison as a separate subsidiary to manage asbestos liabilities. . . . [W]e must focus on the transaction that gave the taxpayer a high basis in the stock and thus gave rise to the alleged benefit upon sale...") 454 F.3d 1340, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2006). See also ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d at 256 n.48; Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938) ("A given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result because reached by following a devious path.").
Conjunctive analysis
The provision clarifies that the economic substance doctrine involves a conjunctive analysis — there must be an inquiry regarding the objective effects of the transaction on the taxpayer's economic position as well as an inquiry regarding the taxpayer's subjective motives for engaging in the transaction. Under the provision, a transaction must satisfy both tests, i.e., the transaction must change in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and the taxpayer must have a substantial non-Federal-income-tax purpose 103 for entering into such transaction, in order to satisfy the economic substance doctrine. This clarification eliminates the disparity that exists among the Federal circuit courts regarding the application of the doctrine, and modifies its application in those circuits in which either a change in economic position or a non-tax business purpose (without having both) is sufficient to satisfy the economic substance doctrine. 104
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103
For purposes of these tests, any State or local income tax effect which is related to a Federal income tax effect shall be treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax effect.
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104
The provision defines "economic substance doctrine" as the common law doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A with respect to a transaction are not allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose. Thus, the definition includes any doctrine that denies tax benefits for lack of economic substance, for lack of business purpose, or for lack of both.
Non-Federal-tax business purpose
Under the provision, a taxpayer's non-Federal-income-tax purpose for entering into a transaction (the second prong in the analysis) must be "substantial." 105 For purposes of this analysis, any State or local income tax effect which is related to a Federal income tax effect shall be treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax effect. Also, a purpose of achieving a favorable accounting treatment for financial reporting purposes shall not be taken into account as a non-Federal-income-tax purpose if the origin of such financial accounting benefit is a reduction of Federal income tax. 106
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105
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. sec. 1.269-2(b) (stating that a distortion of tax liability indicating the principal purpose of tax evasion or avoidance might be evidenced by the fact that "the transaction was not undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the business of the taxpayer"). Similarly, in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), the court stated:
Key to [the determination of whether a transaction has economic substance] is that the transaction must be rationally related to a useful nontax purpose that is plausible in light of the taxpayer's conduct and useful in light of the taxpayer's economic situation and intentions. Both the utility of the stated purpose and the rationality of the means chosen to effectuate it must be evaluated in accordance with commercial practices in the relevant industry. A rational relationship between purpose and means ordinarily will not be found unless there was a reasonable expectation that the nontax benefits would be at least commensurate with the transaction costs. [citations omitted]
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106
Claiming that a financial accounting benefit constitutes a substantial non-tax purpose fails to consider the origin of the accounting benefit (i.e., reduction of taxes) and significantly diminishes the purpose for having a substantial non-tax purpose requirement. See, e.g., American Electric Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, 791-92 (S.D. Ohio 2001) ("AEP's intended use of the cash flows generated by the [corporate-owned life insurance] plan is irrelevant to the subjective prong of the economic substance analysis. If a legitimate business purpose for the use of the tax savings 'were sufficient to breathe substance into a transaction whose only purpose was to reduce taxes, [then] every sham tax-shelter device might succeed,'") (citing Winn-Dixie v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254, 287 (1999)); aff'd, 326 F3d 737 (6th Cir. 2003).
Profit potential
Under the provision, a taxpayer may rely on factors other than profit potential to demonstrate that a transaction results in a meaningful change in the taxpayer's economic position or that the taxpayer has a substantial non-Federal-tax purpose for entering into such transaction. The provision does not require or establish a specified minimum return that will satisfy the profit potential test. However, if a taxpayer relies on a profit potential, the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit must be substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were respected. 107 Fees and other transaction expenses and foreign taxes shall be taken into account as expenses in determining pre-tax profit.
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107
Thus, a "reasonable possibility of profit" alone will not be sufficient to establish that a transaction has economic substance.
Personal transactions of individuals
In the case of an individual, the provision applies only to transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in for the production of income.
Other rules
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the provision
No inference is intended as to the proper application of the economic substance doctrine under present law. In addition, the provision shall not be construed as altering or supplanting any other rule of law, including any common-law doctrine or provision of the Code or regulations or other guidance thereunder; and the provision shall be construed as being additive to any such other rule of law.
Effective Date
The provision applies to transactions entered into after the date of enactment.
1.. Penalty for understatements attributable to transactions lacking economic substance
Present Law
General accuracy-related penalty
An accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 applies to the portion of any underpayment that is attributable to (1) negligence, (2) any substantial understatement of income tax, (3) any substantial valuation misstatement, (4) any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities, or (5) any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement. If the correct income tax liability exceeds that reported by the taxpayer by the greater of 10 percent of the correct tax or $5,000 (or, in the case of corporations, by the lesser of (a) 10 percent of the correct tax (or $10,000 if greater) or (b) $10 million), then a substantial understatement exists and a penalty may be imposed equal to 20 percent of the underpayment of tax attributable to the understatement. 108 Except in the case of tax shelters, 109 the amount of any understatement is reduced by any portion attributable to an item if (1) the treatment of the item is supported by substantial authority, or (2) facts relevant to the tax treatment of the item were adequately disclosed and there was a reasonable basis for its tax treatment. The Treasury Secretary may prescribe a list of positions which the Secretary believes do not meet the requirements for substantial authority under this provision.
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108
Sec. 6662.
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109
A tax shelter is defined for this purpose as a partnership or other entity, an investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement if a significant purpose of such partnership, other entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(C).
The section 6662 penalty generally is abated (even with respect to tax shelters) in cases in which the taxpayer can demonstrate that there was "reasonable cause" for the underpayment and that the taxpayer acted in good faith. 110 The relevant regulations provide that reasonable cause exists where the taxpayer "reasonably relies in good faith on an opinion based on a professional tax advisor's analysis of the pertinent facts and authorities [that] . . . unambiguously concludes that there is a greater than 50-percent likelihood that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged" by the IRS. 111
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110
Sec. 6664(c).
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111
Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6662-4(g)(4)(i)(B); Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6664-4(c).
Listed transactions and reportable avoidance transactions
In general
A separate accuracy-related penalty under section 6662A applies to any "listed transaction" and to any other "reportable transaction" that is not a listed transactions, if a significant purpose of such transaction is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax 112
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112
Sec. 6662A(b)(2).
(hereinafter referred to as a "reportable avoidance transaction"). The penalty rate and defenses available to avoid the penalty vary depending on whether the transaction was adequately disclosed.
Both listed transactions and other reportable transactions are allowed to be described by the Treasury department under section 6011 as transactions that must be reported, and section 6707A(c) imposes a penalty for failure adequately to report such transactions under section 6011. A reportable transaction is defined as one that the Treasury Secretary determines is required to be disclosed because it is determined to have a potential for tax avoidance or evasion. 113 A listed transaction is defined as a reportable transaction which is the same as, or substantially similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction for purposes of the reporting disclosure requirements. 114
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113
Sec. 6707A(c)(1).
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114
Sec. 6707A(c)(2).
Disclosed transactions
In general, a 20-percent accuracy-related penalty is imposed on any understatement attributable to an adequately disclosed listed transaction or reportable avoidance transaction. 115 The only exception to the penalty is if the taxpayer satisfies a more stringent reasonable cause and good faith exception (hereinafter referred to as the "strengthened reasonable cause exception"), which is described below. The strengthened reasonable cause exception is available only if the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment were adequately disclosed, there is or was substantial authority for the claimed tax treatment, and the taxpayer reasonably believed that the claimed tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment. A "reasonable belief" must be based on the facts and law as they exist at the time that the return in question is filed, and not take into account the possibility that a return would not be audited. Moreover, reliance on professional advice may support a "reasonable belief" only in certain circumstances. 116
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115
Sec. 6662A(a).
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116
Section 6664(d)(3)(B) would not allow a reasonable belief to be based on a "disqualified opinion" or on an opinion from a "disqualified tax advisor".
Undisclosed transactions
If the taxpayer does not adequately disclose the transaction, the strengthened reasonable cause exception is not available (i.e., a strict-liability penalty generally applies), and the taxpayer is subject to an increased penalty equal to 30 percent of the understatement. 117 However, a taxpayer will be treated as having adequately disclosed a transaction for this purpose if the IRS Commissioner has separately rescinded the separate penalty under section 6707A for failure to disclose a reportable transaction. 118 The IRS Commissioner is authorized to do this only if the failure does not relate to a listed transaction and only if rescinding the penalty would promote compliance and effective tax administration. 119
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117
Sec. 6662A(c).
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118
Sec. 6664(d).
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119
Sec. 6707A(d).
A public entity that is required to pay a penalty for an undisclosed listed or reportable transaction must disclose the imposition of the penalty in reports to the SEC for such periods as the Secretary shall specify. The disclosure to the SEC applies without regard to whether the taxpayer determines the amount of the penalty to be material to the reports in which the penalty must appear, and any failure to disclose such penalty in the reports is treated as a failure to disclose a listed transaction. A taxpayer must disclose a penalty in reports to the SEC once the taxpayer has exhausted its administrative and judicial remedies with respect to the penalty (or if earlier, when paid). 120
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120
Sec. 6707A(e).
Determination of the understatement amount
The penalty is applied to the amount of any understatement attributable to the listed or reportable avoidance transaction without regard to other items on the tax return. For purposes of this provision, the amount of the understatement is determined as the sum of: (1) the product of the highest corporate or individual tax rate (as appropriate) and the increase in taxable income resulting from the difference between the taxpayer's treatment of the item and the proper treatment of the item (without regard to other items on the tax return); 121 and (2) the amount of any decrease in the aggregate amount of credits which results from a difference between the taxpayer's treatment of an item and the proper tax treatment of such item.
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121
For this purpose, any reduction in the excess of deductions allowed for the taxable year over gross income for such year, and any reduction in the amount of capital losses which would (without regard to section 1211) be allowed for such year, shall be treated as an increase in taxable income. Sec. 6662A(b).
Except as provided in regulations, a taxpayer's treatment of an item shall not take into account any amendment or supplement to a return if the amendment or supplement is filed after the earlier of when the taxpayer is first contacted regarding an examination of the return or such other date as specified by the Secretary. 122
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122
Sec. 6662A(e)(3).
Strengthened reasonable cause exception
A penalty is not imposed with respect to any portion of an understatement if it is shown that there was reasonable cause for such portion and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Such a showing requires: (1) adequate disclosure of the facts affecting the transaction in accordance with the regulations under section 6011; 123 (2) that there is or was substantial authority for such treatment; and (3) that the taxpayer reasonably believed that such treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment. For this purpose, a taxpayer will be treated as having a reasonable belief with respect to the tax treatment of an item only if such belief: (1) is based on the facts and law that exist at the time the tax return (that includes the item) is filed; and (2) relates solely to the taxpayer's chances of success on the merits and does not take into account the possibility that (a) a return will not be audited, (b) the treatment will not be raised on audit, or (c) the treatment will be resolved through settlement if raised. 24
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123
See the previous discussion regarding the penalty for failing to disclose a reportable transaction.
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24
Sec. 6664(d).
A taxpayer may (but is not required to) rely on an opinion of a tax advisor in establishing its reasonable belief with respect to the tax treatment of the item. However, a taxpayer may not rely on an opinion of a tax advisor for this purpose if the opinion (1) is provided by a "disqualified tax advisor" or (2) is a "disqualified opinion."
Disqualified tax advisor
A disqualified tax advisor is any advisor who: (1) is a material advisor 125 and who participates in the organization, management, promotion, or sale of the transaction or is related (within the meaning of section 267(b) or 707(b)(1)) to any person who so participates; (2) is compensated directly or indirectly 126 by a material advisor with respect to the transaction; (3) has a fee arrangement with respect to the transaction that is contingent on all or part of the intended tax benefits from the transaction being sustained; or (4) as determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, has a disqualifying financial interest with respect to the transaction.
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125
The term "material advisor" means any person who provides any material aid, assistance, or advice with respect to organizing, managing, promoting, selling, implementing, or carrying out any reportable transaction, and who derives gross income in excess of $50,000 in the case of a reportable transaction substantially all of the tax benefits from which are provided to natural persons ($250,000 in any other case). Sec. 6111(b)(1).
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126
This situation could arise, for example, when an advisor has an arrangement or understanding (oral or written) with an organizer, manager, or promoter of a reportable transaction that such party will recommend or refer potential participants to the advisor for an opinion regarding the tax treatment of the transaction.
A material advisor is considered as participating in the "organization" of a transaction if the advisor performs acts relating to the development of the transaction. This may include, for example, preparing documents: (1) establishing a structure used in connection with the transaction (such as a partnership agreement); (2) describing the transaction (such as an offering memorandum or other statement describing the transaction); or (3) relating to the registration of the transaction with any federal, state,or local government body. 127 Participation in the "management" of a transaction means involvement in the decision-making process regarding any business activity with respect to the transaction. Participation in the "promotion or sale" of a transaction means involvement in the marketing or solicitation of the transaction to others. Thus, an advisor who provides information about the transaction to a potential participant is involved in the promotion or sale of a transaction, as is any advisor who recommends the transaction to a potential participant.
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127
An advisor should not be treated as participating in the organization of a transaction if the advisor's only involvement with respect to the organization of the transaction is the rendering of an opinion regarding the tax consequences of such transaction. However, such an advisor may be a "disqualified tax advisor" with respect to the transaction if the advisor participates in the management, promotion, or sale of the transaction (or if the advisor is compensated by a material advisor, has a fee arrangement that is contingent on the tax benefits of the transaction, or as determined by the Secretary, has a continuing financial interest with respect to the transaction). See Notice 200512, 2005-1 C.B. 494 regarding disqualified compensation arrangements.
Disqualified opinion
An opinion may not be relied upon if the opinion: (1) is based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future events); (2) unreasonably relies upon representations, statements, finding or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person; (3) does not identify and consider all relevant facts; or (4) fails to meet any other requirement prescribed by the Secretary.
Coordination with other penalties
To the extent a penalty on an understatement is imposed under section 6662A, that same amount of understatement is not also subject to the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) or to the valuation misstatement penalties under section 6662(e) or 6662(h). However, such amount of understatement is included for purposes of determining whether any understatement (as defined in sec. 6662(d)(2)) is a substantial understatement as defined under section 6662(d)(1) and for purposes of identifying an underpayment under the section 6663 fraud penalty.
The penalty imposed under section 6662A does not apply to any portion of an understatement to which a fraud penalty is applied under section 6663.
Erroneous claim for refund or credit
If a claim for refund or credit with respect to income tax (other than a claim relating to the earned income tax credit) is made for an excessive amount, unless it is shown that the claim for such excessive amount has a reasonable basis, the person making such claim is subject to a penalty in an amount equal to 20 percent of the excessive amount. 128
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128
Sec. 6667.
The term "excessive amount" means the amount by which the amount of the claim for refund for any taxable year exceeds the amount of such claim allowable for the taxable year.
This penalty does not apply to any portion of a the excessive amount of a claim for refund or credit which is subject to a penalty imposed under the accuracy related or fraud penalty provisions (including the general accuracy related penalty, or the penalty with respect to listed and reportable transactions, described above).
Description of Proposal
The provision imposes a new, stronger penalty under section 6662 for an understatement attributable to any disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance, as defined in new section 7701(p), 129 or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law. 130 The penalty rate is 20 percent (increased to 40 percent if the taxpayer does not adequately disclose the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment in the return or a statement attached to the return). Except as provided in regulations, an amended return or supplement to a return is not taken into account if filed after the taxpayer has been contacted for audit or such other date as is specified by the Secretary. No exceptions (including the reasonable cause rules) to the penalty are available (i.e., the penalty is a strict-liability penalty). Thus, under the provision, outside opinions or in-house analysis would not protect a taxpayer from imposition of a penalty if it is determined that the transaction lacks economic substance or fails to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law. Similarly, a claim for refund that is excessive under section 6676 due to a claim that is lacking in economic substance or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law is subject to the 20 percent penalty under that section, and the reasonable basis exception is not available.
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129
That provision generally provides that in any case in which a court determines that the economic substance doctrine is relevant, a transaction has economic substance only if: (1) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and (2) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction. Specific other rules also apply. See "Description of Proposal" for the immediately preceding provision, "Clarification of the economic substance doctrine."
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130
For example, the penalty would apply to a transaction that is disregarded as a result of the application of the same factors and analysis that is required under the provision for an economic substance analysis, even if a different term is used to describe the doctrine.
The penalty does not apply to any portion of an underpayment on which a fraud penalty is imposed. 131 The new 20 percent penalty (and 40 percent penalty for nondisclosed transactions) is also added to the penalties to which section 6662A will not also apply. 132
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131
I.e., section 6662(b) of present law applies to the new penalty as well.
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132
As under present law, the penalties under section 6662 (including the new penalty) do not apply to any portion of an underpayment on which a fraud penalty is imposed.
As described above, under the provision, the reasonable cause and good faith exception of present law section 6664(c)(1) does not apply to any portion of an underpayment which is attributable to a transaction lacking economic substance, as defined in section 7701(p), or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law, or to any tax shelter (as defined in present law section 6662(d)(2)(C)). In addition, the reasonable cause and good faith exception of present law section 6664(c)(1) also does not apply to any underpayment in which the taxpayer is a specified person. A specified person is defined as (i) any person required to file periodic or other reports under section 13 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and (ii) any corporation with gross receipts in excess of $100 million for the taxable year involved. 133
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133
For purposes of this rule, all persons treated as a single employer under section 52(a) are treated as one person.
In the case of a substantial understatement of income tax (which is a separate type of understatement under new section 6662(b) than an understatement attributable to a transaction lacking economic substance or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law), 134 the rules of section 6662(d) still apply, but are changed in the case of a specified person (as defined above). In the case of such a person, it is no longer the case that a substantial understatement is reduced if there is or was substantial authority for the taxpayer's treatment, or if the relevant facts were disclosed and there is a reasonable basis for the taxpayer's tax treatment. Under the provision, a substantial understatement of a specified person can be reduced only by that portion attributable to any item with respect to which the taxpayer had a reasonable belief that the tax treatment by the taxpayer is more likely than not the proper treatment.
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134
The rules and exceptions of section 6662(d) do not apply to any understatement attributable to a transaction that lacks economic substance or fails to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law.


Effective Date
The provision aommittee Report for jcx-47-09, hr3962



TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN H.R. 3962, THE "AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR AMERICA ACT OF 2009," AS AMENDED
Prepared by the Staff of the JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION

November 5, 2009

JCX-47-09

pplies to transactions entered into after the date of enactment.

T.. Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine; Penalties (sec. 562 of the bill and sec. 7701 of the Code)

Present Law

In general

The Code provides detailed rules specifying the computation of taxable income, including the amount, timing, source, and character of items of income, gain, loss, and deduction. These rules permit both taxpayers and the government to compute taxable income with reasonable accuracy and predictability. Taxpayers generally may plan their transactions in reliance on these rules to determine the federal income tax consequences arising from the transactions.

In addition to the statutory provisions, courts have developed several doctrines that can be applied to deny the tax benefits of a tax-motivated transaction, notwithstanding that the transaction may satisfy the literal requirements of a specific tax provision. These common-law doctrines are not entirely distinguishable, and their application to a given set of facts is often blurred by the courts, the IRS, and litigants. Although these doctrines serve an important role in the administration of the tax system, they can be seen as at odds with an objective, "rule-based" system of taxation.

One common-law doctrine applied over the years is the "economic substance" doctrine. In general, this doctrine denies tax benefits arising from transactions that do not result in a meaningful change to the taxpayer's economic position other than a purported reduction in federal income tax. 220
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220
See, e.g., ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), aff'g 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1017 (1999); Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Texas 2007), aff'd 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacating and remanding 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004) (slip opinion at 123-124, 128); cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (Mem.) (2007).
Closely related doctrines also applied by the courts (sometimes interchangeable with the economic substance doctrine) include the "sham transaction doctrine" and the "business purpose doctrine." See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (denying interest deductions on a "sham transaction" whose only purpose was to create the deductions). Certain "substance over form" cases involving tax-indifferent parties, in which courts have found that the substance of the transaction did not comport with the form asserted by the taxpayer, have also involved examination of whether the change in economic position that occurred, if any, was consistent with the form asserted, and whether the claimed business purpose supported the particular tax benefits that were claimed. See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); BB&T Corporation v. United States, 2007-1 USTC P 50,130 (M.D.N.C. 2007), aff'd 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008). Although the Second Circuit found for the government in TIFD III-E, Inc., on remand to consider issues under section 704(e), the District Court found for the taxpayer. See, TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, No. 3:01-cv-01839 (Oct. 23, 2009).
Economic substance doctrine
Courts generally deny claimed tax benefits if the transaction that gives rise to those benefits lacks economic substance independent of U.S. federal income tax considerations —notwithstanding that the purported activity actually occurred. The Tax Court has described the doctrine as follows:
The tax law . . . requires that the intended transactions have economic substance separate and distinct from economic benefit achieved solely by tax reduction. The doctrine of economic substance becomes applicable, and a judicial remedy is warranted, where a taxpayer seeks to claim tax benefits, unintended by Congress, by means of transactions that serve no economic purpose other than tax savings. 221
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221
ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. at 2215.
Business purpose doctrine
A common law doctrine that often is considered together with the economic substance doctrine is the business purpose doctrine. The business purpose doctrine involves an inquiry into the subjective motives of the taxpayer —that is, whether the taxpayer intended the transaction to serve some useful non-tax purpose. In making this determination, some courts have bifurcated a transaction in which activities with non-tax objectives have been combined with unrelated activities having only tax-avoidance objectives, in order to disallow the tax benefits of the overall transaction. 222
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222
See, ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d at 256 n.48.
Application by the courts
Elements of the doctrine
There is a lack of uniformity regarding the proper application of the economic substance doctrine. 223 Some courts apply a conjunctive test that requires a taxpayer to establish the presence of both economic substance (i.e., the objective component) and business purpose (i.e., the subjective component) in order for the transaction to survive judicial scrutiny. 224 A narrower approach used by some courts is to conclude that either a business purpose or economic substance is sufficient to respect the transaction. 225 A third approach regards economic substance and business purpose as "simply more precise factors to consider" in determining whether a transaction has any practical economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits. 226
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223
"The casebooks are glutted with [economic substance] tests. Many such tests proliferate because they give the comforting illusion of consistency and precision. They often obscure rather than clarify." Collins v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1988).
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224
See, e.g., Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993) ("The threshold question is whether the transaction has economic substance. If the answer is yes, the question becomes whether the taxpayer was motivated by profit to participate in the transaction."). See also, Klamath Strategic Investment Fund v. United States, 568 F. 3d 537, (5th Cir. 2009) (even if taxpayers may have had a profit motive, a transaction was disregarded where it did not in fact have any realistic possibility of profit and funding was never at risk).
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225
See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985) ("To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and, second, that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists."); IES Industries v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 358 (8th Cir. 2001) ("In determining whether a transaction is a sham for tax purposes [under the Eighth Circuit test], a transaction will be characterized as a sham if it is not motivated by any economic purpose out of tax considerations (the business purpose test), and if it is without economic substance because no real potential for profit exists (the economic substance test)."). As noted earlier, the economic substance doctrine and the sham transaction doctrine are similar and sometimes are applied interchangeably. For a more detailed discussion of the sham transaction doctrine, see, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, Study of Present-Law Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section 3801 of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (including Provisions Relating to Corporate Tax Shelters) (JCS-3-99) at 182.
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226
See, e.g., ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d at 247; James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905, 908 (10th Cir. 1995); Sacks v. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Instead, the consideration of business purpose and economic substance are simply more precise factors to consider . . . We have repeatedly and carefully noted that this formulation cannot be used as a 'rigid two-step analysis'.").
One decision by the Court of Federal Claims questioned the continuing viability of the doctrine. That court also stated that "the use of the 'economic substance' doctrine to trump 'mere compliance with the Code' would violate the separation of powers" though that court also found that the particular transaction at issue in the case did not lack economic substance. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit Court") overruled the Court of Federal Claims decision, reiterating the viability of the economic substance doctrine and concluding that the transaction in question violated that doctrine. 227 The Federal Circuit Court stated that "[w]hile the doctrine may well also apply if the taxpayer's sole subjective motivation is tax avoidance even if the transaction has economic substance, [footnote omitted], a lack of economic substance is sufficient to disqualify the transaction without proof that the taxpayer's sole motive is tax avoidance." 228
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227
Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004) (slip opinion at 123-124, 128); vacated and remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (Mem.) (2007).
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228
The Federal Circuit Court stated that "when the taxpayer claims a deduction, it is the taxpayer who bears the burden of proving that the transaction has economic substance." The Federal Circuit Court quoted a decision of its predecessor court, stating that "Gregory v. Helvering requires that a taxpayer carry an unusually heavy burden when he attempts to demonstrate that Congress intended to give favorable tax treatment to the kind of transaction that would never occur absent the motive of tax avoidance." The Court also stated that "while the taxpayer's subjective motivation may be pertinent to the existence of a tax avoidance purpose, all courts have looked to the objective reality of a transaction in assessing its economic substance." Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d at 1355, 1356.
Nontax economic benefits
There also is a lack of uniformity regarding the type of non-tax economic benefit a taxpayer must establish in order to demonstrate that a transaction has economic substance. Some courts have denied tax benefits on the grounds that a stated business benefit of a particular structure was not in fact obtained by that structure. 229 Several courts have denied tax benefits on the grounds that the subject transactions lacked profit potential. 230 In addition, some courts have applied the economic substance doctrine to disallow tax benefits in transactions in which a taxpayer was exposed to risk and the transaction had a profit potential, but the court concluded that the economic risks and profit potential were insignificant when compared to the tax benefits. 231 Under this analysis, the taxpayer's profit potential must be more than nominal. Conversely, other courts view the application of the economic substance doctrine as requiring an objective determination of whether a "reasonable possibility of profit" from the transaction existed apart from the tax benefits. 232 In these cases, in assessing whether a reasonable possibility of profit exists, it may be sufficient if there is a nominal amount of pre-tax profit as measured against expected tax benefits.
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229
See, e.g., Coltec Industries v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The court analyzed the transfer to a subsidiary of a note purporting to provide high stock basis in exchange for a purported assumption of liabilities, and held these transactions unnecessary to accomplish any business purpose of using a subsidiary to manage asbestos liabilities. The court also held that the purported business purpose of adding a barrier to veil-piercing claims by third parties was not accomplished by the transaction. 454 F.3d at 1358-1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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230
See, e.g., Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 361; Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that an unprofitable, leveraged acquisition of Treasury bills, and accompanying prepaid interest deduction, lacked economic substance).
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231
See, e.g., Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d at 739-40 (disallowing deduction even though taxpayer had a possibility of small gain or loss by owning Treasury bills); Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738, 768 (1990) (stating that "potential for gain . . . is infinitesimally nominal and vastly insignificant when considered in comparison with the claimed deductions").
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232
See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F. 2d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 1985) (the economic substance inquiry requires an objective determination of whether a reasonable possibility of profit from the transaction existed apart from tax benefits); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2001) (applied the same test, citing Rice's Toyota World); IES Industries v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001).
Financial accounting benefits
In determining whether a taxpayer had a valid business purpose for entering into a transaction, at least one court has concluded that financial accounting benefits arising from tax savings do not qualify as a non-tax business purpose. 233 However, based on court decisions that recognize the importance of financial accounting treatment, taxpayers have asserted that financial accounting benefits arising from tax savings can satisfy the business purpose test. 234
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233
See American Electric Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, 791-92 (S.D. Ohio 2001), aff'd, 326 F.3d.737 (6th Cir. 2003).
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234
See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, Report of Investigation of Enron Corporation and Related Entities Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy Recommendations (JSC-3-03) February, 2003 ("Enron Report"), Volume III at C-93, 289. Enron Corporation relied on Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 577-78 (1978), and Newman v. Commissioner, 902 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1990), to argue that financial accounting benefits arising from tax savings constitute a good business purpose.

Tax-indifferent parties

A number of cases have involved transactions structured to allocate income for Federal tax purposes to a tax-indifferent party, with a corresponding deduction, or favorable basis result, to a taxable person. The income allocated to the tax-indifferent party for tax purposes was structured to exceed any actual economic income to be received by the tax indifferent party from the transaction. Courts have sometimes concluded that a particular type of transaction did not satisfy the economic substance doctrine. 235 In other cases, courts have indicated that the substance of a transaction did not support the form of income allocations asserted by the taxpayer and have questioned whether asserted business purpose or other standards were met. 236
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235
See, e.g., ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), aff'g 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
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236
See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006). Although the Second Circuit found for the government in TIFD III-E, Inc., on remand to consider issues under section 704(e), the District Court found for the taxpayer. See, TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, No. 3:01-cv-01839 (Oct. 23, 2009).
Penalty regime
General accuracy-related penalty
An accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 applies to the portion of any underpayment that is attributable to (1) negligence, (2) any substantial understatement of income tax, (3) any substantial valuation misstatement, (4) any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities, or (5) any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement. If the correct income tax liability exceeds that reported by the taxpayer by the greater of 10 percent of the correct tax or $5,000 (or, in the case of corporations, by the lesser of (a) 10 percent of the correct tax (or $10,000 if greater) or (b) $10 million), then a substantial understatement exists and a penalty may be imposed equal to 20 percent of the underpayment of tax attributable to the understatement. 237 Except in the case of tax shelters, 238 the amount of any understatement is reduced by any portion attributable to an item if (1) the treatment of the item is supported by substantial authority, or (2) facts relevant to the tax treatment of the item were adequately disclosed and there was a reasonable basis for its tax treatment. The Treasury Secretary may prescribe a list of positions which the Secretary believes do not meet the requirements for substantial authority under this provision.
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237
Sec. 6662.
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238
A tax shelter is defined for this purpose as a partnership or other entity, an investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement if a significant purpose of such partnership, other entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(C).
The section 6662 penalty generally is abated (even with respect to tax shelters) in cases in which the taxpayer can demonstrate that there was "reasonable cause" for the underpayment and that the taxpayer acted in good faith. 239 The relevant regulations for a tax shelter provide that reasonable cause exists where the taxpayer "reasonably relies in good faith on an opinion based on a professional tax advisor's analysis of the pertinent facts and authorities [that] . . . unambiguously concludes that there is a greater than 50-percent likelihood that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged" by the IRS. 240 For transactions other than tax shelters, the relevant regulations provide a facts and circumstances test, the most important factor generally being the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the proper tax liability. If a taxpayer relies on an opinion, reliance is not reasonable if the taxpayer knows or should have known that the advisor lacked knowledge in the relevant aspects of Federal tax law, or if the taxpayer fails to disclose a fact that it knows or should have known is relevant. Certain additional requirements apply with respect to the advice. 241
________________________________________
239
Sec. 6664(c).
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240
Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6662-4(g)(4)(i)(B); Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6664-4(c).
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241
See Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.6664-4(c). In addition to the requirements applicable to taxpayers under the regulations, advisors may be subject to potential penalties under section 6694 (applicable to return preparers), and to monetary penalties and other sanctions under Circular 230 (which provides rules governing persons practicing before the IRS). Under Circular 230, if a transaction is a "covered transaction" (a term that includes listed transactions and certain non-listed reportable transactions) a "more likely than not" confidence level is required for written tax advice that may be relied upon by a taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties, and certain other standards must also be met. Treasury Dept. Circular 230 (Rev. 4-2008) Sec. 10.35. For other tax advice, Circular 230 generally requires a lower "realistic possibility" confidence level or a "non-frivolous" confidence level coupled with advising the client of any opportunity to avoid the accuracy related penalty under section 6662 by adequate disclosure. Treasury Dept. Circular 230 (Rev. 4-2008) Sec. 10.34.
Listed transactions and reportable avoidance transactions
In general
A separate accuracy-related penalty under section 6662A applies to any "listed transaction" and to any other "reportable transaction" that is not a listed transaction, if a significant purpose of such transaction is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax 242 (hereinafter referred to as a "reportable avoidance transaction"). The penalty rate and defenses available to avoid the penalty vary depending on whether the transaction was adequately disclosed.
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242
Sec. 6662A(b)(2).
Both listed transactions and other reportable transactions are allowed to be described by the Treasury department under section 6011 as transactions that must be reported, and section 6707A(c) imposes a penalty for failure adequately to report such transactions under section 6011. A reportable transaction is defined as one that the Treasury Secretary determines is required to be disclosed because it is determined to have a potential for tax avoidance or evasion. 243 A listed transaction is defined as a reportable transaction which is the same as, or substantially similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction for purposes of the reporting disclosure requirements. 244
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243
Sec. 6707A(c)(1).
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244
Sec. 6707A(c)(2).
Disclosed transactions

In general, a 20-percent accuracy-related penalty is imposed on any understatement attributable to an adequately disclosed listed transaction or reportable avoidance transaction. 245 The only exception to the penalty is if the taxpayer satisfies a more stringent reasonable cause and good faith exception (hereinafter referred to as the "strengthened reasonable cause exception"), which is described below. The strengthened reasonable cause exception is available only if the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment were adequately disclosed, there is or was substantial authority for the claimed tax treatment, and the taxpayer reasonably believed that the claimed tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment. A "reasonable belief" must be based on the facts and law as they exist at the time that the return in question is filed, and not take into account the possibility that a return would not be audited. Moreover, reliance on professional advice may support a "reasonable belief" only in certain circumstances. 246
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245
Sec. 6662A(a).
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246
Section 6664(d)(3)(B) would not allow a reasonable belief to be based on a "disqualified opinion" or on an opinion from a "disqualified tax advisor".
Undisclosed transactions
If the taxpayer does not adequately disclose the transaction, the strengthened reasonable cause exception is not available (i.e., a strict-liability penalty generally applies), and the taxpayer is subject to an increased penalty equal to 30 percent of the understatement. 247 However, a taxpayer will be treated as having adequately disclosed a transaction for this purpose if the IRS Commissioner has separately rescinded the separate penalty under section 6707A for failure to disclose a reportable transaction. 248 The IRS Commissioner is authorized to do this only if the failure does not relate to a listed transaction and only if rescinding the penalty would promote compliance and effective tax administration. 249
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247
Sec. 6662A(c).
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248
Sec. 6664(d).
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249
Sec. 6707A(d).
A public entity that is required to pay a penalty for an undisclosed listed or reportable transaction must disclose the imposition of the penalty in reports to the SEC for such periods as the Secretary shall specify. The disclosure to the SEC applies without regard to whether the taxpayer determines the amount of the penalty to be material to the reports in which the penalty must appear, and any failure to disclose such penalty in the reports is treated as a failure to disclose a listed transaction. A taxpayer must disclose a penalty in reports to the SEC once the taxpayer has exhausted its administrative and judicial remedies with respect to the penalty (or if earlier, when paid). 250
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250
Sec. 6707A(e).
Determination of the understatement amount
The penalty is applied to the amount of any understatement attributable to the listed or reportable avoidance transaction without regard to other items on the tax return. For purposes of this provision, the amount of the understatement is determined as the sum of: (1) the product of the highest corporate or individual tax rate (as appropriate) and the increase in taxable income resulting from the difference between the taxpayer's treatment of the item and the proper treatment of the item (without regard to other items on the tax return); 251 and (2) the amount of any decrease in the aggregate amount of credits which results from a difference between the taxpayer's treatment of an item and the proper tax treatment of such item.
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251
For this purpose, any reduction in the excess of deductions allowed for the taxable year over gross income for such year, and any reduction in the amount of capital losses which would (without regard to section 1211) be allowed for such year, shall be treated as an increase in taxable income. Sec. 6662A(b).
Except as provided in regulations, a taxpayer's treatment of an item shall not take into account any amendment or supplement to a return if the amendment or supplement is filed after the earlier of when the taxpayer is first contacted regarding an examination of the return or such other date as specified by the Secretary. 252
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252
Sec. 6662A(e)(3).
Strengthened reasonable cause exception
A penalty is not imposed under section 6662A with respect to any portion of an understatement if it is shown that there was reasonable cause for such portion and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Such a showing requires: (1) adequate disclosure of the facts affecting the transaction in accordance with the regulations under section 6011; 253 (2) that there is or was substantial authority for such treatment; and (3) that the taxpayer reasonably believed that such treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment. For this purpose, a taxpayer will be treated as having a reasonable belief with respect to the tax treatment of an item only if such belief: (1) is based on the facts and law that exist at the time the tax return (that includes the item) is filed; and (2) relates solely to the taxpayer's chances of success on the merits and does not take into account the possibility that (a) a return will not be audited, (b) the treatment will not be raised on audit, or (c) the treatment will be resolved through settlement if raised. 254
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253
See the previous discussion regarding the penalty for failing to disclose a reportable transaction.
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254
Sec. 6664(d).
A taxpayer may (but is not required to) rely on an opinion of a tax advisor in establishing its reasonable belief with respect to the tax treatment of the item. However, a taxpayer may not rely on an opinion of a tax advisor for this purpose if the opinion (1) is provided by a "disqualified tax advisor" or (2) is a "disqualified opinion."
Disqualified tax advisor
A disqualified tax advisor is any advisor who: (1) is a material advisor 255 and who participates in the organization, management, promotion, or sale of the transaction or is related (within the meaning of section 267(b) or 707(b)(1)) to any person who so participates; (2) is compensated directly or indirectly 256 by a material advisor with respect to the transaction; (3) has a fee arrangement with respect to the transaction that is contingent on all or part of the intended tax benefits from the transaction being sustained; or (4) as determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, has a disqualifying financial interest with respect to the transaction.
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255
The term "material advisor" means any person who provides any material aid, assistance, or advice with respect to organizing, managing, promoting, selling, implementing, or carrying out any reportable transaction, and who derives gross income in excess of $50,000 in the case of a reportable transaction substantially all of the tax benefits from which are provided to natural persons ($250,000 in any other case). Sec. 6111(b)(1).
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256
This situation could arise, for example, when an advisor has an arrangement or understanding (oral or written) with an organizer, manager, or promoter of a reportable transaction that such party will recommend or refer potential participants to the advisor for an opinion regarding the tax treatment of the transaction.
A material advisor is considered as participating in the "organization" of a transaction if the advisor performs acts relating to the development of the transaction. This may include, for example, preparing documents: (1) establishing a structure used in connection with the transaction (such as a partnership agreement); (2) describing the transaction (such as an offering memorandum or other statement describing the transaction); or (3) relating to the registration of the transaction with any federal, state, or local government body. 257 Participation in the "management" of a transaction means involvement in the decision-making process regarding any business activity with respect to the transaction. Participation in the "promotion or sale" of a transaction means involvement in the marketing or solicitation of the transaction to others. Thus, an advisor who provides information about the transaction to a potential participant is involved in the promotion or sale of a transaction, as is any advisor who recommends the transaction to a potential participant.
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257
An advisor should not be treated as participating in the organization of a transaction if the advisor's only involvement with respect to the organization of the transaction is the rendering of an opinion regarding the tax consequences of such transaction. However, such an advisor may be a "disqualified tax advisor" with respect to the transaction if the advisor participates in the management, promotion, or sale of the transaction (or if the advisor is compensated by a material advisor, has a fee arrangement that is contingent on the tax benefits of the transaction, or as determined by the Secretary, has a continuing financial interest with respect to the transaction). See Notice 200512, 2005-1 C.B. 494 regarding disqualified compensation arrangements.
Disqualified opinion
An opinion may not be relied upon if the opinion: (1) is based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future events); (2) unreasonably relies upon representations, statements, finding or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person; (3) does not identify and consider all relevant facts; or (4) fails to meet any other requirement prescribed by the Secretary.
Coordination with other penalties
To the extent a penalty on an understatement is imposed under section 6662A, that same amount of understatement is not also subject to the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) or to the valuation misstatement penalties under section 6662(e) or 6662(h). However, such amount of understatement is included for purposes of determining whether any understatement (as defined in sec. 6662(d)(2)) is a substantial understatement as defined under section 6662(d)(1) and for purposes of identifying an underpayment under the section 6663 fraud penalty.
The penalty imposed under section 6662A does not apply to any portion of an understatement to which a fraud penalty is applied under section 6663.
Erroneous claim for refund or credit
If a claim for refund or credit with respect to income tax (other than a claim relating to the earned income tax credit) is made for an excessive amount, unless it is shown that the claim for such excessive amount has a reasonable basis, the person making such claim is subject to a penalty in an amount equal to 20 percent of the excessive amount. 258
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258
Sec. 6667.
The term "excessive amount" means the amount by which the amount of the claim for refund for any taxable year exceeds the amount of such claim allowable for the taxable year.
This penalty does not apply to any portion of a the excessive amount of a claim for refund or credit which is subject to a penalty imposed under the accuracy related or fraud penalty provisions (including the general accuracy related penalty, or the penalty with respect to listed and reportable transactions, described above).
Explanation of Provision
The provision clarifies and enhances the application of the economic substance doctrine. Under the provision, in the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only if (1) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and (2) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction. 259 The provision provides a uniform definition of economic substance, but does not alter the flexibility of the courts in other respects.
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259
In applying these tests, any State or local income tax effect which is related to a Federal income tax effect shall be treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax effect.
The determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if the provision had never been enacted. Thus, the provision does not change current law standards in determining when to utilize an economic substance analysis. 260
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260
If the tax benefits are clearly consistent with all applicable provisions of the Code and the purposes of such provisions, it is not intended that such tax benefits be disallowed if the only reason for such disallowance is that the transaction fails the economic substance doctrine as defined in this provision. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. sec. 1.269-2, stating that characteristic of circumstances in which a deduction otherwise allowed will be disallowed are those in which the effect of the deduction, credit, or other allowance would be to distort the liability of the particular taxpayer when the essential nature of the transaction or situation is examined in the light of the basic purpose or plan which the deduction, credit, or other allowance was designed by the Congress to effectuate.
The provision is not intended to alter the tax treatment of certain basic business transactions that, under longstanding judicial and administrative practice are respected, merely because the choice between meaningful economic alternatives is largely or entirely based on comparative tax advantages. Among 261 these basic transactions are (1) the choice between capitalizing a business enterprise with debt or equity; 262 (2) a U.S. person's choice between utilizing a foreign corporation or a domestic corporation to make a foreign investment; 263 (3) the choice to enter a transaction or series of transactions that constitute a corporate organization or reorganization under subchapter C; 264 and (4) the choice to utilize a related-party entity in a transaction, provided that the arm's length standard of section 482 and other applicable concepts are satisfied. 265 Leasing transactions, like all other types of transactions, will continue to be analyzed in light of all the facts and circumstances. 266 As under present law, whether a particular transaction meets the requirements for specific treatment under any of these provisions can be a question of facts and circumstances. Also, the fact that a transaction does meet the requirements for specific treatment under any provision of the Code is not determinative of whether a transaction or series of transactions of which it is a part has economic substance. 267
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261
The examples are illustrative and not exclusive.
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262
See, e.g., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946) (respecting debt characterization in one case and not in the other, based on all the facts and circumstances).
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263
See, e.g., Sam Siegel v. Commissioner, 45. T.C. 566 (1966), acq. 1966-2 C.B. 3. But see Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988) (agency principles applied to title-holding corporation under the facts and circumstances).
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264
See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2009-3 2009-1 I.R.B. 108, Secs. 3.01(38), (39), and (41) (IRS will not rule on certain matters relating to incorporations or reorganizations unless there is a "significant issue"); compare Gregory v. Helvering. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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265
See, e.g., National Carbide v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949), Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 435 (1943); compare, e.g. Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (1971), acq., 1972-2 C.B. 1; Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988); see also sec. 7701(l).
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266
See, e.g., Frank Lyon v. Commissioner, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305, aff'd, 671 F. 2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Coltec Industries v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (Mem) (2007); BB&T Corporation v. United States, 2007-1 USTC P 50,130 (M.D.N.C. 2007), aff'd, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008).
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267
As examples of cases in which courts have found that a transaction does not meet the requirements for the treatment claimed by the taxpayer under the Code, or does not have economic substance, see e.g., BB&T Corporation v. United States, 2007-1 USTC P 50,130 (M.D.N.C. 2007) aff'd, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008); Tribune Company and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 110 (2005); H.J. Heinz Company and Subsidiaries v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570 (2007); Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 1261 (Mem.) (2007); Long Term Capital Holdings LP v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff'd, 150 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2005); Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Texas 2007); aff'd, 568 F. 3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Santa Monica Pictures LLC v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.M. 1157 (2005).
The provision does not alter the court's ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise recharacterize a transaction when applying the doctrine. For example, the provision reiterates the present-law ability of the courts to bifurcate a transaction in which independent activities with non-tax objectives are combined with an unrelated item having only tax-avoidance objectives in order to disallow those tax-motivated benefits. 268
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268
See, e.g., Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 1261 (Mem.) (2007) ("the first asserted business purpose focuses on the wrong transaction--the creation of Garrison as a separate subsidiary to manage asbestos liabilities. . . . [W]e must focus on the transaction that gave the taxpayer a high basis in the stock and thus gave rise to the alleged benefit upon sale...") 454 F.3d 1340, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2006). See also ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d at 256 n.48; Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302
U.S. 609, 613 (1938) ("A given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result because reached by following a devious path.").
Conjunctive analysis
The provision clarifies that the economic substance doctrine involves a conjunctive analysis —there must be an inquiry regarding the objective effects of the transaction on the taxpayer's economic position as well as an inquiry regarding the taxpayer's subjective motives for engaging in the transaction. Under the provision, a transaction must satisfy both tests, i.e., the transaction must change in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and the taxpayer must have a substantial non-Federal-income-tax purpose 269 for entering into such transaction, in order to satisfy the economic substance doctrine. This clarification eliminates the disparity that exists among the Federal circuit courts regarding the application of the doctrine, and modifies its application in those circuits in which either a change in economic position or a non-tax business purpose (without having both) is sufficient to satisfy the economic substance doctrine. 270
________________________________________
269
For purposes of these tests, any State or local income tax effect that is related to a Federal income tax effect is treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax effect.
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270
The provision defines "economic substance doctrine" as the common law doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A with respect to a transaction are not allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose. Thus, the definition includes any doctrine that denies tax benefits for lack of economic substance, for lack of business purpose, or for lack of both.
Non-Federal-tax business purpose
Under the provision, a taxpayer's non-Federal-income-tax purpose for entering into a transaction (the second prong in the analysis) must be "substantial." 271 For purposes of this analysis, any State or local income tax effect which is related to a Federal income tax effect shall be treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax effect. Also, a purpose of achieving a favorable accounting treatment for financial reporting purposes is not to be taken into account as a non-Federal-income-tax purpose if the origin of the financial accounting benefit is a reduction of Federal income tax. 272
________________________________________
271
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. sec. 1.269-2(b) (stating that a distortion of tax liability indicating the principal purpose of tax evasion or avoidance might be evidenced by the fact that "the transaction was not undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the business of the taxpayer"). Similarly, in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997), the court stated:
Key to [the determination of whether a transaction has economic substance] is that the transaction must be rationally related to a useful nontax purpose that is plausible in light of the taxpayer's conduct and useful in light of the taxpayer's economic situation and intentions. Both the utility of the stated purpose and the rationality of the means chosen to effectuate it must be evaluated in accordance with commercial practices in the relevant industry. A rational relationship between purpose and means ordinarily will not be found unless there was a reasonable expectation that the nontax benefits would be at least commensurate with the transaction costs. [citations omitted]
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272
Claiming that a financial accounting benefit constitutes a substantial non-tax purpose fails to consider the origin of the accounting benefit (i.e., reduction of taxes) and significantly diminishes the purpose for having a substantial non-tax purpose requirement. See, e.g., American Electric Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, 791-92 (S.D. Ohio 2001) ("AEP's intended use of the cash flows generated by the [corporate-owned life insurance] plan is irrelevant to the subjective prong of the economic substance analysis. If a legitimate business purpose for the use of the tax savings 'were sufficient to breathe substance into a transaction whose only purpose was to reduce taxes, [then] every sham tax-shelter device might succeed,'") (citing Winn-Dixie v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254, 287 (1999)); aff'd, 326 F3d 737 (6 t h Cir. 2003).
Profit potential
Under the provision, a taxpayer may rely on factors other than profit potential to demonstrate that a transaction results in a meaningful change in the taxpayer's economic position or that the taxpayer has a substantial non-Federal-tax purpose for entering into such transaction. The provision does not require or establish a minimum return that will satisfy the profit potential test. However, if a taxpayer relies on a profit potential, the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit must be substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were respected. 273 Fees and other transaction expenses and foreign taxes are taken into account as expenses in determining pre-tax profit.
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273
See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d at 94 (the economic substance inquiry requires an objective determination of whether a reasonable possibility of profit from the transaction existed apart from tax benefits); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d at 781 (applied the same test, citing Rice's Toyota World); IES Industries v. United States, 253 F.3d at 354 (the application of the objective economic substance test involves determining whether there was a "reasonable possibility of profit . . . apart from tax benefits.").
Personal transactions of individuals
In the case of an individual, the provision applies only to transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in for the production of income.
Other rules
The Secretary is to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the provision.
No inference is intended as to the proper application of the economic substance doctrine under present law. In addition, the provision does not alter or supplant any other rule of law, including any common-law doctrine or provision of the Code or regulations or other guidance thereunder; and the provision should be construed as being additive to any such other rule of law.
Penalty for understatements attributable to transactions lacking economic substance
The provision imposes a new strict liability penalty under section 6662 for an understatement attributable to any disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance, as defined in new section 7701(p), 274 or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law. 275 The penalty rate is 20 percent (increased to 40 percent if the taxpayer does not adequately disclose the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment in the return or a statement attached to the return). Except as provided in regulations, an amended return or supplement to a return is not taken into account if filed after the taxpayer has been contacted for audit or such other date as is specified by the Secretary. No exceptions (including the reasonable cause rules) to the penalty are available. Thus, under the provision, outside opinions or in-house analysis would not protect a taxpayer from imposition of a penalty if it is determined that the transaction lacks economic substance or fails to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law. Similarly, a claim for refund that is excessive under section 6676 due to a claim that is lacking in economic substance or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law is subject to the 20 percent penalty under that section, and the reasonable basis exception is not available.
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274
That provision generally provides that in any case in which a court determines that the economic substance doctrine is relevant, a transaction has economic substance only if: (1) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and (2) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction. Specific other rules also apply. See "Description of Proposal" for the immediately preceding provision, "Clarification of the economic substance doctrine."
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275
For example, the penalty applies to a transaction that is disregarded as a result of the application of the same factors and analysis that is required under the provision for an economic substance analysis, even if a different term is used to describe the doctrine.
The penalty does not apply to any portion of an underpayment on which a fraud penalty is imposed. 276 The new 40-percent penalty for nondisclosed transactions is added to the penalties to which section 6662A will not also apply. 277
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276
I.e., section 6662(b) of present law applies to the new penalty as well.
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277
As under present law, the penalties under section 6662 (including the new penalty) do not apply to any portion of an underpayment on which a fraud penalty is imposed.
As described above, under the provision, the reasonable cause and good faith exception of present law section 6664(c)(1) does not apply to any portion of an underpayment which is attributable to a transaction lacking economic substance, as defined in section 7701(p), or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law. In addition, the exception of present law section 6664(c)(1) does not apply to any tax shelter (as defined in present law section 6662(d)(2)(C)). Likewise, the reasonable cause and good faith exception of present law section 6664(d)(1) does not apply to any portion of a reportable transaction understatement which is attributable to a transaction lacking economic substance, as defined in section 7701(p), or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law, or to any tax shelter (as defined in present law section 6662(d)(2)(C)).
Effective Date
The provision applies to transactions entered into after the date of enactment. Additionally, the provision applies to underpayments, understatements, and refunds and credits attributable to transactions entered into after the date of enactment.
U.. Certain Large or Publicly Traded Persons Made Subject to a More Likely Than Not Standard for Avoiding Penalties on Underpayments (sec. 563 of the bill and secs. 6662 and 6664 of the Code)
Present Law
General accuracy-related penalty
An accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 applies to the portion of any underpayment that is attributable to (1) negligence, (2) any substantial understatement of income tax, (3) any substantial valuation misstatement, (4) any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities, or (5) any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement. If the correct income tax liability exceeds that reported by the taxpayer by the greater of 10 percent of the correct tax or $5,000 (or, in the case of corporations, by the lesser of (a) 10 percent of the correct tax (or $10,000 if greater) or (b) $10 million), then a substantial understatement exists and a penalty may be imposed equal to 20 percent of the underpayment of tax attributable to the understatement. 278 Except in the case of tax shelters, 279 the amount of any understatement is reduced by any portion of the understatement attributable to an item if (1) the treatment of the item is supported by substantial authority, or (2) facts relevant to the tax treatment of the item were adequately disclosed and there was a reasonable basis for its tax treatment. The Treasury Secretary may prescribe a list of positions which the Secretary believes do not meet the requirements for substantial authority under this provision.
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278
Sec. 6662.
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279
A tax shelter is defined for this purpose as a partnership or other entity, an investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement if a significant purpose of such partnership, other entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(C).
The section 6662 penalty generally is abated (even with respect to tax shelters) in cases in which the taxpayer can demonstrate that there was "reasonable cause" for the underpayment and that the taxpayer acted in good faith. 280 Treasury regulations provide that reasonable cause exists where the understatement is attributable to a tax shelter where the taxpayer "reasonably relies in good faith on an opinion based on a professional tax advisor's analysis of the pertinent facts and authorities [that] . . . unambiguously concludes that there is a greater than 50-percent likelihood that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged" by the IRS. 281 For transactions other than tax shelters, Treasury regulations provide a facts and circumstances test, the most important factor generally being the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the proper tax liability. If a taxpayer relies on an opinion, reliance is not reasonable if the taxpayer knows or should have known that the advisor lacked knowledge in the relevant aspects of Federal tax law, or if the taxpayer fails to disclose a fact that it knows or should have known is relevant. Certain additional requirements apply with respect to the advice. 282
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280
Sec. 6664(c).
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281
Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6662-4(g)(4)(i)(B); Treas. Reg. sec. 1.6664-4(c).
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282
See Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.6664-4(c). In addition to the requirements applicable to taxpayers under the regulations, advisors may be subject to potential penalties under section 6694 (applicable to return preparers), and to monetary penalties and other sanctions under Circular 230 (which provides rules governing persons practicing before the IRS). Under Circular 230, if a transaction is a "covered transaction" (a term that includes listed transactions and certain non-listed reportable transactions) a "more likely than not" confidence level is required for written tax advice that may be relied upon by a taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties, and certain other standards must also be met. Treasury Dept. Circular 230 (Rev. 4-2008) Sec. 10.35. For other tax advice, Circular 230 generally requires a lower "realistic possibility" confidence level or a "non-frivolous" confidence level coupled with advising the client of any opportunity to avoid the accuracy related penalty under section 6662 by adequate disclosure. Treasury Dept. Circular 230 (Rev. 4-2008) Sec. 10.34.
Listed transactions and reportable avoidance transactions
In general
A separate accuracy-related penalty under section 6662A applies to any "listed transaction" and to any other "reportable transaction" that is not a listed transaction, if a significant purpose of such transaction is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax 283 (a "reportable avoidance transaction"). The penalty rate and defenses available to avoid the penalty vary depending on whether the transaction was adequately disclosed.
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283
Sec. 6662A(b)(2).
Section 6707A(c) imposes a penalty for failure adequately to report listed transactions and reportable transactions under section 6011. A reportable transaction is defined as one that the Treasury Secretary determines is required to be disclosed because it is determined to have a potential for tax avoidance or evasion. 284 A listed transaction is defined as a reportable transaction which is the same as, or substantially similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction for purposes of the reporting disclosure requirements. 285 For reportable transactions, the penalty is $10,000 for natural persons and $50,000 in any other case. The penalty for a listed transaction is $100,000 for natural persons and $200,000 in any other case. 286 The Commissioner of the IRS may rescind all or any portion of any penalty imposed under section 6707A if the violation is with respect to a reportable transaction other than a listed transaction and rescinding the penalty would promote compliance with the requirements of this title and effective tax administration. 287
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284
Sec. 6707A(c)(1).
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285
Sec. 6707A(c)(2).
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286
Sec. 6707A(b).
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287
Sec. 6707A(d).
Disclosed transactions
In general, a 20-percent accuracy-related penalty is imposed on any understatement attributable to an adequately disclosed listed transaction or reportable avoidance transaction. 288 The only exception to the penalty is if the taxpayer satisfies a more stringent reasonable cause and good faith exception ("strengthened reasonable cause exception"), which is described below. The strengthened reasonable cause exception is available only if the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment were adequately disclosed, there is or was substantial authority for the claimed tax treatment, and the taxpayer reasonably believed that the claimed tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment. A "reasonable belief" must be based on the facts and law as they exist at the time that the return in question is filed, and must not take into account the possibility that a return would not be audited. Moreover, reliance on professional advice may support a "reasonable belief" only in certain circumstances. 289
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288
Sec. 6662A(a).
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289
Section 6664(d)(3)(B) would not allow a reasonable belief to be based on a "disqualified opinion" or on an opinion from a "disqualified tax advisor".
Undisclosed transactions
If the taxpayer does not adequately disclose the transaction, the strengthened reasonable cause exception is not available (i.e., a strict-liability penalty generally applies), and the taxpayer is subject to an increased penalty equal to 30 percent of the understatement. 290 However, a taxpayer will be treated as having adequately disclosed a transaction for this purpose if the Commissioner of the IRS has separately rescinded the separate penalty under section 6707A for failure to disclose a reportable transaction. 291
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290
Sec. 6662A(c).
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291
Sec. 6664(d).
A public entity that is required to pay a penalty for an undisclosed listed or reportable transaction must disclose the imposition of the penalty in reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") for such periods as the Secretary specifies. The disclosure to the SEC applies without regard to whether the taxpayer determines the amount of the penalty to be material to the reports in which the penalty must appear, and any failure to disclose such penalty in the reports is treated as a failure to disclose a listed transaction. A taxpayer must disclose a penalty in reports to the SEC once the taxpayer has exhausted its administrative and judicial remedies with respect to the penalty (or if earlier, when paid). 292
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292
Sec. 6707A(e).
Determination of the understatement amount
The penalty is applied to the amount of any understatement attributable to the listed or reportable avoidance transaction without regard to other items on the tax return. For purposes of this provision, the amount of the understatement is determined as the sum of: (1) the product of the highest corporate or individual tax rate (as appropriate) and the increase in taxable income resulting from the difference between the taxpayer's treatment of the item and the proper treatment of the item (without regard to other items on the tax return); 293 and (2) the amount of any decrease in the aggregate amount of credits which results from the difference between the taxpayer's treatment of an item and the proper tax treatment of such item.
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293
For this purpose, any reduction in the excess of deductions allowed for the taxable year over gross income for such year, and any reduction in the amount of capital losses which would (without regard to section 1211) be allowed for such year, shall be treated as an increase in taxable income. Sec. 6662A(b).
Except as provided in regulations, a taxpayer's treatment of an item may not take into account any amendment or supplement to a return if the amendment or supplement is filed after the earlier of when the taxpayer is first contacted regarding an examination of the return or such other date as specified by the Secretary. 294
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294
Sec. 6662A(e)(3).
Strengthened reasonable cause exception
A penalty is not imposed under section 6662A with respect to any portion of an understatement if it is shown that there was reasonable cause for such portion and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Such a showing requires: (1) adequate disclosure of the facts affecting the transaction in accordance with the regulations under section 6011; 295 (2) that there is or was substantial authority for such treatment; and (3) that the taxpayer reasonably believed that such treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment. For this purpose, a taxpayer will be treated as having a reasonable belief with respect to the tax treatment of an item only if such belief: (1) is based on the facts and law that exist at the time the tax return (that includes the item) is filed; and (2) relates solely to the taxpayer's chances of success on the merits and does not take into account the possibility that (a) a return will not be audited, (b) the treatment will not be raised on audit, or (c) the treatment will be resolved through settlement if raised. 296
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295
See the previous discussion regarding the penalty for failing to disclose a reportable transaction.
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296
Sec. 6664(d).
A taxpayer may (but is not required to) rely on an opinion of a tax advisor in establishing its reasonable belief with respect to the tax treatment of the item. However, a taxpayer may not rely on an opinion of a tax advisor for this purpose if the opinion (1) is provided by a "disqualified tax advisor" or (2) is a "disqualified opinion."
Disqualified tax advisor
A disqualified tax advisor is any advisor who: (1) is a material advisor 297 and who participates in the organization, management, promotion, or sale of the transaction or is related
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297
The term "material advisor" means any person who provides any material aid, assistance, or advice with respect to organizing, managing, promoting, selling, implementing, or carrying out any reportable transaction, and who derives gross income in excess of $50,000 in the case of a reportable transaction substantially all of the tax benefits from which are provided to natural persons ($250,000 in any other case). Sec. 6111(b)(1).
(within the meaning of section 267(b) or 707(b)(1)) to any person who so participates; (2) is compensated directly or indirectly 298 by a material advisor with respect to the transaction; (3) has a fee arrangement with respect to the transaction that is contingent on all or part of the intended tax benefits from the transaction being sustained; or (4) as determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, has a disqualifying financial interest with respect to the transaction.
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298
This situation could arise, for example, when an advisor has an arrangement or understanding (oral or written) with an organizer, manager, or promoter of a reportable transaction that such party will recommend or refer potential participants to the advisor for an opinion regarding the tax treatment of the transaction.
A material advisor is considered as participating in the "organization" of a transaction if the advisor performs acts relating to the development of the transaction. This may include, for example, preparing documents: (1) establishing a structure used in connection with the transaction (such as a partnership agreement); (2) describing the transaction (such as an offering memorandum or other statement describing the transaction); or (3) relating to the registration of the transaction with any federal, state, or local government body. 299 Participation in the "management" of a transaction means involvement in the decision-making process regarding any business activity with respect to the transaction. Participation in the "promotion or sale" of a transaction means involvement in the marketing or solicitation of the transaction to others. Thus, an advisor who provides information about the transaction to a potential participant is involved in the promotion or sale of a transaction, as is any advisor who recommends the transaction to a potential participant.
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299
An advisor should not be treated as participating in the organization of a transaction if the advisor's only involvement with respect to the organization of the transaction is the rendering of an opinion regarding the tax consequences of such transaction. However, such an advisor may be a "disqualified tax advisor" with respect to the transaction if the advisor participates in the management, promotion, or sale of the transaction (or if the advisor is compensated by a material advisor, has a fee arrangement that is contingent on the tax benefits of the transaction, or as determined by the Secretary, has a continuing financial interest with respect to the transaction). See Notice 200512, 2005-1 C.B. 494 regarding disqualified compensation arrangements.
Disqualified opinion
An opinion may not be relied upon if the opinion: (1) is based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future events); (2) unreasonably relies upon representations, statements, finding or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person; (3) does not identify and consider all relevant facts; or (4) fails to meet any other requirement prescribed by the Secretary.
Coordination with other penalties
To the extent a penalty on an understatement is imposed under section 6662A, that same amount of understatement is not also subject to the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) or to the valuation misstatement penalties under section 6662(e) or section 6662(h). However, such amount of understatement is included for purposes of determining whether any understatement (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)) is a substantial understatement as defined under section 6662(d)(1) and for purposes of identifying an underpayment under the section 6663 fraud penalty.
The penalty imposed under section 6662A does not apply to any portion of an understatement to which a fraud penalty is applied under section 6663.
Erroneous claim for refund or credit
If a claim for refund or credit with respect to income tax (other than a claim relating to the earned income tax credit) is made for an excessive amount, unless it is shown that the claim for such excessive amount has a reasonable basis, the person making such claim is subject to a penalty in an amount equal to 20 percent of the excessive amount. 300
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300
Sec. 6667.
The term "excessive amount" means the amount by which the amount of the claim for refund for any taxable year exceeds the amount of such claim allowable for the taxable year.
This penalty does not apply to any portion of the excessive amount of a claim for refund or credit which is subject to a penalty imposed under the accuracy-related or fraud penalty provisions (including the general accuracy-related penalty, or the penalty with respect to listed and reportable transactions, described above).
Explanation of Provision
Under the provision, in the case of a "specified person," the reasonable cause and good faith exception of present law section 6664(c)(1) applies to a portion of an underpayment only if the taxpayer has a reasonable belief that the tax treatment is more likely than not the proper treatment of the item. This reasonable belief exception is not available to any portion of the underpayment that is attributable to one or more tax shelters (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)), transactions lacking economic substance or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law, or reportable transaction understatements which are attributable to one or more tax shelters (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)) or transactions lacking economic substance.
A specified person is defined as (i) any person required to file periodic or other reports under section 13 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and (ii) any corporation with gross receipts in excess of $100 million for the taxable year involved. 301
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301
For purposes of this rule, all persons treated as a single employer under section 52(a) are treated as one person.
In the case of a specified person, it is no longer the case that a substantial understatement (as defined in section 6662(d)(1)) is reduced if there is or was substantial authority for the taxpayer's treatment, or if the relevant facts were disclosed and there is a reasonable basis for the taxpayer's tax treatment.
Effective Date
The provision applies to underpayments and understatements attributable to transactions entered into after the date of enactment