No joint venture between
service provider & owner of assets; profits share is ordinary income
Rigas v
U.S., (CD TX 5/2/7/2011) 107 AFTR 2d ¶2011-788
A district court has held that a joint venture did not exist
between an energy company and the limited partnership that managed some of its
assets, although the latter received a share of the profits when the assets
were disposed of. Even though there were some indications that a partnership
existed, including the marriage of capital and know-how, many more aspects of
the relationship, such as who controlled and owned the assets, indicated that
the limited partnership merely received a fee for services. As a result, one of
the limited partnership's partners could not treat his share of profits from
the limited partnership as capital gain; rather, it was taxed as ordinary
income.
Background. A joint venture or other contractual
arrangement may create a separate entity for federal tax purposes if the
participants carry on a trade, business, financial operation, or venture and
divide the profits. Some courts have held joint venture arrangements to be
partnerships (and their members held to be partners) even though they did not
consider themselves partners and were operating under an agreement specifically
providing that they were not partners, and even if they did not held themselves
out to others as partners.
Facts. In 2003, Hydrocarbon Capital LLC (Hydrocarbon) bought from Mirant
Corporation a portfolio of interests related to the oil and gas industry,
including credit agreements, royalty interests, and stock warrants. Hydrocarbon
asked five former Mirant employees, including John Rigas, to manage the
portfolio of assets due to their past management experience. The five men formed
Odyssey Energy Capital I, LP (Odyssey) to carry out the management functions.
Each was a limited partner in Odyssey, while Odyssey's general partner was a
limited liability corporation.
Odyssey and Hydrocarbon entered into an agreement under which
Odyssey provided servicing, management, administration and disposition services
for the asset portfolio, including the hiring of necessary environmental and
petroleum consultants and conducting physical inspection of the assets within
the portfolio. Odyssey agreed to maintain an office, to employ adequate
personnel, to collect payments on the assets, and to track overhead expenses.
Odyssey's overhead expenses, including salaries of its individual partners,
were funded through a $6 million nonrecourse promissory note issued by
Hydrocarbon to Odyssey. On a semiannual basis, Odyssey would submit a budget
for overhead expenses to Hydrocarbon for its review and approval. Once
approved, Hydrocarbon would draw down sums from the promissory note and wire
the loan funds to Odyssey. The agreement specifically said that it was not
intended that a partnership would be created between Odyssey and Hydrocarbon.
Odyssey had the authority to take actions regarding the assets
that were in the best interest of Hydrocarbon, but was subject to certain
limitations on its authority, including the inability to enter into binding
commitments to dispose of assets, to incur unforeseen expenses, and to enter
into transactions that were not previously approved by Hydrocarbon. Title,
ownership, and exclusive control of the assets was retained by Hydrocarbon.
Under the agreement, Odyssey was to be paid a performance fee as
full compensation for rendering services. Hydrocarbon would: (1) recoup all
third-party out-of-pocket expenses plus the initial value of the asset
portfolio; (2) receive a preferred return of 10% of the profits; and (3) use
the remaining funds to pay off any amounts outstanding on the promissory note.
Finally, Odyssey and Hydrocarbon would split the profits whereby Odyssey would
take 20% of the profits and Hydrocarbon would retain 80%. Odyssey's performance
fee was subject to a “claw-back” provision that ensured Hydrocarbon would
receive the amounts provided for in steps (1)–(3).
In 2004, the capital assets in the portfolio were sold for $288
million, yielding a gain of approximately $110 million to Hydrocarbon, After
providing for steps (1)–(3) in the above calculation, Odyssey received
approximately $20 million as its performance fee. Odyssey later paid
Hydrocarbon $31,920 under the claw-back provision of the management agreement.
On its original partnership return for 2004, Odyssey characterized
the approximately $20 million it had received from Hydrocarbon as “gross
profit” income and issued Schedules K-1 to its limited partners, including
Rigas. He, in turn, filed a return for 2004 reporting his $4 million
distribution from Odyssey as ordinary business income. In 2007, Odyssey filed
an amended return for 2004 and characterized the $20 million it had received
from Hydrocarbon as net long-term capital gain. In turn, Rigas filed an amended
return for 2004 showing the $4 million he received as net long-term capital
gain rather than ordinary business income, and claimed a refund, which IRS
disallowed.
The central substantive dispute before the district court was
whether the relationship between Odyssey and Hydrocarbon was a joint venture or
partnership, as Rigas maintained, or a mere service relationship, as IRS
maintained.
Conduct of the parties controls. The district court looked
to the following factors in making its decision that no partnership agreement
existed between Odyssey and Hydrocarbon:
... Contributions
of the parties to the venture. Odyssey contributed funds for overhead
expenses through its draw-downs on the promissory note and bought a working
interest in a lease for $130,000 using funds from the promissory note. Although
both sets of transactions were initially funded by Hydrocarbon through the
promissory note, Odyssey later bore the cost of these transactions because of
the manner in which the performance fee was calculated. The court thus treated
these reductions of Odyssey's promissory note as capital contributions, where
the contribution was deferred until the liquidation of the partnership. Odyssey
also used its own money to buy furniture and fixtures for its office, and its
partners contributed substantial know-how needed to manage the portfolio
assets.
... Interest
in profits or losses. A clawback provision provided that, after the
distribution of the 20% and 80% of income, Hydrocarbon could ask Odyssey to
repay some of its 20% income if subsequent expenses or losses on the assets
came to light. Odyssey, in fact, did pay approximately $30,000 to Hydrocarbon
under the clawback provision. The court found that the clawback was indicative
of a partnership arrangement. It also found that the subordination of the
profits interest to Hydrocarbon's recovery of its expenses and initial
investment could be indicative of a partnership relationship, though it was
equally consistent with a theory that Odyssey was a service provider to be
rewarded with a percentage of the profits.
... Responsibilities
of the parties. Despite the great deal of responsibility Odyssey exercised
over the asset portfolio, it did not have authority to withdraw funds from
Hydrocarbon's bank accounts, could not increase Hydrocarbon's capital
commitment to a particular asset, could not enter into binding agreements in
Hydrocarbon's name, and could not dispose of an asset without Hydrocarbon's
prior written approval. Thus, the court held that Odyssey's responsibilities,
while numerous, did not extend into the key areas of acquiring and disposing of
assets or drawing upon Hydrocarbon's bank accounts that would indicate a
partnership relationship.
... Parties'
right to and control over income and capital. Odyssey did not own title to
any of the assets in the portfolio, and, apart from depositing checks, and did
not share control with Hydrocarbon over the bank accounts that corresponded
with the companies in the asset portfolio. Odyssey could only make
recommendations to Hydrocarbon. Thus, the court held that Odyssey's lack of the
right to and control over the assets and income of the venture was indicative
of a service provider relationship.
... Representations
to IRS and third parties. Odyssey and Hydrocarbon did not file joint tax
returns or joint financial reports with governmental authorities. In addition,
Odyssey and Hydrocarbon had separate checking accounts. The court said these
factors indicated that Odyssey and Hydrocarbon maintained separate accounting
and financial arrangements, tilting towards a finding that Odyssey was a
service provider for, rather than a partner with, Hydrocarbon.
After considering all of the factors indicative of the entities'
intent to form a partnership, the district court held that IRS had established
by a preponderance of the evidence that a partnership relationship did not
exist between Odyssey and Hydrocarbon. As a result, Rigas could not treat his
share of the profits from the sale of the assets managed by Odyssey as
long-term capital gain. Rather, it was taxable as ordinary income received for
services.
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