Tuesday, May 12, 2015

section 6663 civil fraud May 11, 2015


Khuong Duong v. Commissioner; Dung T. Tran v. Commissioner.

U.S. Tax Court, Dkt. No. 14991-13, 15151-13, TC Memo. 2015-90, May 11, 2015.

[Appealable, barring stipulation to the contrary, to CA-4 and CA-11.—CCH.]

[ Code Secs. 61 and 446]
Gross income: Underreported income: Reconstruction of income: Bank deposits method.–

The IRS established that two nail salon owners underreported their income by using the bank deposits method. The unreported income was allocated equally between the taxpayers for the deposits into their joint accounts, and wholly to one of the business owners for the deposits into his wholly-owned account. However, the IRS’s determination of additional tip income for both individuals was arbitrary and erroneous. Although the one owner performed services as a nail stylist, the IRS’s methodology imputed income to her for tips that were paid to other employees and there was no support for the IRS’s contention that the other owner, who acted as the office manager and did not perform services as a nail technician, received any tip income.—CCH.

[ Code Sec. 6662]
Penalty: Accuracy-related: Negligence.–

A business owner was liable for an accuracy-related penalty attributed to negligence. She underreported income and failed to maintain adequate records for the nail salon businesses. In addition, she did not testify and offered no reliable evidence that she attempted to assess her tax liability correctly.—CCH.

[ Code Sec. 6663]
Penalty: Fraud: Intent.–

A business owner was liable for fraud penalties for the two tax years at issue. The "badges of fraud" demonstrated that the individual evaded payment of tax he knew to be owed. The business owner made false statements and failed to cooperate with the IRS; he acted with fraudulent intent and his underpayments for the tax years at issue were attributed to fraud.—CCH.

Khuong Duong and Dung T. Tran, pro se; Shari A. Salu, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

LAUBER, Judge: For the taxable years 2007 and 2008, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or respondent) determined against both petitioners deficiencies [*2] in Federal income tax and civil fraud penalties under section 6663(a) 1 and against petitioner Tran certain additions to tax. The deficiencies stem mainly from petitioners' underreporting of income from two nail salons they jointly operated, AK Nails and Perfection Nails. After conducting a bank deposits analysis, the IRS made whipsaw determinations by asserting, in full against each petitioner, all taxable deposits into their joint bank accounts.

 [*3] After concessions, 2 the issues remaining for decision are: (1) whether petitioners failed to report income for 2007 and 2008 as determined by respondent using the bank deposits method; (2) whether petitioners are liable for fraud penalties; and (3) if petitioner Tran is not liable for the fraud penalty, whether she is liable for the accuracy-related penalty for 2008. We answer the first question in the affirmative, and we find that petitioner Duong is liable for the fraud penalty for both years. We find that respondent has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner Tran is liable for the fraud penalty but conclude that she is liable for the accuracy-related penalty for 2008.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulations of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated by this reference. When they petitioned this Court, petitioner Khuong Duong (Duong) lived in Severn, Maryland, and petitioner Dung T. Tran (Tran) lived in Splant City, Florida.

[*4] Petitioners jointly owned and operated AK Nails and Perfection Nails during the years in issue and split the profits and losses 50-50. Each salon had several nail stations so that multiple stylists could serve customers simultaneously. Tran was the main stylist and often worked alone; petitioners employed other nail stylists in both salons as necessary to meet customer demand. Petitioners paid these stylists a wage by check, and the stylists kept any tips that customers gave them. Customers paid for the salon services and tips by credit card, debit card, or cash. Duong functioned as a store manager and did not act as a nail stylist.

Although petitioners were not married during 2007, they filed a joint Federal income tax return for that year. They attached to this return a Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, reporting gross receipts of $37,469 from AK Nails. For 2008 each petitioner filed an individual return using the “single” filing status. Tran attached to her return a Schedule C reporting gross receipts of $38,347 from AK Nails. Duong attached to his return a Schedule C reporting gross receipts of $44,377 from Perfection Nails.

The IRS selected petitioners' returns for audit, focusing on their Schedule C income. A revenue agent met with petitioners and toured both nail salons. During these visits petitioners stated that they had reported on their tax returns all income received by the salons. They denied receiving cash at either location, insisting that [*5] customers made all payments by credit or debit card. Duong bears principal responsibility for making these false statements.

Petitioners did not maintain adequate books and records for their businesses. Duong declined to provide the revenue agent with bank statements or with the other limited business records that petitioners possessed. Duong bears principal responsibility for the failure to turn over business records to the revenue agent.

The revenue agent issued summonses to petitioners' banks in order to conduct a bank deposits analysis. During 2007 petitioners maintained three joint bank accounts and Duong maintained a separate joint account with his father. During 2008 petitioners maintained two joint bank accounts and Duong maintained a separate individual account. Petitioners comingled funds from these accounts and used the accounts for both business and personal activities.

Under the bank deposits method, the IRS estimates the gross receipts of a business that lacks reliable records. This analysis begins with the bank deposits made during the tax year, then adds any other income shown to have been received but not placed in a bank. From that total, various subtractions must be made for nontaxable deposits. Nontaxable deposits include loan proceeds, interaccount [*6] transfers, gifts, inheritances, and other nontaxable items. See Morrison v. United States, 270 F.2d 1, 2-3 (4th Cir. 1959).

The revenue agent followed this procedure here. She started with petitioners' bank statements and calculated the total deposits made during 2007 and 2008. From these totals she deducted deposits shown to be from nontaxable sources, including a home equity loan, other loans, transfers from other accounts, various rebates, insurance proceeds, State and Federal tax refunds, and for Doung's separate account in 2007, wages earned by his father.

For 2007 the revenue agent calculated total deposits of $235,679 in petitioners' joint accounts, less $98,866 from nontaxable sources, yielding $136,813 of presumptive gross receipts. For 2008 she calculated total deposits of $136,826 in petitioners' joint accounts, less $36,893 from nontaxable sources, yielding $99,933 of presumptive gross receipts. For Duong's separate account in 2007 she calculated total deposits of $20,119, less $3,092 from nontaxable sources, yielding $17,027 of additional gross receipts for Duong. For Duong's separate account in 2008 she calculated total deposits of $51,553, less zero from nontaxable sources, yielding $51,553 of additional gross receipts for Duong.

The revenue agent then increased the presumptive gross receipts set forth above by 8% to account for tips. Under her theory, if a salon customer tipped the [*7] stylist in cash, the cash tip would probably not be included in petitioners' bank deposits. The IRS determined that tips presumptively received should be added to the bank deposit totals as “other income shown to have been received but not placed in bank.” See Morrison, 270 F.2d at 2.

On the basis of the examination and the revenue agent's initial calculations, the IRS on April 2, 2013, issued separate notices of deficiency to Duong and Tran. They timely petitioned this Court, and the cases were consolidated. Petitioners thereafter provided respondent with documents substantiating, for their joint bank accounts, additional nontaxable deposits of $32,078 for 2007 and $12,190 for 2008. After allowing these items, respondent's revised position was that the gross receipts chargeable to each petitioner, before adding 8% for tips, were as follows:


 [*8] The Court held a trial on September 30, 2014. Respondent called the revenue agent as a witness, and she explained in detail her bank deposits analysis. Duong spoke for both petitioners and testified on his own behalf; Tran, who was present, did not testify or conduct cross-examination. During the recall of the revenue agent, Duong questioned her about 17 checks that he contended should be treated as additional nontaxable deposits. The Court determined that the revenue agent's schedule of nontaxable deposits already included 14 of these checks.

The remaining three items consisted of a check from J.P. Morgan Chase for $9,000, a check from Nhut Hong Le for $3,000, and a check from Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. for $896. Petitioners argued that the first item was a credit card cash advance, but they did not furnish the revenue agent or introduce into evidence the relevant credit card statement. Petitioners argued that the second item was a loan, but they did not advance this contention until a week before trial and produced no evidence of a loan apart from Duong's testimony. Petitioners argued that the third item was a utility rebate, but they provided no evidence as to whether they had deducted the original payment on a tax return. For these reasons, the revenue agent testified as to her belief that these three checks should not be treated as nontaxable deposits.

[*9] At the close of trial the Court ordered one round of seriatim briefs. Respondent timely filed his brief on January 29, 2015. Petitioners failed to file a posttrial brief. 3

OPINION

I. Burden of Proof

The IRS' determinations in a notice of deficiency are generally presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving those determinations erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). For the presumption of correctness to attach to the deficiency determination in unreported income cases, the Commissioner must establish a “minimal evidentiary showing” connecting the taxpayer with the income-producing activity, see Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1548-1549 (11th Cir. 1993), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1991-636, or demonstrate that the taxpayer actually received unreported income, see Edwards v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1982). Once respondent makes the required threshold showing, the burden of proof shifts to the taxpayer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent's determinations are [*10] arbitrary or erroneous. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515 (1935); Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74 (1986).

To satisfy his initial burden of production, respondent introduced records obtained during the IRS audit. These records establish that petitioners received unreported income. Although not necessarily required to do so, respondent has also shown that the nail salons are the likely source of petitioners' unreported income. See Stinnett v. United States, 173 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1949); cf. Mills v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 744, 748-749 (4th Cir. 1968) (when using the bank deposits method, the Commissioner need not prove a likely source of income), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1967-67; Tokarski, 87 T.C. at 77. On the basis of this credible evidence, we are satisfied that the IRS' determinations, as set forth in the notices of deficiency, are entitled to the general presumption of correctness. See Power-stein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-271.

II. Analysis

A. Unreported Income

Section 61(a) defines gross income as “all income from whatever source derived,” including income derived from business. A taxpayer must maintain books and records establishing the amount of his or her gross income. See sec. 6001. When a taxpayer keeps no books of account or keeps books that are demonstrably [*11] inaccurate, the IRS may determine his income “under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income.” Sec. 446(b); see Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 693 (1989). Where a taxpayer has poor records and large unexplained bank deposits, the Commissioner may properly employ the bank deposits method to estimate the taxpayer's income. Estate of Hague v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1943), aff'g 45 B.T.A. 104 (1941); Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 651, 657 (1975), aff'd, 566 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1977). The IRS has great latitude in reconstructing a taxpayer's income, and the reconstruction “need only be reasonable in light of all surrounding facts and circumstances.” Petzoldt, 92 T.C. at 687.

In the instant cases petitioners failed to maintain accurate books or records from which their Federal tax liabilities could be computed. They refused during the audit to provide the revenue agent with any records at all. Respondent was thus authorized to determine their income by using the bank deposits method.

Bank deposits are prima facie evidence of income. The bank deposits method starts with the presumption that all money deposited in a taxpayer's bank account during a given period constitutes taxable income. Price v. United States, 335 F.2d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 1964). This presumption is rebutted to the extent the deposits are shown to include nontaxable amounts, and “the Government must [*12] take into account any non-taxable source * * * of which it has knowledge.” Ibid.; DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 868 (1991), aff'd, 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992).

After the IRS reconstructs a taxpayer's income and determines a deficiency, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the IRS' implementation of the bank deposits analysis was unfair or inaccurate. See Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 645 (1994); DiLeo, 96 T.C. at 871-872. The taxpayer may do so by showing (among other things) that certain deposits came from nontaxable sources. See Clayton, 102 T.C. at 645. Nontaxable sources include funds attributable to “loans, gifts, inheritances, or assets on hand at the beginning of the taxable period.” Burgo v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 729, 743 n.14 (1978) (quoting Troncelliti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1971-72).

The revenue agent employed the bank deposits method to reconstruct petitioners' 2007 and 2008 income. She used their bank account statements (which are part of the record) to prepare schedules listing all deposits. She eliminated $138,851 of nontaxable deposits using evidence of which she had knowledge. Upon receiving more documentation from petitioners, she determined that $44,268 of additional deposits should be treated as nontaxable and eliminated them from her analysis. In the end, she determined that $183,119 of the deposits, roughly [*13] half the total, was nontaxable. She then estimated petitioners' unreported gross receipts by subtracting from their taxable deposits the gross receipts reported on their tax returns. We find that her implementation of the bank deposits method was reasonable.

Petitioners' primary challenge at trial to the revenue agent's methodology was the contention that she should have treated 17 specific checks as additional nontaxable deposits. We determined that the revenue agent's schedule of nontaxable deposits already included 14 of these checks. We will discuss the other three.

Duong testified that a $9,000 check from J.P. Morgan Chase was a credit card cash advance. If this allegation were true, petitioners could easily have verified it by providing the revenue agent or the Court with a credit card statement showing the alleged advance. We decline to credit Duong's uncorroborated testimony in the absence of such evidence. See, e.g., Tokarski, 87 T.C. at 77.

Duong next testified that a $3,000 check from Nhut Hong Le represented a loan from a personal friend, and that his parents later paid off this loan on his behalf. Petitioners did not advance this contention during the IRS audit, and Duong first made the argument a week before trial. Duong provided no documentary evi- [*14] dence that this check represented a loan or that his parents paid off the loan. Again, we decline to credit his uncorroborated testimony.

Finally, Duong testified that an $896 check from Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. was a utility rebate that should be treated as nontaxable. However, when an amount is deducted from gross income in one year and recovered in a subsequent year, such amount is taxable in the later year if the original deduction yielded a tax benefit. See Unvert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 807, 812 (1979), aff'd, 656 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1981); W. Adjustment & Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 721 (1941). Petitioners failed to prove that this check was a rebate for residential electric service as opposed to electric service provided to their nail salons and previously deducted by them as such. In the absence of such evidence we will not treat the $896 check as a nontaxable receipt. See Clayton, 102 T.C. at 645.

We find that the agent's bank deposits analysis was reasonable and that petitioners failed to prove the nontaxability of any deposits beyond the $183,119 that the IRS allowed. On top of the taxable bank deposits thus determined, the revenue agent added 8% to capture tips presumptively received by petitioners but not deposited in a bank. We reject as unreliable this aspect of the IRS' approach.

The record demonstrates that only stylists received tip income. Because Duong functioned as an office manager and did not perform services as a nail [*15] stylist, there is no support for respondent's contention that he received tip income. We thus cannot sustain respondent's determination of tip income for Duong.

Tran was a nail stylist and presumably received some tips. But many customers paid by credit or debit card. If the tip was included in the total amount charged, the tip (like the fee for services) would presumably be accounted for already in the bank deposits analysis. To the extent customers paid in cash, respon-dent's methodology implausibly assumes that Tran methodically segregated each service charge from the corresponding tip, depositing the former in the bank but pocketing the latter. Moreover, Tran could keep tips only for work that she performed. Because the salons employed other stylists, respondent's methodology would impute income to Tran for tips that other employees received.

Respondent did not analyze what percentage of the salons' customers paid in cash or what percentage of the stylist services Tran performed. Adding 8% to Tran's share of the total gross receipts would overstate her tip income substantially, to a degree that cannot be determined. We accordingly find that respon-dent's determination of additional tip income, as applied to Tran as well as to Duong, is arbitrary and erroneous.

[*16] In the notices of deficiency, respondent reasonably made whipsaw determinations and treated 100% of taxable deposits in the joint accounts as gross receipts of both petitioners. Respondent concedes on brief that “the unreported income should be allocated equally between the petitioners for the unreported deposits from their joint accounts, and wholly to petitioner Duong for the money deposited into the accounts that were not held jointly with petitioner Tran.” We agree with this assessment. With that concession and with the elimination of any additional tip income to either petitioner, we sustain respondent's determinations of unreported income consistent with the revenue agent's bank deposits analysis. 4

B. Civil Fraud Penalty

Respondent determined fraud penalties against Duong for 2007 and 2008 and against Tran for 2008. “If any part of any underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud,” section 6663(a) imposes a penalty of 75% of the portion of the underpayment due to fraud. Respondent has the burden of proving fraud, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. Sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b); Richardson v. Commissioner, 509 F.3d 736, 743 (6th Cir. [*17] 2007), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2006-69. To sustain his burden respondent must establish two elements: (1) that there was some underpayment of tax for each year in issue; and (2) that at least some portion of the underpayment for each year was due to fraud. Hebrank v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 640, 642 (1983). Respondent has carried his burden of proving that petitioners underreported their income and underpaid their tax for 2007 and 2008. The remaining question is whether any part of these underpayments was due to fraud.

Fraud is intentional wrongdoing designed to evade tax believed to be owing. Neely v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 79, 86 (2001). The existence of fraud is a question of fact to be resolved upon consideration of the entire record. Estate of Pittard v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 391, 400 (1977). Fraud is not to be presumed or based upon mere suspicion. Petzoldt, 92 T.C. at 699-700. However, because direct proof of a taxpayer's intent is rarely available, fraudulent intent may be established by circumstantial evidence. Grossman v. Commissioner, 182 F.3d 275, 277-278 (4th Cir. 1999), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1996-452.

Circumstances that may indicate fraudulent intent, commonly referred to as “badges of fraud,” include but are not limited to: (1) understating income; (2) keeping inadequate records; (3) giving implausible or inconsistent explanations of behavior; (4) concealing income or assets; (5) failing to cooperate with tax [*18] authorities; (6) engaging in illegal activities; (7) providing testimony lacking credibility; (8) filing false documents, including false income tax returns; (9) failing to file tax returns; and (10) dealing extensively in cash. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943); Morse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-332, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 673, 675, aff'd, 419 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2005). No single factor is dispositive; however, the existence of several factors “is persuasive circumstantial evidence of fraud.” Vanover v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-79, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1418, 1420-1421.

Numerous badges of fraud demonstrate that Duong intentionally evaded the payment of tax he knew to be owed. He understated his income for both years in issue. See Stone v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 213, 214, 224-226 (1971). He maintained inadequate records and failed to provide relevant records to the revenue agent. See Ark. Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-497. He gave the revenue agent inconsistent explanations, stating falsely that neither business received cash payments from customers. At trial he contradicted himself by stating, implausibly, that AK Nails customers sometimes paid in cash but that Perfection Nails customers never did so.

Duong also failed to cooperate with tax authorities. The revenue agent requested bank statements but never received them. Duong indicated that he had [*19] merchant receipts but likewise failed to provide those to respondent. Eventually, the revenue agent had to summons the bank statements. See Good v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-323 (finding lack of cooperation where revenue agent was forced to summons taxpayer's bank records). Duong regularly commingled business and personal funds, as the bank deposits analysis made clear. And his testimony at trial concerning cash receipts and alleged nontaxable deposits lacked credibility. See Scott v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-65.

We find that the facts, taken as a whole, clearly and convincingly establish that Duong acted with fraudulent intent and that his underpayments of tax for 2007 and 2008 were due to fraud. While several of the same badges of fraud apply to Tran, we reach the opposite conclusion as to her. Duong bears principal responsibility for the false statements made to, and the lack of cooperation with, the IRS revenue agent. Unlike Duong, Tran did not present testimony lacking credibility at trial. Our assessment of the evidence is that Tran followed the direction and actions of Duong and that her behavior does not rise to the level of fraud. We accordingly conclude that respondent did not prove fraud by Tran by clear and convincing evidence.

[*20] C. Accuracy-Related Penalty

Respondent contends in the alternative that Tran is liable for an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for 2008. The Code imposes a 20% accuracy-related penalty on any underpayment of tax attributable to (among other things) “[n]egligence or disregard of rules or regulations.” See sec. 6662(a) and (b)(1). “Negligence” is defined as “any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply” with the provisions of the Code. Sec. 6662(c). The Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to this penalty. Sec. 7491(c). Once the Commissioner satisfies his burden, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to prove that the penalty does not apply. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 447 (2001). Respondent met his burden of production by showing that Tran underreported income and failed to maintain adequate records for the nail salons. The burden thus shifts to her.

The accuracy-related penalty does not apply to any portion of an underpayment “if it is shown that there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith” with respect thereto. Sec. 6664(c)(1). Tran did not testify and offered no reliable evidence that she attempted to assess her tax liability correctly. We accordingly sustain respondent's imposition of the accuracy-related penalty for 2008.

[*21] To reflect the foregoing,

Decisions will be entered under Rule 155

Footnotes
1             
All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all dollar amounts to the nearest dollar.

2             
Respondent has conceded the section 6651 additions to tax against petitioner Tran for 2007. Petitioner Duong is deemed to have conceded the disallowance of a mortgage interest deduction of $22,574 on his 2007 Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business. He did not present any evidence concerning this issue at trial, and he did not file a posttrial brief. See Schladweiler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-351, aff'd, 28 Fed. Appx. 602 (8th Cir. 2002). Petitioners did not raise any affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, in their pleadings, and we find that any such defenses are likewise waived. See Rule 39; Goings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-87.

3             
When a party fails to file a brief on issues that have been tried, we may consider those issues waived or conceded. See, e.g., Nicklaus v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 117, 120 n.4 (2001); Stringer v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 693, 704-708 (1985), aff'd without published opinion, 789 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1986). We will exercise our discretion not to do so here for issues that were addressed at trial.

4             
While there is no longer any dispute as to the amounts of petitioners' deductible Schedule C expenses, the allocation of those expenses (and of petitioners' reported Schedule C gross income) will have to be determined as part of the Rule 155 computations. The best evidence is that petitioners split both income and expenses 50-50.







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Saturday, March 7, 2015

IRS published 12 tax scams



Scams for 2015


 
IR-2015-26, Feb. 9, 2015
WASHINGTON — The Internal Revenue Service wrapped up the 2015 "Dirty Dozen" list of tax scams today with a warning to taxpayers about aggressive telephone scams continuing coast-to-coast during the early weeks of this year's filing season.
The aggressive, threatening phone calls from scam artists continue to be seen on a daily basis in states across the nation. The IRS urged taxpayers not give out money or personal financial information as a result of these phone calls or from emails claiming to be from the IRS.
Phone scams and email phishing schemes are among the "Dirty Dozen" tax scams the IRS highlighted, for the first time, on 12 straight business days from Jan. 22 to Feb. 6. The IRS has also set up a special section on IRS.gov highlighting these 12 schemes for taxpayers.
"We are doing everything we can to help taxpayers avoid scams as the tax season continues," said IRS Commissioner John Koskinen. "Whether it's a phone scam or scheme to steal a taxpayer's identity, there are simple steps to take to help stop these con artists. We urge taxpayers to visit IRS.gov for more information and to be wary of these dozen tax scams."
Illegal scams can lead to significant penalties and interest for taxpayers, as well as possible criminal prosecution. IRS Criminal Investigation works closely with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to shutdown scams and prosecute the criminals behind them. Taxpayers should remember that they are legally responsible for what is on their tax returns even if it is prepared by someone else. Make sure the preparer you hire is up to the task. For more see the Choosing a Tax Professional page.
For the first time, here is a recap of this year's "Dirty Dozen" scams:
  • Phone Scams: Aggressive and threatening phone calls by criminals impersonating IRS agents remains an ongoing threat to taxpayers. The IRS has seen a surge of these phone scams in recent months as scam artists threaten police arrest, deportation, license revocation and other things. The IRS reminds taxpayers to guard against all sorts of con games that arise during any filing season. (IR-2015-5)
  • Phishing: Taxpayers need to be on guard against fake emails or websites looking to steal personal information. The IRS will not send you an email about a bill or refund out of the blue. Don’t click on one claiming to be from the IRS that takes you by surprise. Taxpayers should be wary of clicking on strange emails and websites. They may be scams to steal your personal information. (IR-2015-6)
  • Identity Theft: Taxpayers need to watch out for identity theft especially around tax time. The IRS continues to aggressively pursue the criminals that file fraudulent returns using someone else’s Social Security number. The IRS is making progress on this front but taxpayers still need to be extremely careful and do everything they can to avoid becoming a victim. (IR-2015-7)
  • Return Preparer Fraud: Taxpayers need to be on the lookout for unscrupulous return preparers. The vast majority of tax professionals provide honest high-quality service. But there are some dishonest preparers who set up shop each filing season to perpetrate refund fraud, identity theft and other scams that hurt taxpayers. Return preparers are a vital part of the U.S. tax system. About 60 percent of taxpayers use tax professionals to prepare their returns. (IR-2015-8)
  • Offshore Tax Avoidance: The recent string of successful enforcement actions against offshore tax cheats and the financial organizations that help them shows that it’s a bad bet to hide money and income offshore. Taxpayers are best served by coming in voluntarily and getting their taxes and filing requirements in order. The IRS offers the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP) to help people get their taxes in order. (IR-2015-09)
  • Inflated Refund Claims: Taxpayers need to be on the lookout for anyone promising inflated refunds. Taxpayers should be wary of anyone who asks them to sign a blank return, promise a big refund before looking at their records, or charge fees based on a percentage of the refund. Scam artists use flyers, advertisements, phony store fronts and word of mouth via community groups and churches in seeking victims. (IR-2015-12)
  • Fake Charities: Taxpayers should be on guard against groups masquerading as charitable organizations to attract donations from unsuspecting contributors. Contributors should take a few extra minutes to ensure their hard-earned money goes to legitimate and currently eligible charities. IRS.gov has the tools taxpayers need to check out the status of charitable organizations. Be wary of charities with names that are similar to familiar or nationally known organizations. (IR-2015-16)
  • Hiding Income with Fake Documents: Hiding taxable income by filing false Form 1099s or other fake documents is a scam that taxpayers should always avoid and guard against. The mere suggestion of falsifying documents to reduce tax bills or inflate tax refunds is a huge red flag when using a paid tax return preparer. Taxpayers are legally responsible for what is on their returns regardless of who prepares the returns. (IR-2015-18)
  • Abusive Tax Shelters: Taxpayers should avoid using abusive tax structures to avoid paying taxes. The IRS is committed to stopping complex tax avoidance schemes and the people who create and sell them. The vast majority of taxpayers pay their fair share, and everyone should be on the lookout for people peddling tax shelters that sound too good to be true. When in doubt, taxpayers should seek an independent opinion regarding complex products they are offered. (IR-2015-19)
  • Falsifying Income to Claim Credits: Taxpayers should avoid inventing income to erroneously claim tax credits. Taxpayers are sometimes talked into doing this by scam artists. Taxpayers are best served by filing the most-accurate return possible because they are legally responsible for what is on their return. (IR-2015-20)
  • Excessive Claims for Fuel Tax Credits: Taxpayers need to avoid improper claims for fuel tax credits. The fuel tax credit is generally limited to off-highway business use, including use in farming. Consequently, the credit is not available to most taxpayers. But yet, the IRS routinely finds unscrupulous preparers who have enticed sizable groups of taxpayers to erroneously claim the credit to inflate their refunds. (IR-2015-21)
  • Frivolous Tax Arguments: Taxpayers should avoid using frivolous tax arguments to avoid paying their taxes. Promoters of frivolous schemes encourage taxpayers to make unreasonable and outlandish claims to avoid paying the taxes they owe. These arguments are wrong and have been thrown out of court. While taxpayers have the right to contest their tax liabilities in court, no one has the right to disobey the law or disregard their responsibility to pay taxes. The penalty for filing a frivolous tax return is $5,000. (IR-2015-23)




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Wednesday, December 17, 2014

List of Countries exchanging U.S. citizen data with the IRS - Alvin Brown & Associates


Rev. Proc. 2012-24, I.R.B. 2012-20, April 17, 2012.

The IRS has issued a list of the countries with which the United States has in effect an income tax or other convention or bilateral agreement relating to the exchange of information within the meaning of Code Sec. 6103(k)(4) pursuant to which the United States agrees to provide, as well as receive, information and under which the competent authority is the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate. Reg. §§1.6049-4(b)(5) and 1.6049-8, as revised by T.D. 9584, require the reporting of certain deposit interest paid to nonresident alien individuals on or after January 1, 2013. The new guidance also identifies the countries with which the Treasury Department and the IRS have determined that it is appropriate to have an automatic exchange relationship with respect to the information collected under the regulations. Back references: ¶36,037.46 and ¶36,894.7253.
SECTION 1. PURPOSE
Sections 1.6049-4(b)(5) and 1.6049-8 of the Income Tax Regulations, as revised by TD 9584, require the reporting of certain deposit interest paid to nonresident alien individuals on or after January 1, 2013. The purpose of this revenue procedure is to list, in Section 3, the countries with which the United States has in effect an income tax or other convention or bilateral agreement relating to the exchange of information within the meaning of section 6103(k)(4) pursuant to which the United States agrees to provide, as well as receive, information and under which the competent authority is the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, as described in §1.6049-8(a). As discussed in the preamble to the regulations, even when such an agreement exists, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is not compelled to exchange information, including information collected pursuant to the regulations, if there is concern regarding the use of the information or other factors exist that would make exchange inappropriate. This revenue procedure also identifies in Section 4 the countries with which the Treasury Department and the IRS have determined that it is appropriate to have an automatic exchange relationship with respect to the information collected under the regulations. This revenue procedure will be updated as appropriate.
SECTION 2. BACKGROUND
The regulations provide that in the case of reportable interest aggregating $10 or more paid to a nonresident alien individual (as defined in section 7701(b)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code), the payor shall make an information return on Form 1042-S for the calendar year in which the interest is paid. Reportable interest is interest described in section 871(i)(2)(A) that relates to a deposit maintained at an office within the United States, and that is paid to a nonresident alien individual who is a resident of a country identified, in an applicable revenue procedure (see §601.601(d)(2) of this chapter) as of December 31 prior to the calendar year in which the interest is paid, as a country with which the United States has in effect an income tax or other convention or bilateral agreement relating to the exchange of information within the meaning of section 6103(k)(4) pursuant to which United States agrees to provide, as well as receive, information and under which the competent authority is the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate. This revenue procedure constitutes the revenue procedure referenced in§1.6049-8(a) and will be updated by subsequent revenue procedures as appropriate.
SECTION 3. COUNTRIES OF RESIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE REPORTING REQUIREMENT APPLIES
The following are countries with which the United States has in effect an income tax or other convention or bilateral agreement relating to the exchange of tax information within the meaning of section 6103(k)(4) pursuant to which the United States agrees to provide, as well as receive, information and under which the competent authority is the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate:
Antigua & Barbuda
Aruba
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Bermuda
British Virgin Islands
Bulgaria
Canada
China
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Egypt
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Gibraltar
Greece
Grenada
Guernsey
Guyana
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Isle of Man
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jersey
Kazakhstan
Korea (South)
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mexico
Monaco
Morocco
Netherlands
Netherlands island territories: Bonaire, Curacao, Saba, St. Eustatius and St. Maarten (Dutch part)
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Slovak Rep.
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
Venezuela
SECTION 4. COUNTRIES WITH WHICH TREASURY AND THE IRS HAVE DETERMINED THAT AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF DEPOSIT INTEREST INFORMATION IS APPROPRIATE
The following list identifies the countries with which the automatic exchange of the information collected under §§1.6049-4(b)(5) and 1.6049-8 has been determined by the Treasury Department and the IRS to be appropriate:
Canada
SECTION 5. EFFECTIVE DATE
This revenue procedure is effective for interest paid on or after January 1, 2013.
SECTION 6. DRAFTING INFORMATION
The principal author of this revenue procedure is Kathryn T. Holman of the Office of Chief Counsel International (International). For further information regarding this revenue procedure contact Kathryn T. Holman on (202) 622-3840 (not a toll free call).





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    Thursday, March 20, 2014

    Offer in compromise - effective tax administration

    An IRS Appeals officer, during a Collection Due Process hearing, abused his discretion in rejecting an offer in compromise (OIC) based on effective tax administration (ETA) because he failed to adequately consider public policy and equity issues. The taxpayers, a married couple that operated an S corporation, agreed that the assessed tax liabilities were correct but submitted a proposed ETA OIC on the basis that their tax problems stemmed from the criminal conduct (embezzlement) of their former bookkeeper. Although the taxpayers’ contention that the Appeals officer was obligated, as a matter of law, to accept the ETA OIC was rejected, the Appeals officer improperly failed to give any consideration to the public policy and equity grounds alleged by the couple. At trial, the IRS contended that the taxpayers’ circumstances did not conform with the examples provided in the regulations. However, those examples are not the exclusive circumstances under which the IRS may accept an OIC for public policy or equity reasons. The case was remanded for further consideration by the Appeals office.

    Stacey L. Bogart and Timothy P. Bogart v. Commissioner, U.S. Tax Court, Dkt. No. 4568-12L, TC Memo. 2014-46, March 18, 2014..


    MEMORANDUM OPINION

    KROUPA, Judge: This collection review matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 121(a). 1 [*2] Petitioners' Federal tax troubles stem from the criminal conduct of their former bookkeeper. Petitioners submitted an offer-in-compromise (OIC) of $10,000 2 to resolve deficiencies of $69,309 plus interest on the grounds that the OIC promoted effective tax administration (ETA OIC). Respondent rejected the ETA OIC and issued a determination notice sustaining a final notice of intent to levy (proposed levy action).See sec. 6330(d)(1).
    Respondent contends that he acted within his discretion when he rejected the ETA OIC. Petitioners contend that respondent was obligated to accept the ETA OIC as a matter of law. Petitioners alternatively contend that we should remand the matter because respondent failed to adequately consider the ETA OIC on public policy and equity grounds. We conclude that respondent has yet to adequately consider the ETA OIC on those grounds. We will therefore deny the cross-motions for summary judgment without prejudice and remand the matter for respondent to consider the ETA OIC on public policy and equity grounds.
    The Commissioner may determine that an OIC would promote effective tax administration when collection in full would create economic hardship. See sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3)(i), (iii), Proced. & Admin. Regs. If collection would not cause economic hardship, the Commissioner may still compromise a tax liability to promote effective tax administration when the taxpayer identifies compelling public policy or equity considerations. See sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
    Petitioners do not challenge the liabilities or their ability to satisfy them. Respondent determined, and petitioners acknowledge, that the ETA OIC did not meet the economic hardship standard.See sec. 301.6343-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Thus, the cross-motions focus on the rejection of the ETA OIC under only public policy and equity considerations. See sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
    [*10] The Commissioner will accept an OIC for public policy or equity reasons only if the taxpayer demonstrates that “exceptional circumstances” exist and meets three requirements. Sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.; Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) pt. 5.8.11.2.2(4) (Sept. 23, 2008). First, the taxpayer must have remained in compliance since incurring the liability and must not have an overall compliance history that weighs against compromise. IRM pt. 5.8.11.2.2(4). Second, the taxpayer must also show he or she acted reasonably and responsibly in incurring the liability. Id. Third, the Commissioner must also determine that other taxpayers would view the compromise as fair and equitable. Id. The Commissioner must base his determination on all facts and circumstances. Sec. 301.7122-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
     
    b. Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment
    We now turn to petitioners' arguments in support of their summary judgment motion. First, petitioners claim that they satisfied the requirements as a matter of law for respondent to accept the ETA OIC. See IRM pt. 5.8.11.2.2. We disagree. It is undeniable that Ms. Sanak perpetrated a fraud against petitioners. The Commissioner maintains, however, wide discretion when evaluating an OIC and determining whether a taxpayer demonstrated exceptional circumstances. The record does not establish as a matter of law that respondent was obligated to accept the ETA OIC.
    [*13] Next, petitioners argue that respondent abused his discretion when the SO rejected the ETA OIC without forwarding it to respondent's NEH-ETA group. 5 See id. pt. 5.8.11.2.2(1). Again, we disagree. The Appeals officer maintains discretion to accept an OIC that promotes effective tax administration and forward only those OICs to the NEH-ETA group. Id. The IRM does not require the Appeals officer to forward every OIC based on public policy or equity grounds to the NEH-ETA group. Thus, the Appeals officer could have rejected the ETA OIC without forwarding it to the NEH-ETA group. See id. pt. 1.2.44.2.1 (Jan. 6, 2009).
    Last, petitioners contend that the matter should be remanded for further consideration because respondent did not adequately consider the ETA OIC. We agree. Notwithstanding respondent's wide discretion, he still must review the issues petitioners raised during the hearing. The undeveloped record demonstrates that respondent has not fully considered the ETA OIC as required. The record does not allow for meaningful review. See Hoyle v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 197, 205 (2008). Thus, we will deny the cross-motions for summary judgment without prejudice and remand the matter for further consideration.
    [*14] We have considered all arguments made in reaching our decision, and, to the extent not mentioned, we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.
    To reflect the foregoing,
    An appropriate order will be issued.

      Footnotes

       
       
       
      4
      Example (1) contemplates a taxpayer that was assessed a large deficiency because the taxpayer could not manage his own financial affairs because of serious illness. Sec. 301.7122-1(c)(3)(iv), Example ( 1), Proced & Admin. Regs. The taxpayer in Example (2) has a deficiency that results from the taxpayer's actions based on erroneous advice from the Commissioner.Id.
       
       
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      Monday, February 24, 2014

      offer in compromise form 656 - irs tax levy





      2014ARD 034-1

      Internal Revenue Service: Interim guidance: Federal contractor levies

      DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
      INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
      WASHINGTON, D.C. 20224
      SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISION
      February 10, 2014
      Control Number: SBSE-05-0214-0007
      Expiration: February 10, 2015
      Impacted: IRM 5.11.1
      IRM 5.7.9
      MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTORS, FIELD COLLECTION AREA OPERATIONS DIRECTOR, ADVISORY AND INSOLVENCY
      FROM: Dretha Barham /s/ Dretha Barham
      Director, Collection Policy
      SUBJECT: Interim Guidance Memorandum for Federal Contractor Levies Issued by Field Collection
      The purpose of this memorandum is to provide guidance for Field Collection revenue officers about federal contractor levies (referred to as FEDCON levies) and related Collection Due Process (CDP) issues. Please ensure this information is distributed to all affected employees within your organization.
      Background
      The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 amended IRC section 6330(f) and (h), to permit the IRS to issue any levy on a taxpayer prior to providing them with their Collection Due Process (CDP) notice and hearing if the taxpayer is a federal contractor. In addition, FEDCON levies may be served during a timely requested pre- or post-levy CDP hearing or judicial review of such hearing to collect liabilities for all outstanding balance due periods including periods that are the subject of the hearing.
      Federal contractors are any person or entity who currently has a contract with the federal government to sell or lease property, goods or services. This does not include a taxpayer who was in the past a federal contractor but currently is not involved in any contractual relationship with the federal government. A contract is a mutually binding legal relationship obligating a person or entity to furnish property, goods, or services and the federal executive agency to pay for those property, goods, or services. Attached are guidelines for FEDCON levy and CDP issues for status 26 cases.
      ICS Considerations:
      Field Collection (FC) revenue officers may begin to issue FEDCON levies in ICS on the issuance date of this memorandum to collect any IMF or BMF liability, for which the IRC 6331(d), Notice of Intent to Levy (CP 504 notice) period has expired, if the taxpayer is a federal contractor.
      • ICS Cases in which there is an unreversed Federal Contractor Indicator (FCI) are flagged with a red literal (FCA) on the Case Summary screen.
      • ICS will block revenue officer issuance of the FEDCON levy unless the revenue officer answers “yes” when ICS prompts with the following: “Final Notice Delivery Date is not 30 days prior to levy. Is this a FEDCON levy? (Yes or No)?” This is a requirement because there would be no TC 971 AC 069 on the module.
      • See changes listed in ICS User Guide.
      See the following attachments for additional information on Federal Contractor Levies issued by Field Collection:
      • Attachment 1, Guidance to be included in IRM 5.7.9, Federal Contractors.
      • Attachment 2, Guidance to be included in IRM 5.11.1, Background, Pre-Levy Actions, Restrictions on Levy & Post-Levy Actions.
      IRM 5.11.1 and 5.7.9 will be updated to incorporate these guidelines. If you have any questions, please contact me, or a member of your staff may contact Kathleen Morton, Senior Program Analyst or James Maslanka, Senior Program Analyst. Territory personnel should direct any questions, through their management staff, to the appropriate Area contact.
      Attachments
      cc: Director, Enterprise Collection Strategy
      Director, Field Collection
      www.irs.gov
      Attachment 1, Guidance to be included in IRM 5.7.9, Federal Contractors
      Decision Point: How to Recognize a Federal Contractor for FEDCON Levy Purposes:
      If there is an unreversed TC 971 AC 647, also known as a Federal Contractor Indicator (FCI), on the taxpayer's Master File (MF) record, and the taxpayer has a current federal contract consider the taxpayer a federal contractor. See IRM 5.7.9.2.1, Federal Contractor Indicator (FCI). Often, this indicator is systemically input based on a Form 8596, Information Return for Federal Contracts , filed with the IRS. The indicator may also be manually input. If you determine during a case investigation that a taxpayer is a federal contractor and has been awarded a contract, request input of the TC 971 AC 647.
      Conditions, which support a RO finding that a taxpayer is a federal contractor subject to FEDCON levy, include:
      1.
      Unreversed TC 971 AC 647 and current federal contract.
      2.
      Taxpayer interview confirms they are currently a federal contractor. See IRM 5.7.9.2.3, Federal Contractors Identified Through Case Investigation . Request input of the TC 971 AC 647.
      3.
      Certain FPLP cases annotated with TC 971 AC 062. The FPLP TC 971 AC 062 DLN may indicate if the taxpayer is currently receiving federal contractor or vendor payments. See IRM 5.7.9.2.2, further research may be necessary to confirm whether the taxpayer is a current contractor or vendor. Request input of TC 971 AC 647 if confirmed.
      4.
      Taxpayer answers “yes” to question 55, Is the business a Federal Contractor on Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals or question 15, Is the business a Federal Government Contractor , on Form 433-B, Collection Information Statement for Businesses. Request input of the TC 971 AC 647.
      Manual Input of TC 971 AC 647 (FCI):
      Revenue officers should request input of TC 971 AC 647 (FCI) if the case investigation reflects that a taxpayer is currently in a contractual relationship with the federal government and:
      • You have confirmed that the TP has been awarded a federal contract.
      • The master file does not yet contain an unreversed FCI.
      Exception: TC 971 AC 647 should not be input for Medicare providers/suppliers. This is because these providers/suppliers are not federal contractors under IRC section 6330.
      Use the Form 4844 template in ICS to request input of the FCI. The input requires an entry in the field for “contract end date.” If the contract end date is known, request input of that date. If the contract end date is not known, select a date 1 year from the input request date. Conduct further research to ascertain the correct end date.
      Note: There is no requirement that an unreversed TC 971 AC 647 be present on an account before a FEDCON levy is issued but the taxpayer must currently be a federal contractor when the levy is initiated. Request input prior to issuing levy.
      Reversing the TC 971 AC 647 :
      A systemic process posts reversals of the FCI to the Master File once a year for BMF accounts (January) and twice a year for IMF accounts (January and June) based on the expiration of the contract end date. TC 972 AC 647 is posted when the FCI indicator is reversed. Reversals may also be manually input at any time by requesting input of TC 972 AC 647.
      A manual reversal would be appropriate if you determine that the taxpayer federal contract has been completed or the end date has expired. For example:
      • Case investigation and verification supports a finding that the taxpayer has not received any federal payments during the current year.
      • Most recent contract end date has expired.
      • RO determines that the FCI was erroneously input because the taxpayer was never a federal contractor.
      Federal Payment Levy Program (FPLP) Considerations/FPLP Block:
      FPLP incorporated the post-levy CDP FEDCON levy process starting in January 2012. See IRM 5.11.7.2.3.4(4), Levy Service Process , for more information about those cases. FPLP systemically identifies accounts with unreversed FCI annotations, including those accounts in stats 22, 24 and 26. This automated levy program may issue FEDCON levies on cases that are in ACS, the Queue and in RO inventories.
      Generally it may be more effective to allow FPLP to levy the federal payment source under the provisions of IRC 6331(h)(3) rather than using a paper levy under the provisions of IRC 6331(a) because, in federal contractor cases, levies under IRC 6331(a) are not likely to be of continuing effect. FPLP would be the more effective method since IRC section 6331(h)(3) allows for continuous levy of up to one hundred percent (100%) of any specified payment due to a vendor of property, goods or services sold or leased to the Federal government
      Even if FPLP remains in place, consider using a paper FEDCON levy to reach other sources.
      If you contemplate using the FPLP block see IRM 5.11.2.2, Releasing Levies , for guidance about when levy release is appropriate. Document the ICS case history with the reasons when an FPLP block is requested. Current procedures require GM approval of FPLP block requests. See IRM 5.11.7.2.6(1 ) Blocking or Releasing FPLP Levy.
      Collection Statute Considerations:
      When taxpayers file a timely request for CDP hearing, the collection statute is suspended on the periods that are the subject of the CDP even if FEDCON levy action continues for those periods.
      Attachment 2, Guidance to be included in IRM 5.11.1, Background, Pre-Levy Actions, Restrictions on Levy & Post-Levy Actions
      Post-Levy Action - Federal Contractor Levy
      (1) This section contains guidance on post-levy actions for Stat 26 federal contractor levy cases in Field Collection.
      Levy Authority Amended
      The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (SBJA) section 2104, amended IRC section 6330(f) and (h)(2) to allow the collection due process (CDP) notice and hearing to occur post-levy with respect to “federal contractor levies.” This term is defined in section 6330(h)(2) as “…any levy if the person whose property is subject to levy is a Federal contractor.”
      Federal Contractor Levy
      (1) IRC section 6330(h)(2) describes a federal contractor (FEDCON) Levy, as any levy if the person whose property is subject to levy is a Federal contractor. When a FEDCON levy is served, the taxpayer will be given post-levy CDP rights. The taxpayer may seek Tax Court judicial review of the determination resulting from the post-levy hearing.
      (2) Federal contractors are any person or entity who currently has a contract with the federal government to sell or lease property, goods or services. This does not include a taxpayer who was in the past a federal contractor but currently is not involved in any contractual relationship with the federal government. A contract is a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the person or entity to furnish property, goods, or services and the federal executive agency to pay for those property, goods, or services.
      (3) Our computer systems identify some federal contractor cases on the Individual Master File (IMF) and the Business Master File (BMF). Indicators that a person or entity is a federal contractor may include the following:
      • Federal Contractor Indicator. See IRM 5.7.9.2.1, Federal Contractor Indicator (FCI) (unreversed TC 971 AC 647).
      • Federal Payment Levy Program (FPLP), TC 971 AC 062 Document Location Number (DLN). See IRM 5.7.9.2.2 and Exhibit 5.11.7-5, TC 971 AC 062 (Document Locator Number (DLN) Format, Miscellaneous Field, XREF Field).
      • The Federal Payment Levy Program (FPLP) can also issue Federal Contractor (FEDCON) Levies and can be identified by a TC 971 AC 677 posted to the module. See IRM 5.11.7.2.3.4(4).
      Note: Revenue officers can also identify federal contractor cases. See Attachment 1, Identification and General Instructions for FEDCON Levy. This information will be included in IRM 5.7.9.
      Note: The TC 971 AC 062 DLN positions 11 and 12 are also designated with a ‘03’ in the payment position for Medicare payments, and positions 7, 8 &9 will show the federal agency code of ‘0306’ for HHS Medicare match, which are not FEDCON eligible.
      (4) Only the federal contractor may be listed on the FEDCON levy. For federal payments other than Social Security or RRB benefit payments, a FEDCON levy may be issued to any payment source on all BMF tax modules and IMF tax modules if the entity is identified as a Federal contractor with an unreversed TC 971 AC 647 posted on the entity. For BMF tax modules do not include or list the general partners and members of a LLC on the FEDCON levy. For IMF tax modules only include the spouse identified as the federal contractor on filing status 2, married filing joint modules.
      (5) A FEDCON levy may have previously been issued by FPLP. A TC 971 AC 677 will post on the module with the literals “SAL, OTH” displayed in the Miscellaneous Field. This will generate a post-levy CDP notice CP 90C (or 297C) and post a TC 971 AC 069. The taxpayer is provided their CDP appeal rights after the levy. See IRM 5.11.7.2.3.3, FPLP Notice Process (TC 971 AC 069 or AC 169).
      (6) The FEDCON (TC 971 AC 677) levy processes occur after the expiration of the 30-day notice required by IRC 6331(d). The issuance of the CP 504 meets the 30-day pre-levy requirement of IRC 6331(d)
      Issuing Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing in Field Collection FEDCON Case
      (1) When warranted, the Service may exercise its discretion to issue a pre-levy CDP notice on modules eligible for FEDCON levy based upon the unique case factors.
      Examples of unique case factors:
      • The issuance of a pre-levy notice might be advisable if there no contact with the taxpayer within the last 180 days. See IRM 5.11.1.2.2.7, Timeliness of Notice.
      • When the Letter 1058 is issued on initial contact with a BMF or combination BMF/IMF taxpayer when a deadline is set for the taxpayer to take specific action. See IRM 5.11.1.2.2(3), Satisfying the Notice Requirement.
      • When the Letter 1058 will be issued during initial contact on IMF case but a FEDCON levy is not yet appropriate. See IRM 5.11.1.2.2(4).
      Note: The federal contractor exception in IRC 6330(f) applies to a FEDCON levy. Similar to a DETL levy, a FEDCON levy can be served during a timely requested pre or post-levy CDP hearing or judicial review of such hearing to collect tax liabilities (FEDCON tax periods) subject to the hearing. Prior to levying, you are required to determine if Appeals or Counsel has information that prohibits levy (OIC, IA etc.) or may affect the decision to levy. Follow the guidance in IRM 5.1.9.3.15(7) for contacting Appeals or Counsel. FEDCON levies may be issued for any levy source, not just federal payments.
      (2) If the tax period meets the criteria for issuing a FEDCON levy and levy action is determined to be appropriate:
      • Make sure the IRC 6331(d), Notice of Intent to Levy, was properly issued at least 30 days prior to levy action
      Note: This refers to the CP 504 notice or the “Status 58” notice. If the CP 504 notice was not issued, issue the pre-levy CDP notice, L1058. This meets the IRC 6331(d) and IRC 6330 requirement. FEDCON levy can only be issued 30 days after issuance of the L1058 per IRC 6331(d).
      • Document the ICS case history regarding the FEDCON determination.
      Note: When there is no TC 971 AC 069 on the module, ICS will block revenue officer issuance of the FEDCON unless the revenue officer answers yes when ICS prompts with the following: “Final Notice Delivery Date is not 30 days prior to levy. Is this a FEDCON levy? (Yes or No)?”
      (3) Include Letter 1058-F, Post Levy Federal Contractor Collection Due Process with the taxpayer's copy of a FEDCON levy for post-levy CDP notices.
      Caution: If the taxpayer was issued a pre-levy CDP notice (L1058) for the FEDCON tax period(s) being levied, do not issue a post-levy CDP notice (L1058-F).
      (4) Both the post-levy or pre-levy CDP notice must be:
      • Given in person,
      • Left at the taxpayer's home or business, or
      • Sent to the taxpayer's last known address by certified or registered mail return receipt requested.
      Note: Use registered mail only if the taxpayer is outside the United States. There is no international certified mail.
      Note: Where L1058-F has been correctly sent to the taxpayer's last known address and another address is subsequently found, do not send an additional L1058-F, relating to the same tax liability, to the new address.
      Note: If L1058-F is mistakenly sent to an address other than the last known address, immediately send a new L1058-F to the correct last known address.
      (5) Include a copy of the levy, Publication 594, Publication 1660 and Form 12153 with the L1058-F.
      (6) If the L1058-F is issued more than 10-days after issuing the FEDCON, document the reason in the ICS history.
      (7) FEDCON post-levy hearing requests are processed similarly to other hearing requests. Refer to IRM 5.1.9 , Collection Appeal Rights , for guidance in processing hearing requests.
       
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