GAO examines tax evasion potential of foreign-parented
groups primarily operating in U.S.
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592466.pdf
GAO-12-743, “Information on Foreign-Owned but Essentially
U.S.-Based Corporate Groups Is Limited”
A new report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
has analyzed the prevalence of, and potential tax advantages or abuse stemming
from, foreign-parented corporate groups with U.S. subsidiaries that conduct the
majority of their worldwide operations in the U.S. Although information on the
subject was limited, GAO concluded that this structure may provide an advantage
because foreign-controlled domestic corporations and their foreign parents may
not be subject to the anti-deferral rules applicable to U.S. parent
corporations and their foreign subsidiaries. However, the report also concluded
that this structure doesn't provide a greater opportunity to avoid the transfer
pricing rules.
Background on the anti-deferral rules. U.S. corporations are
generally taxed on income from outside the U.S. just as they are on income from
inside the U.S. (Code Sec. 862) This rule is intended to ensure an even playing
field and eliminate any tax advantage that would otherwise be derived by a U.S.
corporation doing business in a low-tax country. However, subject to certain
limitations, the U.S. corporation's foreign-source income is insulated from
U.S. tax until it is actually brought back to the U.S. and distributed to the
U.S. owners. Thus, U.S. corporations can defer income by simply forming a
wholly-owned subsidiary in a low-tax country.
The Code's subpart F “anti-deferral” regime addresses this
issue by taxing U.S. shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) on
their pro rata share of the CFC's subpart F income under Code Sec. 952(a) and
investments in U.S. property, regardless of whether these amounts were actually
distributed to the shareholders. A CFC is defined as a foreign corporation with
regard to which more than 50% of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote or the total value of the stock of the corporation is
owned (directly, indirectly, or constructively) by U.S. shareholders, who are
specifically defined for CFC purposes as a U.S. person who owns 10% or more of
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote in the
foreign corporation. (Code Sec. 957, Code Sec. 951(b)) In effect, these rules
make U.S. corporations immediately taxable on certain types of income, such as
interest and rents, of their foreign subsidiaries.
Background on the transfer pricing rules. Under Code Sec.
482, IRS is authorized to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits or allowances among organizations, trades, or businesses
owned or controlled by the same interests in order to prevent tax evasion or to
reflect the true taxable income of any such entity. This prevents the shifting
of income and deductions among certain related taxpayers for the sole purpose
of minimizing taxes.
The standard to be applied is that of a taxpayer dealing at
arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer. The arm's length result of a
controlled transaction must be determined under the method that provides the
most reliable measure of an arm's length result.
GAO report. In a report addressed to Senate Finance
Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-MT) and Ranking Member Orrin Hatch (R-UT), GAO
states that a multinational corporate group, whether U.S.-owned or
foreign-owned, can generally shift income to subsidiaries in low-tax countries
to avoid or evade U.S. taxes, even if the majority of their economic activity
is in the U.S. However, use of a foreign-controlled domestic corporation (FCDC)
structure can provide a tax avoidance or evasion advantage over structures
where U.S. parents own foreign subsidiaries.
GAO observed that many corporate groups with U.S. owners
achieve the FCDC structure by forming a new foreign corporation in a low-tax
country that becomes the owner of the corporate group. This transaction is
known as an “inversion,” and it is typically used to reduce the group's overall
tax liabilities. Foreign ownership can also occur via takeovers or mergers by
foreign corporations, foreign corporations with U.S. subsidiaries incorporating
overseas at the onset, or foreign corporations expanding their operations and
establishing new subsidiaries in the U.S.
The primary advantage of the FCDC structure is that, unlike
U.S. parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries, the anti-deferral rules
generally don't apply to an FCDC structure. Rather, the anti-deferral rules
only apply to an FCDC if it is also the owner of a CFC, or to the foreign
parent of an FCDC if the foreign parent is itself a CFC.
However, with respect to tax evasion through transfer
pricing abuse, FCDC structures don't provide any particular advantage since
they are subject to the same rules as U.S. corporations with foreign
subsidiaries.
Limited data. GAO emphasized that data on foreign-owned but
essentially U.S.-based corporate groups was extremely limited, and noted that
it was unable to describe how they came to adopt this structure “[w]ithout
basic information.” GAO stated the Form 5472 doesn't provide information from
which GAO can ascertain the percentage that a group's business in one
particular country represents of its worldwide business, and it further doesn't
contain information on intermediary parties to an FCDC structure. Form 5472
could, however, be revised to better identify and understand FCDCs.
RIA observation: This
report could potentially lead to the Senate Finance Committee proposing
legislation to ensure greater transparency for FCDCs, such as heightened
information reporting requirements.What GAO Found
The FCDC ownership structure could provide a tax avoidance
or evasion advantage relative to a structure where U.S. parents own foreign
subsidiaries. Academic experts we spoke to said that the FCDC corporate
structure does not provide an inherently greater ability to evade taxes through
transfer pricing abuse because transfer pricing rules are the same for the FCDC
structure as for U.S. corporations with foreign subsidiaries. However,
according to IRS officials and our own research, the FCDC structure could
confer a tax advantage because certain rules that can limit potential abuse by
U.S. parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries may not apply to FCDCs and
their foreign parent companies. These rules (called anti-deferral rules) make
immediately taxable to U.S. corporations certain types of income such as
interest, rents, and royalties of their foreign subsidiaries. These types of
income tend to be easily moveable from one taxing jurisdiction to another and
hence more amenable to transfer pricing abuse.
Very little is known about the foreign parents of
corporations with a majority of their operations in the United States. Studies
of this corporate structure were limited to studies of corporations that
inverted to achieve this structure. In an inversion, a corporate group with a
U.S. owner typically creates a new foreign corporation in a low tax country
that becomes the foreign owner of the corporate group in order to reduce the
group’s tax liabilities. Even in these cases, the studies did not claim to have
information on all inversions. Our own attempts to identify foreign parents of
corporations with a majority of their operations in the United States ran into
important limitations. In our first method—comparing U.S. sales to the foreign
parent’s worldwide sales as shown on their annual reports—provided
unrepresentative results because too few foreign parents broke out U.S. sales
separately. In addition, results from our second method—using the country where
the foreign parent’s principal business activities were located (as reported on
IRS Form 5472)—were difficult because IRS does not define principal countries
where business is conducted on the form, allowing taxpayers to claim more than
one country as a principal location where business is conducted. Thus, the
information on the form does not permit clear inferences about how much
business the foreign-controlled corporate group does in any particular country,
including the United States. Without basic information about these
foreign-owned but essentially U.S.-based corporate groups, describing how they
came to adopt this structure is not feasible. The benefits of obtaining more
information about the possible effects on tax compliance of these
foreign-controlled corporate groups, other characteristics of the corporate
groups and how they came to be organized as they are would have to be weighed
against the cost of collecting such data.
Why GAO Did This Study
A multinational corporate group, whether U.S.-owned or
foreign-owned, with subsidiaries inside and outside of the United States can
shift income to its subsidiaries in countries where corporate taxes are lower
in order to avoid or evade U.S. taxes. As detailed in previous reports, this
income shifting can be accomplished through such practices as manipulating
transfer prices (the prices that members of the corporate group charge each
other for goods and services). Foreign-owned multinational corporations can do
this even if the majority of their economic activity is in the United States.
Tax policymakers have long been concerned about the tax compliance implications
of these practices.
It is not clear what is known about foreign-parented
corporate groups with U.S. subsidiaries where the majority of worldwide
operations are in the United States. You asked us to provide information about
corporate groups that fit this description. Specifically, we agreed to
determine (1) whether there are advantages in this ownership structure for
avoiding or evading taxes, and (2) what is known about the number, size, type,
and other relevant characteristics of these corporate groups and how they came
to be organized with this structure.
For more information, contact James R. White at (202)
512-9110 or whitej@gao.gov.
www.irstaxattorney.com (212) 588-1113 ab@irstaxattorney.com
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