In this case, the IRS could not settle a tax debt with an
Offer-in-Compromise because it lost jurisdiction when the case was transferred
to the Department of Justice. Under 26
U.S.C. § 7122(a), the IRS “may compromise any civil or criminal case arising
under the internal revenue laws prior to reference to the [DOJ] for prosecution
and defense; and the Attorney General or his delegate may compromise any such
case after reference to the [DOJ] for prosecution or defense.” However, “[o]nce
a tax matter is referred to the [DOJ], only the Attorney General or a person to
whom authority has been delegated by the Attorney General may settle the
matter.” United States v. Forma, 784 F. Supp. 1132, 1139 [69 AFTR 2d 92-943]
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also Slovacek v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 828, 833 [81
AFTR 2d 98-1859] (1998) (agreeing with Forma); Int'l Paper Co. v. United
States, 36 Fed. Cl. 313, 321 [78 AFTR 2d 96-6075] (1996) (agreeing with Forma);
Brubaker v. United States, 342 F.2d 655, 662 [15 AFTR 2d 440] (7th Cir. 1965)
(determining that excess tax “liabilities cannot be compromised by the Attorney
General or the [DOJ] unless and until the Commissioner refers [the matter] to
the [DOJ] for prosecution or defense”); cf. Bergh v. Dep't of Transp., 794 F.2d
1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that a compromise is “within the discretion
of the agency conducting the litigation”).
U.S. v. JACKSON, Cite as 111 AFTR 2d 2013-XXXX, 01/25/2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANTHONY DENNIS JACKSON; GROSSIE
SMITH-JACKSON; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR &
INDUSTRY; PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA ANTHONY DENNIS JACKSON,
Appellant.
Case Information:
Code Sec(s):
Court Name: UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
Docket No.: No.
12-2284,
Date Decided:
01/25/2013Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 25, 2013.
Prior History:
Disposition:
HEADNOTE
.
Reference(s):
OPINION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:09-cv-01745) District
Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr.
Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
OPINION
Judge: PER CURIAM
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
Anthony Dennis Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals from an
order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denying his motion for reconsideration and motion for relief from
final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). For the following reasons, we
will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only
recite the facts necessary for our discussion. In 1988, Jackson and his now
ex-wife purchased real property located at 617 South Cobbs Creek Parkway in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 1998, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
assessed tax liabilities for years 1992 through 1994 after Jackson did not file
federal income tax returns for those years. Jackson filed untimely returns for
the years 1995 through 1998, and the IRS assessed the taxes due. By April 2009,
Jackson's outstanding tax liability for the years 1992 through 1998, including
penalties and interest, totaled $465,876.15. In April 2009, the IRS referred
Jackson's case to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and requested that it file
suit to reduce Jackson's liability to judgment and to foreclose the federal tax
liens on his property.
On April 24, 2009, the Government filed a complaint against
Jackson, seeking to reduce to judgment the tax assessments for years 1992
through 1998, to foreclose the federal tax liens against Jackson's property,
and to have the property sold. The Government also named Jackson's ex-wife, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of Labor and Industry, Philadelphia Gas
Works, and the City of Philadelphia as defendants who may have claimed an
interest in or a lien on the property. Jackson failed to appear, and the
Government moved for default judgment. On February 17, 2010, the District Court
granted the Government's motion for default judgment, entered judgment in favor
of the Government for $469,323.11 plus statutory additions, and foreclosed the
federal tax liens on Jackson's property. The District Court also entered an
order of sale for Jackson's property. Jackson did not appeal this judgment.
In November 2011, almost two years after the District Court
entered judgment, Jackson filed a motion to compel the Government to satisfy
the judgment, alleging that he had paid all his tax liabilities with interest
and penalties. In opposition, the Government stated that after judgment was
entered, Jackson had submitted tax returns for years 1992 through 1994. Based
on those forms, and without DOJ's consent, the IRS erroneously made
unauthorized abatements of Jackson's liabilities for those years. Around the
same time, Jackson paid $22,921.58 towards his liability for 1992, $2,781.65
towards his liability for 1993, and $16,026.53 towards his liability for 1994.
However, the IRS reversed the unauthorized abatements around the time when
Jackson filed his motion. On December 12, 2011, the District Court denied
Jackson's motion to compel, noting that he had failed to establish that he had
paid his taxes, penalties, and interest in full.
Jackson filed a combined motion for reconsideration and
motion for relief from final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) on
December 22, 2011, asserting that his tax debt had been covered by the
abatement and that the IRS had agreed to accept a lesser amount to settle his
balance owed. On April 2, 2012, the District Court denied Jackson's motions.
Jackson then timely filed his notice of appeal.
II.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review both the denial of a motion for reconsideration and a motion for relief
from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for abuse of discretion. See
Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Budget
Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).
III.
On appeal, Jackson asserts that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing and that the District Court denied him due process by not holding one.
He also alleges that the IRS abated his tax liabilities and that his resulting
liabilities have already been satisfied. Furthermore, Jackson argues that the
District Court ignored applicable case law.
A. Motion for Relief from Judgment
Jackson asserts that he was entitled to relief under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(5) because, according to him, all his tax liabilities were paid.
Rule 60(b)(5) allows a district court to relieve a party from a final judgment
if “the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged.” Here, Jackson
neither disputes the amount of the judgment entered against him nor argues that
he has paid the full amount of the judgment. Instead, Jackson alleges that the
three payments totaling $41,729.76 made towards his tax liability for 1992
through 1994 satisfied his total liability. Accordingly, the District Court
properly determined that Jackson had not satisfied the outstanding judgment.
Jackson's argument that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing and that the District Court denied him due process by not holding one
is without merit. A district court has “substantial discretion in determining
whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 60(b) motion.” United
States v. 8136 S. Dobson St., 125 F.3d 1076, 1086 (7th Cir. 1997); see also
Atkinson v. Prudential Prop. Co., 43 F.3d 367, 374 (8th Cir. 1994). Here, the
relevant facts were not in dispute because, again, Jackson did not dispute that
he had not paid the full amount of the judgment entered against him, that
abatements were entered after his case was referred to the DOJ, or that the IRS
reversed the erroneous abatements. Therefore, we find that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Jackson's main contention is that the IRS abated his tax
liabilities. The IRS lost its authority to compromise Jackson's tax liabilities
in April 2009 when it referred Jackson's case to the DOJ for prosecution.
Accordingly, the abatements made in 2011 were void because they were made
without authorization from the DOJ. See IRS Chief Counsel Notice CC-2011-020,
2011 WL 4402105 (Sept. 15, 2011) (“Abatement of tax for a tax period referred
to [the DOJ] that is made without the approval of [the DOJ] is invalid and may
be reversed, because the Service lacks the authority to take such action on the
taxpayer's account without Justice approval.”); cf. In re Bugge, 99 F.3d 740,
745 [78 AFTR 2d 96-7115] (5th Cir. 1996) (clerical error doctrine provides
authority for reversal of abatement of original assessment in limited
circumstances). Furthermore, the DOJ retains authority to compromise even if a
judgment has been obtained and the case has been returned to the IRS for
collection. See IRS Chief Counsel Notice CC-2011, 020, 2011 WL 4402105.
Accordingly, the original assessments remained valid because the abatements
made by the IRS were void. See id. (reassessment not necessary because the
post-referral abatements were void).
Finally, Jackson's assertion that the District Court ignored
applicable case law is meritless. As an initial matter, Jackson does not cite
any particular authority to support his allegation. However, it appears that he
is referring to the unpublished order of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Oklahoma in United States v. Pound, No. CIV-07-427-RAW,
2010 WL 2803918 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 2010), which he attached to his motions. In
Pound, the district court concluded that the taxpayer was entitled to
post-judgment relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) & (6) after the IRS
erroneously abated his liabilities. However, the District Court did not err in
not following Pound because it had, at most, persuasive value. Furthermore, in
2011, after Pound was decided, the IRS specifically disagreed with Pound and
determined that a “post-referral abatement made without approval by Justice is
void and the abatement should be reversed and the Service's transcript records
corrected.” IRS Chief Counsel Notice CC-2011-020, 2011 WL 4402105. Accordingly,
the District Court correctly did not follow Pound.
B. Motion for Reconsideration
A motion for reconsideration “must rely on one of three
grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of
new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.” Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 669. Jackson did not identify any of these
grounds in his motion; instead, his motion for reconsideration relied upon the
same arguments as his Rule 60(b) motion. As discussed above, Jackson's
arguments have no merit, and so we discern no abuse of discretion in the
District Court's denial of Jackson's motion.
IV.
For the reasons stated herein, as well as those set forth by
the District Court, we will affirm the District Court's order denying Jackson's
motions for reconsideration and relief from judgment.
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